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Urguhars,

EUROPE

AT THE

OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1860

THE

SPANISH PARLIAMENT

AND THE

CONFISCATION OF CRACOVIA

EUROPE

AT THE

OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1847.

THE

SPANISH MARRIAGES,

AND THE

CONFISCATION OF CRACOW.

DAVID UNWIN

LONDON,

JOHN COLLIER, 25, FLEET STREET.

1847.

25-6

OMISSION, *bottom of p. 131.*

If Rome was rescued from a Cataline, be it also remembered that she was endangered by a Cataline. He, too, was a patrician, and a senator. Rome was mistress of the world; there was no foreign power to seek his help, or aid his enterprise. From out her Senate the danger sprung, yet in that Senate Rome was saved.

1850

EUROPE

AT THE

OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1847.

THE

SPANISH MARRIAGES,

AND THE

CONFISCATION OF CRACOW.

“He had to struggle against the Empress’s false professions of friendship for a country which she wished to see occupied and occupying France in a hot war, while she matured her own projects against Turkey.”

LORD MALMESBURY’S CORRESPONDENCE.

BY


DAVID URQUHART.

LONDON:

JOHN OLLIVIER, 59, PALL MALL.

1847.

329. 60.



OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1847

SPANISH MANIFIESTO

CONFISCATION OF CHURCH

DAVID LINGHART

LONDON

JOHN OLLIVER, 40, FLEET STREET

1847

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LETTER I.

FRANCE ENTRAPPED INTO THE SPANISH MARRIAGES.

SIR,—France for the second time finds herself alone in the world. In the autumn of 1840 her isolation served to effectuate the first partition of Turkey—now it brings the final extinction of Poland. France was supposed then to menace the world, when she herself trembled; now, to have successfully carried into execution a deep design, when she has been surprised into the steps she has taken, and confounded with the consequences that have followed. That the Spanish marriages were no original design, either of France's able Minister, or her dexterous King, is a proposition difficult perhaps of belief, but less difficult surely to admit than the alternative, which is, that the rulers of France are capable of acts which appear rather those of maniacs than of statesmen. The stakes were set, and the bait was placed for them, and they were both stalked and trapped into the snare. In bitterness and pique they made the match in the particular manner that was requisite to raise the outcry, and to cloak their soreness and shame they have pretended a design and claimed a triumph.

In judging of any particular act, we must take into account, in nations, as in individuals, previously ascertained character, and, by so much the more, capacity. Nations of diverse character and race constitute the European society; we are, therefore, to expect extreme inequality in their mental state, and by reason of the diversity of their constitutions, no less inequality in their faculties of concentrating their minds so as to apprehend clearly or to act

consistently. Among such a society, it is not to be expected that there is a struggle going on as between equal antagonists ; but, on the contrary, that some one preponderates, and not by avowed strength, but by concealed dexterity. Some act ; others are only used or are acted upon. That France belongs to the latter class, a glance at past events will suffice to show.

France has been a party to all the great transactions, and some steps she has taken alone. She was a member of the Holy Alliance, but was the last to join it ; it was planned by Russia. She sent an army to Madrid, to put down the constitution in Spain ; her own Minister declared, even in the Chambers, that the step was not her own, and that she acted on compulsion. She attacked Algiers, and occupied the regency ; it was directly and indirectly at the suggestion of Russia. She occupied Ancona ; it was on the invitation of the Pope, (to save him from an Austrian occupation) ; she evacuated it to please Russia. She joined the triple alliance of the 6th of July, for the pacification of the East ; it originated at St. Petersburg, was discussed with England ; it was only communicated to France "to sign or not to sign." She joined the quadruple treaty for the pacification of Spain ; it was settled with Spain and Portugal, and only then communicated to her,* and accepted only because made the absolute condition of the English alliance. In 1839 (July 17th), the

* On the 13th of June, 1835, the *Morning Chronicle* wrote as follows :—

"The conversation occurred on Monday. On the Tuesday, Lord Palmerston framed the articles of a treaty, in which England, Portugal, and Spain only were to be comprised. On Wednesday the draught received the sanction of Earl Grey, and was communicated for consideration, separately, to the members of the Cabinet. In the meantime, it occurred to the author of the draught, that the object in view might be materially facilitated, and the scope of the treaty extended to purposes conducive to the security of peace throughout Europe, if France could be prevailed upon to become one of the principal contracting parties. Her name was added. On Friday the Cabinet deliberated, and resolved in favour of the league. On Saturday it

Powers signed a protocol to act only in common in the affairs of the Levant; yet on the 15th of July, 1840, a treaty which came from St. Petersburg, and was discussed in London, from which she was excluded, was signed. She signed the treaty of the 13th July, 1841, by which she excluded herself from the Dardanelles at all times, having, in 1833, protested against a secret treaty between Russia and Turkey, to exclude her during wars! The treaty of 1841, like that of 1840, was sent from St. Petersburg. In no case had she an original conception or scheme; she has been always overreached; and Minister after Minister broken at home in consequence of failures abroad. In Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Africa, Poland, Germany, Spain, she has been incessantly at work, but never as the result of the use of her own reason. On her, never by her, was exerted influence; wherever France appears on the stage, it is Russia that has furnished her her rôle.

The results of a measure, or a series of measures, present another chain of evidence by which to judge of their source. The Spanish marriages have not benefited France. They have afforded the occasion of extinguishing Poland without risk, and they have placed France in the most painful and alarming position. The Power which is recognised to be the ablest in Europe profits, all the others are injured; for who

received the sanction of the King. On Sunday a note from Lord Palmerston assembled the Ministers of the three Powers at his house in Stanhope-street, where he produced the draught. It was so plainly calculated for the interests of all parties," &c.

This treaty had been hitherto represented throughout Europe as French. The *Chronicle* proceeds:—

“ Talleyrand has hitherto been deemed the author of this treaty. For the name of that Prince, the people of England will feel some little pride in substituting for the future that of the Foreign Secretary of the Whig Cabinet
* * * Yet this is the only man in our Cabinet whom the apostate *Times*, the drivelling *Herald*, the *Russian Gazette* of Augsburgh, the misguided *Post*, and the reckless, though able *Standard*, have confederated to put down!”

can doubt that Austria and Prussia suffer not less than England and France? Here then, as in all previous transactions, the axiom of the *Quarterly Review* applies, namely, that since Russia has commenced to interfere in the affairs of Europe and Asia, "The tools with which she works are the cabinets and statesmen of Europe." * * *

The Montpensier marriage has brought for France—not the glory of having overreached England—not the satisfaction of having avenged the Treaty of July—not the revival of the authority of Louis XIV.—not addition of power from her preponderance in Spain—not additional importance in Europe from newly-acquired strength, and suddenly revealed dexterity. Yet, a few weeks ago, no less were the claims of the French Government and the assertions of its organs. But, instead, France is protested against by England for a violation of the public treaties of Europe; this blow is followed by a similar one from the northern Powers. To detach Austria from England she made concessions respecting Switzerland, to the great disgust of a powerful party within; the sacrifice is without avail. She panders to Russia and shuts up Polish printing presses; equally in vain. Her alliance with the revolutionary dynasty in Spain is followed immediately by a matrimonial alliance of Austria with the Duc de Bordeaux—now *pretender to the French throne*; whilst the official organs of the British Government speak to her King of subverted dynasties! The northern Powers seize upon Cracow, and even this does not suffice to rally to her England. Her advances are scorned, and she, first protested against, has to excite by a cold and unmeaning remonstrance, at once the contempt of her people and the anger of her late allies. The obloquy of this disaster falls on the King, who by his desire to gain a dowry and a Princess for a younger son, has broken the alliance with England "on which rested the peace of the world," and tempted the

* Sir John Macneill, in *Quarterly Review*, No. CV.

northern Powers to this act, from which springs a compact for spoliation of states and thralldom over principles affecting France in her institutions and her rights, and ultimately directed against her very existence. Spain, the *fons malorum*, instead of a prop at her side, proves a millstone around her neck, and the matrimonial bond, a halter round that of her King.*

I am here giving no *ex post facto* explanation. On the very day on which the intelligence reached this country of the sequestration of Cracow (Nov. 16), it was stated by the *Times* that France was so humiliated in consequence of the Spanish marriage (the feelings thereby produced in England), that there was no indignity that she would not have to undergo; that abjectly bartering sacrifices for some apparent signs of good will from the northern Powers, which should cover the disaster of her quarrel with England—she was ready to “*surrender every thing from Cracow to Constantinople.*” She is then threatened with war from England, and that threat is put forth as occasioning her humiliation before the northern Powers. War is not to be made because of the Montpensier marriage, but it is to flow indirectly from it! The writer in the *Times* does not say this is a case for war; he does admit that the people of England care little on the subject; but yet the actual rupture, the foreshadowed and now accomplished humiliation, and the prospective war, are all clear and inevitable consequences of the “despicable deception” practised by the King of France and his Minister upon England.

The article is so very extraordinary, as a statement of the case, as an anticipation of events, and a specimen of rea-

* “Il ne tiendra pas à l’entente cordiale qu’elle ne les serve dis liens d’hyménée pour étranger l’influence Française en Espagne.”—*Charivari*. September.

Kings and jesters have changed places. The cap and bells have become the last refuge of common sense.

soning, that I subjoin some extracts. I do so for another reason ; this journal in opposition to the Government, in its most startling propositions reiterates the Minister's conversation in private. The *Times* proclaims to the world the novel doctrine of an indirect war, and announces it with certainty.* Lord Palmerston informs, in secret, the representatives of Foreign Powers, that war with France will be a prospective result of the proceedings in Spain.

The connection, then, of the Montpensier marriage, and the sequestration of Cracow is established. It has brought the humiliation of France before the northern Powers, and her readiness to surrender, as announced beforehand, and (so far) justified by the result, everything “from Cracow to Constantinople.” But this humiliation is the result of change *common to England and to France*. The quarrel between them has humiliated the one—it has then also humiliated the other. England, by her quarrel

* “The English people, without attaching an excessive interest or importance to the person of a Spanish Infanta, or the dynastic schemes of the house of Orleans, have witnessed with indignation an example of despicable deception, the more painful to them because it was practised by a Sovereign and a Minister who heretofore enjoyed an amount of respect in this country not often paid to foreign rulers. * * * It is of importance *to provide against* the possibility of a war arising out of the indirect consequences of these events, which the original event itself did not cause or justify. Neither the people of England nor the people of France will go to war if they can help it, and they will infallibly call to a hard account any Minister who may have rendered such a catastrophe inevitable. * * * It has prostrated the French Cabinet before the northern Powers. Their alliance, or at least their encouragement or acquiescence, was to be sought for on any terms, in proportion as the good will and support of the English Cabinet were lost. That is the object to which the whole ability of the French Cabinet is now directed. * * * The French Government are aware that they must be prepared to submit to any conditions, and to pocket any indignities. They have begun at Vienna. * * * In like manner, it is not improbable that Prussia may be propitiated by an abandonment of the position taken up by France in the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark : and, to obtain the signal honour of a Russian Ambassador in Paris, the Court of Neuilly *is ready to surrender anything that may be required from Cracow to Constantinople !*”—*Times*, Nov. 16.

with France, is reduced to the same necessity as France by her quarrel with England. Both conjointly have surrendered Cracow, and will surrender Constantinople.

But did the Montpensier marriage entail this rupture *rude*? Did the French Government practise on England a "despicable deception?" This is denied on the one side, and asserted on the other. After a careful examination of the subject, I have come to the conclusion, that no such deception was practised, but, on the contrary, that the French Government was the victim, as on every former occasion, of a conspiracy, and that the purpose for which she was practised upon speaks for itself in the humiliation of both countries, and their common surrender to the aggression of the north. This conclusion is to be tested by the truth or falsehood of the allegations against France, by which were engendered the mutual exasperation. The examination of this point is of vital importance, not to this country only, but to the human race; for Russia's ambition can only be checked by laying bare her process and exposing her instruments.

When the intelligence reached this country that Louis Philippe *had disposed of the hand of the Queen of Spain to facilitate the marriage of his son with her sister*, there was a case presented sufficient to have excited the disgust and awakened the animosity of the people the least susceptible to the dignity of Crowns or the honour of females, and the least jealous of the pretensions of a compeer or the encroachments of a rival. There was also that which might have been calculated to excite the gravest indignation against the British Government which had suffered this indignity to be put by one of our allies upon another. Moreover there seemed no occasion for the act, for England had already assented to the marriage of the French Prince and the Spanish Princess, and it was in consequence of some minor squabble that the French Government had taken those

most unwarrantable means of hurrying the match alone and in defiance of the British Minister. The event, however, did excite no interest. The marriage of the Queen was scarcely noticed; what was said was about the marriage of the Princess. The provincial press spoke of it, without exception, as a matter to which England was wholly a stranger—and the metropolitan press characterised it as a transaction which must involve France in great embarrassments in Spain, and the King of the French in great embarrassments at home. Neither did the Whigs reproach their opponents with having suffered this intrigue against Spain to have progressed while they were in office, nor did the Conservative journals reproach their antagonists with having suffered it to be accomplished, on their return to power.

There was one exception. Lord Palmerston unites, as no other Minister has done before him, the power of acting secretly for the nation, with that of misrepresenting through the press his acts. We are under the necessity of tracking his footsteps no less by the columns of the daily press, than in public acts and official documents. The case is, indeed, rendered more complex and difficult, but the field of evidence is also enlarged. Wherever the King of the French was vehemently denounced, and the English Government asserted to have been outwitted and overreached, Lord Palmerston's hand may be traced; the tone and language of his organs have been that of a virulent opposition, exaggerating the case it had to make out against an obnoxious Government. He alone, then, got up the agitation in England against France, and for that purpose he put forth two accusations, and by them he obtained the result—the first, that the French Government had dealt treacherously with England; the second, that it had violated the Treaty of Utrecht.

An agreement had been entered into between the French Government and the Tory Administration, the chief stipu-

lations of which were, that a Bourbon Prince of Spain was to marry the Queen, and the Duc de Montpensier the Infanta, England renouncing a previously suggested project of putting forth Prince Leopold of Coburg as candidate for the Queen's hand, and France consenting to postpone for a year the marriage with the Princess, or until there had been issue from the Queen. The English Government was thus a party to the marriage of the Princess Louise with the Duc de Montpensier, and delay was the condition which was placed against the renunciation by England of the Coburg Prince. When Lord Palmerston came into office, the French Government applied to him to know if he was content with the arrangements entered into with his predecessors. *To this communication he made no reply.* After waiting for a full month, the French Embassy in London pressing him, he assigned as reason for his silence the intrigues of France in Spain. If this was true, it was for him to have charged the French Government then with the fraud, to have demanded explanations, to have had the matter cleared up; but how could there be any frauds on the part of the French Government until (it being put to him), he had sanctioned or disavowed the compact? His silence was a slight which must have tended to incite France to act alone, and his subsequent reply was an outrage; and both coincided to provoke France into doing what she did do—act as if there had been no compact. He himself put forward at Madrid Prince Leopold of Coburg,* and the public journals of London re-echo in their columns the calumnies and insults privately addressed to Paris. Upon this the French Government proceeds, as is usual with modern French Governments, not to clear themselves by a simple statement of the facts, not to bring home his perfidy to the British Minister, but

* “ *The accident* of Lord Palmerston's having named the Coburg Prince first, in a despatch in which he enumerated the rival suitors, and the appearance of our own observations on the 7th of August, in which we de-

to take a pettish silly revenge. They fall into the trap laid for them. Such is the story of the marriage.

The facts are not doubtful. It is not denied by Lord Palmerston's organ that the French Government applied to him first—that they put it to him to continue or not to continue the agreement entered into with his predecessor. It is not asserted that he replied in the affirmative. It is not denied that he returned no answer ; and therefore, without referring to the putting forward of the Prince of Coburg at Madrid, or the insults in the *Times*, the *Chronicle*, and the despatches to Paris, the French Government was clearly discharged from the compact with England, and free, as regarded her, to pursue its own course.

The charge of duplicity was therefore groundless, and could not have been made in error. It was a fabrication founded on a dilemma in which he had placed the French Minister, and of this the proof is inevitable in his having himself in his own organs represented as having been overreached.

Now as to the violation of the Treaty of Utrecht.

monstrated that the Coburg Prince had nothing in common with the royal family of England, were seized upon as important disclosures of a design to wrest the throne of Spain from the descendants of Philip V. We are, indeed, now enabled to comprehend the immoderate importance which was attached by the French official press to our own remarks on that occasion. They were at first directly attributed to a leading member of the English Cabinet, and when we had disposed of that falsehood, they were as falsely described as a species of Downing-street manifesto. The intention of this and many similar exaggerations is now perfectly evident. It was thought that they might be used hereafter as proofs of duplicity on the part of Lord Palmerston, and our article is now deliberately brought forward by the *Journal des Débats* for this very purpose. The whole structure of this invention is as loose and groundless as the allegation it is intended to support. If the whole *defence of the policy* of Louis Philippe rests on the alleged *preference* of the British Government for Prince Leopold of Coburg, it is false, not only in the whole, but in every part.”—*Times*, Nov. 2.

If Lord Palmerston held the marriage to be a violation of that Treaty, it became his part on his return to office to liberate his country from the understanding with France which sanctioned it; but in breaking that understanding so as to release the French Government from its conditions, he left it a tie over England, since he made the violation of it a charge against France; the charge, then, is made, like the former one, in fraud.

The Treaty of Utrecht deals not with marriages but with successions, and the consequences of this marriage are among the cases for which the Treaty of Utrecht was framed to provide. If the Treaty of Utrecht were a bar to such a marriage, that Treaty could itself be no longer in force, since similar marriages have already taken place.*

A dauphin of France married, in 1745, a heiress to the Crown of Spain; so much nearer the Treaty of Utrecht, when the danger did exist of the junction of those Crowns which it had been the purpose of that Treaty to prevent, and in the case of a direct heir to the one Crown and an immediate heiress to the other, England made no discovery of the disturbance of the balance of power, or of injury to Spain, of preponderance of France, or of violation of the Treaty of Utrecht. If it be violated now, so must it have been on the 23rd of January, 1745; so on the 21st of January, 1721; so on the 25th of August, 1739, when similar marriages were contracted; and a treaty (the base morality and vague phraseology of the times forces one to repeat) once violated is thereafter worthless, except for those who, by protest, save their rights—otherwise the infraction becomes precedent. A treaty broken in one point is null in all, and infringed with impunity by one of the parties, is binding on none. What dexterity, therefore, was

* After a month's iteration of the word "violation;" and after all the fruits are obtained, the *Chronicle* discovers that it has made a "mistake." So, after the *Times* has accomplished its prophesied surrender of Cracow, it calls upon France and England to join and resist Russia in the East!

requisite to make, out of a similar marriage, a quarrel between two nations of grown-up men?

But the Treaty of Utrecht was not between England and France. It was a public European act. It was not for one power alone to decide upon its infraction. Lord Palmerston had to refer an alleged violation, first to the legal authorities at home, then to take counsel with the other parties; and then the steps, whatever they might be, had to be taken in common.

Was there any course but this—and who could imagine if Lord Palmerston had taken it, or so much as announced his dissatisfaction with the compact, or his opposition to the marriage, that France would not have desisted? The dotation of the younger son would not have stood against a quarrel with England, not to say a quarrel with the rest of Europe. The case would then have stood over, at least until a decision.

As in July, 1840, M. Thiers would have been too happy to have joined the treaty had it been allowed him—so now would they have been too glad to have given up the marriage, had the consequences been hinted at. In the one and the other case it never entered into their minds to anticipate what was coming. Lord Palmerston carefully concealed his game; the batteries were all masked until the fitting moment; as the Moors at the battle of Isly, the French Government sees only a little manœuvring among their friends, and it is not until the muzzles are at their breasts that the volley is poured. Lord Palmerston had supposed and admitted the compact to be violated, when it was not, and had not cared about it. Of Utrecht he had not spoken a word; the marriage is hurried on, and as soon as settled, then he breaks silence, and France discovers that *she* has practised a base deception on England, and violated the public law of Europe.

But, after all, the Treaty of Utrecht *has ceased to have*

any binding power or legal existence since the year 1793 ! How perfect must be the knowledge of Lord Palmerston of the European intelligence with which he has to deal ! Amid all this fierce contention no one lays his finger on this point : yet the Treaty of Utrecht has no more to do with the case than a treaty between Rome and Carthage. Treaties cease and determine on the occurrence of war, unless revived at the peace. The Treaty of Utrecht was not revived in 1815,* and has therefore passed away from the body of European law.

Lord Palmerston has succeeded in this extraordinary enterprise, by his double position as editor and Minister. Labouring in the press, he got up the rancour, for which, as Minister, he had furnished the occasion.

The use of a press, formerly, by a Government, was defensive ; and an organ connected with the Government was particularly restrained and hampered by the connection. The present Minister makes use of his antagonists, and the journals immediately connected with himself are specially useful to taunt and exasperate foreign Powers. He sends an insulting note, and accompanies it by an insulting leader, or a letter reaches the papers in Paris simultaneously with a note sent to the French Embassy in London, promulgating its contents, and his organ in London then charges the French Government with the indecent act. At home he can, day by day, assert, deny, contradict, give intelligence true or false, blow hot and cold in the same or in different papers, and who can trace in all this his hand or purpose ? Morning and evening the shuttle plies backwards and forwards, and each thread of deception covers the last. Is there not here enough to stultify any home public, or to drive wild any foreign Government ?

* In Article CVII., an article of the Treaty of Utrecht, bearing on the delimitations of Portuguese and French Guiana, is mentioned, but only as a record.

Like the Parliament, the press formerly exposed and resisted, now it screens, the governing power. Parliament has only screened corruption; the press spreads delusion. His friends (that is to say, the partizans of the faction he affects) as well as foes, hold Lord Palmerston to be "a dangerous man"—this can only mean that his purposes are inscrutable; for no avowed purpose of one man can be dangerous. The press, then, serves him at once to cover and advance his ends. Walpole invented and added to the science of government the mysteries of exchange and finance; Lord Palmerston has added his branch to the arts of government, characterised by Lord Lyttelton as practices which Government was originally instituted to put down. The mysteries of finance, however, served only to attain mean ends, which appeared on the very surface—to secure a Minister in office—to serve the interests of a party—to put money in the pocket of a man. The purposes for which the fourth estate is now absorbed into the Cabinet are of a higher order. It reveals no less than an attempt to grasp and pervert the intellectual powers of man; and practical, no less than abstract, it brings events from thoughts, it establishes, upsets, changes, readjusts,—it commands the relations of community and community, and embracing the universe in its design, moves the whole human race by its action. Peace or war may now depend on the issue of a negotiation, not with an empire, but with a newspaper.

Such are the results of secrecy. No one knows who in a Cabinet acts or advises—no one knows who writes in a newspaper. The nation knows not what is done with it by its Government, nor the parties what is done with them by their leaders.

The action of Lord Palmerston does not date from his return to office. He had prepared beforehand the whole measures in Spain while formerly Minister, and had continued to direct them while out of office. There the Am-

bassador whom he had appointed, and whom he had raised to that station in a manner out of ordinary course, and because an instrument peculiarly fitted for his purpose, was retained by the Conservative Government. All other Ambassadors, though men of high standing, and not political partizans, were displaced—but in Spain, where his policy had been the subject of the vehement assaults and unbounded reprobation of his antagonists, his agent is kept. The Tory Administration was not in the secret of the agents of England in Spain. While Lord Aberdeen, at the Chateau d'Eu, was declaring that England would not consent to putting forward a Prince of Coburg—in Spain it was received as a truth, sanctioned by all the authority which in that country diplomatic inuendoes can convey, that a concert existed between France and England to divide between them the two sisters. It was by a year of menace of this degradation, that the proposal of France, when finally made, was rendered endurable, for they conceived it a relief to have only one foreigner, and a gain to have one Spanish prince. The English Ambassador at Madrid, on the announcement of the decision of the Spanish Government, immediately manifests ill-humour, and writing a letter to the Opposition to be published in the press, in which he insults the future Prince Consort, gives to the marriage of the Duke de Montpensier that share of popularity which every measure must have in Spain, which is known to be distasteful to either France or England, yet he takes care to paralyse opposition to the marriages in the Cortes, by refusing that whispered assent without which a Spanish opposition has been long unaccustomed to move. The official organ in London thunders forth denunciations and appeals to arms: dropping the editorial mask, it tells Spain that “*the means of negotiation are exhausted,*” points to the arms and money, marines and Legion lent to Christino, and as now possibly available against her, and invites Narvaez “to become a second

Bolivar." That this appeal may appear the public voice of England, the leading journal re-echoes the note, and inquires whether the "Maria Theresa of her age is to find no Hungary in her dominions?" France insulted before, is now alarmed, and turns to *Russia*. A commercial treaty with the Czar is hurried on, and to show her devotion, it is carried into execution before ratification.

This marriage, crowns and sums up a whole era of intrigue in Spain, fixes the fate of that devoted country, and converts it into an arena of strife for years: yet after all, it is but the stepping-stone to something else. It is no sooner accomplished than it is forgotten by us, in the consequences that it brings. This long-laboured for and fatal consummation is but the germ of mightier troubles on another field—which I shall crave your indulgence to enter on to-morrow.

I remain, Sir, &c.

December 7th, 1846.

January 18, 1847.

P.S.—The documents now published confirm in every point my statements and conclusions made public in this letter more than a month before. It will suffice, to extract the following passage to show the position of France at the origin :—

"The marriage of the Queen of Spain is the only question between England and France, which is at present important, and may become perplexing. Let us cut short this perplexity. You were perfectly right in affirming, that the sons of D. Francisco de Paulo suited us. * * * * * If the English cabinet approves and adopts this policy, we are ready to act in concert with England, in order to put it efficaciously into practice."—*M. Guizot to Comte Jarnac, July 20, 1846.*

LETTER II.

THE SEPARATE PROTEST.

SIR,—When the intelligence reached France and England that Cracow had been confiscated, *it was disbelieved*. An hour of suspense was followed by a burst of indignation. The French Minister, in announcing to the British Ambassador at Paris the common disaster, has lost sight of the Montpensier marriage. As great must have been his astonishment, in being told by the British Ambassador that this was the very case of which he had warned him, and that this was the very fruit of the Montpensier marriage, as when he found that in effectuating that marriage, *he* had broken the compact with England, and violated the treaty of Utrecht!

Lord Normanby's reply to M. Guizot is thus given in the *Chronicle*:—

“When France concluded the Montpensier marriage, in violation of the treaty of Utrecht, and in the face of a formal protest of England, he (Lord Normanby) had intimated to the French Minister, *that should* any event hereafter arise which called for the intervention of France and England, it could not be expected that England would concur in any joint action, but would reserve to herself the liberty of acting separately.”

The English Ambassador is not overwhelmed with the intelligence, but is ready for it. It is instantly seized upon, not to re-unite the two countries, but to re-allege a charge that was false, and to exhibit a recklessness in the pursuit of a purpose of insult, which no consideration of duty or danger could restrain. No Ambassador could

have spoken thus, unless instructed; therefore the English Minister had provided for an event of which he represents himself as being in ignorance, and his act is but the application of a previously uttered, but ambiguously worded threat.

A remarkable passage in the *Presse* has appeared in the London journals of this morning, which affords me the opportunity at once of exposing the latest fallacy, and confirming from their own mouth, the conclusion in my letter, published by you this day. The *Presse*, in commenting on a statement made by the *Augsburgh Gazette* to the effect, "That the Governments of France and England could not have been surprised at a measure which has been an accomplished fact for several months past," says, "*One fact, however, appears from this statement, which we ought carefully to remember, and which is, that the Spanish marriages and the rupture of the cordial understanding, had no reference to the resolution of the three Courts, since that resolve preceded these events.*"

How could the anterior date of the resolution respecting Cracow disprove the connection; it is on the priority of that date that the connection stands. If the Northern Powers had acted, as Lord Palmerston says, "with alacrity" on the occurrence of a rupture between England and France, there would have been no connection except that of *propter quia postea*. It might then have been a charge which in other times would have endangered the head of a British Minister, if, out of a groundless quarrel of his own making, he had entailed upon his country such consequences; but the connection that is asserted, and which the article in the *Presse* is penned to meet, is this—that the Northern Powers, having planned the confiscation of Cracow, the quarrel was, with guilty purpose and design, brought about by Lord Palmerston to facilitate it; and this charge the sentence in the *Presse* does substantiate;

for the only point in which the evidence was hitherto incomplete was the priority of the decision with respect to Cracow. That decision could not have been carried into effect until they were assured that they should be able to paralyse England and France, and prevent their acting in common. That decision, it now appears, was taken several months ago, while another Ministry existed in England. *Why was it not then carried into effect?* The troops were already in Cracow. Why did they wait to proclaim their intention? They waited for a rupture between England and France. Has this come to them as a piece of good fortune? They waited until they were enabled through Louis Philippe himself, to bring into office in England THE FRIEND OF POLAND. He finds England and France again in amicable relations, and a compact concluded between them in respect to the only matter of present moment which might have endangered their unanimity. What prospect, then, was there for the Northern Powers, of that rupture which should enable them to confiscate Cracow? None whatever, unless *he* had come into office. He traps the French Government into a false position, breaks the compact, charges them with having broken it, and, working the press, the two countries are instantaneously driven into exasperation—the one by the falsehood he has made it believe against the other, the other by the perfidious calumny of which it finds itself the object. Here is the quarrel. Now, the confiscation of Cracow can be proclaimed; but the French Government and nation, stunned by the blow at Cracow, immediately offer him co-operation, and seek his aid. It was for this that the confiscation of Cracow was not pressed until he came into office. He has done for Russia, by a few lines on a page of paper, what all her Baskirs and all her Calmucks never could have accomplished.

Lord Palmerston had flatly contradicted the *Presse*.

On first announcing his determination, through the columns of the *Chronicle*, not to act with France, he declared that the Northern Powers had only *followed her* example:—“The *disregard* of treaties *commenced* by France in the Montpensier marriage, and now *followed up* by the Northern Powers in the annexation of Cracow, is sufficient to startle all thinking men, *and almost to destroy* the faith which has hitherto been placed in the treaties upon which the present position of Europe rests. The French Government show that the *alacrity* shown by the Northern Powers in *following* its own bad example has given it great concern.”

Had it been known at the time that the confiscation of Cracow had been determined on, every one would have seen the purpose of quarrelling with France. If they do not now see it, it is not from want of evidence, but from a certain evil practice, that of forming opinions day by day upon events as they occur. *

An essential distinction has hitherto manifested itself between transactions when England and France were conjointly concerned in the East and in the West. They have never acted in common in the one region or in the other, without falling into rivalries and jealousies. In the East, however, their mistakes have been hitherto accompanied with one favourable chance—the presence and successes of a third power have served, from time to time, to reunite them. In the West, their jealousies were undi-

* The Russian Chargé d’Affaires attended the recent *fête* at M. Guizot’s. It was a matter of astonishment how he should have gone there when all the other Ambassadors abstained from the insult to the Turkish Government, of recognising the Bey of Tunis as an independent Prince. Everybody was satisfied next morning that M. Kissilief was Chargé d’Affaires, and not Ambassador, and thus they accounted for an act by his not being the Ambassador of Russia, which was to be accounted for only by his being the representative of Russia. If they would only wait they would see why he went.

verted from each other, and their faults without redemption. At present the storm produced by a flimsy lie in Spain, is instantly hushed before a Northern move made to the Eastward. The disposition indeed of two nations that can be disposed of in the dark, matters little: be it, however, recorded, that, as yet, the feelings of the two nations remain unchanged, and they have on this occasion turned to each other, if not with the sympathies of freemen, at least with the instincts of men.*

The rancour of France against England was a *bonà fide* rancour in presence of the awful final disappearance of a nation, and the relapse of the European nations into a *societas leonum*. That rancour is instantly hushed. In England the animosity being fictitious, remains unchanged. The two countries have become the two presses, and while the press in France does represent the feelings of the nation, the press of London represents only the purposes of the Foreign Minister, and it has the same cue as Lord Normanby in his dialogue with M. Guizot.

What must have been the calculated effect of spurning her sympathies and rejecting her aid? The Montpensier marriage was a passing incident. Cracow, and in Cracow Poland, and in Poland the public law of Europe, and in that public law the existence of every state, and the sense of right in each human being, are not passing incidents, and every step taken by England in reference to them, remains indelible; and instead of being effaced by subsequent events, stands the pivot on which all future things will hinge.

An event, above all others calculated to unite the two Governments, had real differences existed, has no such effect; unanimity within each of those countries, and

* An organ of Lord Palmerston says:—"The present enthusiasm throughout France for the liberation of Cracow, far greater and more universal than anything of the kind felt in this country, does honour to the French."

between them both, produces no results, and an act of aggression of the three Northern Powers against the two great constitutional States, throws them into no embarrassment as to how they were to deal with the three Powers, but into the greatest embarrassment between themselves. It is one of those cases in which men seek a solution in the stars, because to trace their sequence upon earth is above the grasp of their intelligence, or below the level of their morality. There is no difference between England and France on the subject matter. They are agreed as to what they are to do ; to what they do they attach no importance, and they know that no importance will be attached to it by the opposite party. Their protest is no more than a "Leader," with the loss of the editorial "we," and with the disadvantage of what is only, after all, an editorial signature. How, then, should the case present any embarrassment? If the question had been asked beforehand, who could have answered? Their embarrassment lies on this needle's point—shall they protest conjointly or separately.

But this was a case which admitted of no ambiguity, a line of conduct is fixed by the forms of office and by the laws. The Treaty of Vienna is a general compact of all the Powers of Europe ; not merely the eight Powers who signed the general treaty, but all and every separate State constituted according to the separate treaties which are included in it, are parties to the general treaty. A violation of such a compact must be decided to be so by the parties in common. Their *separate* opinion is of no value. England and France had to take measures in common with the other parties to that treaty. It is not in the province of the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department to decide upon the violation of a treaty. Is Europe to depend on one country's act, or England on one man's caprice, will, error, or perfidy, in such a contingency as this? If so,

indeed, must our ancestors have been mad, who laid down for such cases, forms so stringent, and laws so provident. That duty belongs to the law officers of the Crown. It is for him, the Secretary of (the Council of) State, to submit the case. To neglect to do so—or to act upon their decision is an impeachable offence. The British Minister had to submit the case to a judicial decision, and to put it in the course of legal procedure. Until this was done nothing could be done, and this could neither be evaded nor delayed, except in defiance of the law. This neglect was a crime surpassing in guilt and consequences the accumulation of those for which the penalty of human life is paid in the course of a century.

The only doubt, which in a *bonâ fide* transaction could have presented itself to the Cabinet of England, was the disposition of France. Without her aid it might be a question whether England could break up the coalition of the Northern Powers, and enforce reparation, without having recourse to war. If France, through irritation, or desiring to get rid of a treaty that had been framed to strip her of her conquests, had turned against England, there would have been a difficulty presented to the British Ministry. France lost to us, the secondary Powers could scarcely be expected to venture to take their stand with England;* so that she might be left alone to act. A glorious occasion, indeed; but still one of that hazardous kind which it requires genius and a will to lead to a favourable issue.

No such doubt or difficulty was here. France besought England for aid and co-operation. Put then the case of any ordinary person, Minister of England—say a farmer, or a shopkeeper—say, if you will, Lord Aberdeen—what could have happened, if not an instantaneous concurrence with France, which must have carried with it at once the

* This was written before the intelligence arrived of the effect produced in Germany, Sweden, and Turkey.

whole of Europe. And, therefore, Russia waited till the proper man was Minister in England. The circumstances of the last Polish war were reproduced, as the result will be. Then the general movement of Europe and of Asia was paralysed by one man, who now again holds in his hands the fate of the world.

When I said that unanimity prevailed in the journals and in opinion in France, I did not overlook "an avowed Russian organ,"—called so by the *Times* (and, of course, by the same authority denied to be so). This paper deplores the infatuation of France, and hails the rupture of these treaties, so dear to England and so noxious to France, and specially argues against the importance which France attaches to a joint protest. Alone across the Channel it concurs with Lord Palmerston. It argued for a separate protest; at one time, on the plea that it would be more efficacious in support of the treaties, at another on that of its being more efficacious in getting rid of them. The same course is likewise pursued by those different journals in England that ostensibly represent or really support the policy of the Foreign Minister.

" facies non omnibus una

Nec diversa tamen qualem decet esse sororum."

MORNING CHRONICLE.

" Now, England is not prepared to go to war for the independence of Cracow. England is not prepared to abet France in breaking the treaty of Vienna on the Rhine, or beyond the Alps, because the Northern Powers have broken it at Cracow. We do not think that any English Minister would be prepared to subscribe to the inferences which French politicians draw from the conduct of the Northern Powers. *And unless we are prepared for all*

LA PRESSE.

" *Of what consequence is it whether the protest be made conjointly or individually? The principal point is, that it should be made, and that the two great constitutional Governments which have participated in the arrangement of the treaty of Vienna, should protest against the most flagrant violation of the most precise article of that treaty. France and England are not, in fact, in the same position with respect to the treaties of Vienna.*

this, and for a great deal more, for which we are quite as little prepared, it would be very difficult for England to unite with France in what is termed "joint action" upon this question. Nor do we think that such a protest as England ought to make on this question would derive, just now, any additional weight from being in the shape of a joint protest. What this country says to Russia will not have less effect (!) because France, instead of saying it along with us, says the same thing the day before or the day after."

England suggested, and we may say, dictated them, against us. England owes to them the preponderance which she exercises in Europe; and England is, moreover, the ally of Austria, which profits by the spoliation just consummated. England, therefore, has great interest in the maintenance of the treaties of Vienna. *France, on the contrary, feels an opposite interest. The three Northern Courts have broken her chains and the instrument of her degradation."*

To protest separately is, of course, no matter of Whig or of Tory opinion; the suggestion of a separate protest, though appearing in different organs, could only have come from the Foreign Minister. In fact, they announced the decision taken before they began to argue upon the point. Consequently, the Russian organ in Paris, and the organs of Lord Palmerston in London, coincide with each other, and are severally distinct from the remainder of their respective countries.

The measure thus recommended by the Russian organ in Paris, and the organs of Lord Palmerston in London, is that which has converted the act of the three Powers into a source of embarrassment between the two. On the one side were, first:—The forms of office and of law; secondly:—The opportunity of restoring the union of England and France; thirdly:—The coalition of all the other Powers of Europe against those who had violated the Treaty of Vienna. On the other hand there is, first:—The infraction of the duties of his office and the forms of business; secondly:—The conversion of the act of the three Powers into a new source of quarrel between France and England; thirdly:—The prostrating of the

second-rate Powers, and constraining them into a silent acknowledgment of this aggression. It could not be blindly that the option was made.

The Protest being separate, has of course no effect. The disunion of France and England, revealed by the mere fact, bears at once its fruit. The indignation throughout Germany, Prussia, Austria, is subjugated by the knowledge that the nations they must have looked to as the protectors of Poland and as the avengers of this deed, are themselves divided. This indignation is thus prevented from coming to bear upon their own Governments, so as to detach them from the alliance as must otherwise have happened. The secondary Powers, who are the first to feel, as they are now directly menaced, lose at once all heart and courage, and as it is a case in which no man can remain neutral, by the fact of their not joining in the protest they are made partakers in and partisans of the wrong. This position Lord Palmerston has confirmed by sending to each of them a copy of his Protest—that unparalleled document so called, which, as we shall presently see, is a subterfuge and not a Protest. The humiliation is not made out of the occasion, it has been prepared beforehand. In the course of last session the British Minister took occasion to make a speech upon Cracow, in which, while these events were foreshadowed, and the future conduct of France predetermined, he left no man in ignorance that such a step as that which has been taken, was the last of outrages that could be perpetrated against England and France; so that this was the end, the last limit of possible endurance, and this passed, nothing could be henceforward done by them or expected from them. I again repeat that on the very day on which the intelligence arrived in London, these words were printed:—"Surrender everything from Cracow to Constantinople." These words were set down, not as a charge brought against Lord Palmerston,

but in defending his policy, which had brought this result. This was published, too, upon the very day that France had offered to England the effacing of the cause of this humiliation—by a cordial alliance to defend both Cracow and Constantinople.

What signifies the protest of France after she has been protested against by England? What signifies the protest of England, after she has protested against France in vain, and then accepted what she protested against? Besides, what are England and France that they should presume to speak in such a cause? It is long since they have been put out of court. Before they can recover themselves here or in any case, justice must be done at home on their faithless servants. Is it after Chusan and Istaliff and Cabool and Passages and St. Sebastian and Dahara and Constantine and Tangier, that the Governments of these two buccaneering States can address themselves to deal with a question of law or of humanity? England and France may copy Russia, but it will only be in morality; they have not yet discovered the art of profiting by their crimes, far less of turning the crimes of others to account.

Lord Palmerston being Minister, a joint protest could have been of no practical avail as against Russia. But a separate protest, besides all those effects abroad, carries other consequences at home. It is now a conclusion in the mind of every man in England, that henceforward, no occasion however great, no duty however solemn, no insult however gross, no perfidy however base, no danger however menacing, no union of interests however intimate—no community of policy, no necessity of self-defence, can ever bring these two nations together, or outweigh the secret, inscrutable, mysterious animosity or fate that keeps them apart.

I conclude by entreating special attention to the point,

that the knot of the difficulty, *the separate protest*, was prepared beforehand. The instantaneous act of Lord Palmerston in London—it had already been announced by “*his*” ambassador in Paris, and then only recalled as giving an interpretation to ominous and mysterious words used on a prior occasion. Not only was the sequestration of Cracow prosecuted concurrently with the marriages in Spain, but the detailed process of the conduct of the posterior event was completely settled and provided for in the inception of the prior one.

If it be objected, that to connect the designs of Russia with the events in the Peninsula is too far-fetched; I answer, that that connection Lord Palmerston has established. Eleven years ago he assumed the discovery in the Peninsula of the means of counteracting the preponderance of Russia in the East—as then his greatest claim to public applause. A few years later his organs announced that at Irun and St. Sebastian, and by the expulsion of Don Carlos, he had avenged England on Russia for Cabool and Ghuznee: meaning that by sacrificing sixty millions sterling of Spanish money and fifty thousand Spanish lives, to say nothing of English treasure and lives—he had counteracted the sending by Russia of a second lieutenant of Artillery into Central Asia—the alleged cause of sacrificing *there* fifteen thousand British subjects and twenty millions of British treasure!

And how should Russia neglect the affairs of Spain, she, for whose intelligence no detail is too minute, as no conception is too vast and no end too remote! England and France have long been compared to Carthage and Rome. Was it not *Spain* that brought their mutual destruction? How, therefore, should Russia neglect Spain? And if, as we have seen, Cracow has been sacrificed in a quarrel between England and France in respect to Spain, how dull must she be not to have anticipated such a thing;

how ingenuous not to have aided in bringing it about ! Russia has no cabals of Ministers, no changes of Administration, no play of party, no strife of opinion, no elections of Parliament, no speeches from the Throne, no Corn Law, no Malt Tax, no Short Time, or Pauperism for her chiefs and nobles to be busy about ; there are no commercial panics, no changing moods of animosity, now for this nation now for that, to absorb her genius, or to parade as evidences of her civilization. She has the spectacle of those things in Europe to amuse her leisure, and the contrasts and chances which these afford, to please her vanity, to mature her judgment, attract her activity, point her ambition, or fire her lust. How then should she neglect Spain ?

The factions in Spain have been changed in title from designations of opinion to those of foreign states ; and this is the last pitch of degradation to which we can conceive a people approaching. Are there not avowed Russian partizans and organs in Germany, in France, in England ? Are there not statesmen in every country in Europe known to be her creatures and her pensioners ? Of the great transactions that have occurred, are the principal ones not allowed to have been schemes and projects of hers, and whatever may be said of each diplomatic revolution at the time of its occurrence, no one will deny that in respect to prior transactions every Government of Europe has been her dupe, and each separate country has been in turn the field of her triumph, and of the failure of her baffled antagonists or duped allies.

Has there ever been heard of a French or an English organ, a French or an English party *in Russia* ? Has there ever been a Minister in Russia known as a French or English creature or pensioner ?* In what transaction has

* Lord Malmsbury, indeed, draws in strong colours the picture of a traitor in his day in the Russian Cabinet. Probably, however, he was a traitor, as

she ever been overreached by an ally, or thwarted by an antagonist? On what field of Europe, Asia, or Africa, has she been baffled by the one or duped by the other? What parity then exists? And how can the nations of the Goths tell what she is about in any matter or on any field? And if, as in Spain, she does not show herself—what legitimate inference is to be drawn, save this, that *she has there her work more effectually done by others than she could do it herself?* It is, besides, requisite that she should not appear. If she did, England and France would find, as in the East, another object for their mutual hatred besides themselves.

Nor is the estrangement of France and England the only fruit. The same blow has still more effectually prostrated Prussia and Austria. The first of these States has been, ever since she was cast down by the purposely lost battle of Friedland, to be reconstructed by Russia in 1815, a mere tool of the Czar. But to be a useful tool she had to be made to assume a different physiognomy, and was exhibited with a bearing of independence, a gloze of learning, a tincture of religion, and a parade of enlightenment. It was thus that she was used to win her way in Germany, in order to be made an antagonist of Austria, who was exhibited as an oppressive, an umbrageous, a darkening, fanatic, and stationary power. *Now* placed by the side of Austria, and under the knout of Russia, the prestige of her internal power, and the means of her German progress, vanish. She falls now and henceforward into a struggle of existence, and in her weakness she must rely on the support of that hand which, by revealing its power over her, has created it. Is there here no change in the affairs of the world, and would it be a small part, were this the sole result, that Spain has been made to play in the destinies of Europe?

recently the Russian Minister at Paris was unwell, "*par ordre.*" But at that time there existed two able men out of Russia, Frederick II. and Hardenberg.

Austria, at the first treaty of Vienna, entered into a secret compact with England, France, and Sweden, to defend Europe and themselves against the encroachments of Russia. By that act they recognised at the close of the war with France that they found themselves in presence of a new danger, and this they took as the basis of an alliance. There were thus three of the great Powers of Europe on the one side and two on the other. Although they were *three to two*, and the three powerful against the two weak, and had all the rest of Europe with them, and of course the Ottoman empire and what remained of Poland, and commanding the Sound and the Dardanelles, and having the military power of the Continent and the whole naval power of the Ocean, with Napoleon too, in their hands, and directed by such heads and leaders as Talleyrand and Metternich, Wellington and Soult—they yet so dreaded that species of power of which Russia was alone possessed, namely, the *intellectual*, that their alliance was kept a profound secret. Of course it was no secret to Russia. *Napoleon was brought back from Elba.* The treaty found in the archives of Paris was formally communicated to the Czar by Napoleon, and subsequently published to the world. A few months later Europe was ready again to assemble at Vienna, sufficiently tamed down to think no more of a coalition against Russia.

Austria even then sought to renounce her share of Poland. Ten years later she refused to join the fatal triple alliance for the pacification of the East. In 1829 she made every effort to induce England and France to support Turkey. In 1831, she sent an Envoy to recognize Poland, before whose face Warsaw fell. In 1833 and 1835, she resisted the attempted assumption by Russia of protectorate over Turkey. In 1838 she endeavoured to induce England to join Turkey and herself in a commercial treaty, which should constitute a political barrier to Russia on the

Danube, and it was only then, after a last insult and a crowning betrayal by the English Foreign Minister, and ineffectually endeavouring to awaken the English Premier to the motives by which he might be swayed, that she, for the first time, compacted with Russia in the affairs of the East. Then followed the Treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, when she, after long tampering, gave a promise to adhere if England did so, having been entrapped into that promise by the previous declaration of the English Minister that he would not adhere to it. Another downward step was made in 1841, when she was a party to that most infamous of compacts of the 13th July, when all Europe accepted and revived for Russia the expired treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, against which England and France had protested, and against which they had paraded a naval demonstration. Then Lord Palmerston leaves office, and she is left fallow for a time. He returns to power, and she accepts Cracow, under a menace from Russia. Hitherto, whatever she had done against the interests of Europe or the established laws, was in concurrence with England and following merely in her wake. The harmony between the two was not broken, and neither special grounds of quarrel established, nor concert and alliance with Russia. Now the chain is entirely severed. It is by her act that the Treaty of Vienna is broken down. It is against her that every attempt at restoration in England must first be directed. What has produced this change? One man in a certain room, in a certain house, in a certain street in London, whose word no man trusts, whose purposes no man comprehends, whose acts no man knows!

And what, then, is the position of England? Bound in a treaty with France to maintain the independence of Spain, and Spain, as declared by the Minister of England, prostrated by France. France, the great ally of the Liberal party in England, severed from us by a Whig Minister,

and driven to an exasperation that forebodes the events of 1793, and driven so by her indignation at the rupture of the public laws of Europe which she in 1793 had violated. For what were the confiscations in Alsace to the confiscation of Cracow? Austria, the immemorial ally of England, repeating in 1846 the act of France of 1793, and that not as a solitary frenzied revolutionist, but as a subordinate agent of an alliance of military Powers, of whom Russia stands the patron and the chief. This, after you have signed a bond to exclude yourselves from the Dardanelles. The despotic alliance consolidated, the constitutional alliance dissolved, England at enmity with all! And the whole is brought out of a false allegation of the violation of a treaty which has no existence—by her own Minister.

Lord Palmerston can succeed, however, in acting for England only in as far (in the case of a decision known at the time) as he convinces the gentlemen and ladies whom he meets and with whom he converses. At present he has, of course, to talk over each person, and to show them that England can do nothing. His arguments are two—"I cannot join with France after her abominable conduct." "I cannot reach Cracow. Can I come down to the House and ask supplies for a war?" Each listener is, of course, convinced that England and France can unite for no purpose—that war is out of the question for any purpose; and they go away satisfied that Lord Palmerston is "attached to the French people, but has always been thwarted by her King—that he therefore thoroughly detests Louis Philippe, and he alone is the cause, if there has been no fruit from all the sacrifices he (Lord Palmerston) has made to preserve the French alliance."

I can add nothing to what I have said regarding the first of these pretexts, but I must suggest something further to show equally the hollowness of the second.

Suppose that France had not offered her co-operation

to England, and that Europe, all Europe, was not, and is not ready to hail and confirm any act of vigour of the British Government, are there not a whole catalogue of things which an English Minister could do to make it worth Russia's while to incur a larger sacrifice than the restoration of Cracow to prevent their being done? Is there not first the public and legal establishment of the violation of the treaty of Vienna? Would it not then follow that the Russia-Dutch loan is no longer to be paid? that the treaties of July 6, July 15, and above all of July 13 (1841), *for closing the Dardanelles*, are no longer binding? that whatever commercial stipulations exist fall to the ground, and that England may transfer to Turkey, Naples, South America, &c., her demand for the raw materials, the sale of which furnishes, directly and indirectly, three-fourths of the revenues of Russia? Let any one weigh any of these separate, secure, peaceful means of action, and see if not only the ambitious projects, but the very life of Russia be not in the hands of an honest British Minister? There is, besides, a Russian Minister in London who might be required to withdraw, and a British representative at St. Petersburg who might be recalled. There is an Ottoman Empire that might be encouraged and strengthened, instead of being deceived, betrayed, and insulted. There is also a Persia—there is, above all, a Circassia. There are soundings in the Dardanelles for British ships of the line; there is also a Prussia and an Austria to be detached, they who are only, and who have been enthralled by British treason. Russian ambition might be arrested in the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia alone, and we have the wide world to operate upon; wherever her designs and machinations extend—there are hearts to feel for Poland, and hands to work the fall of Russia. A head only is wanted. Within, the elements of discord, the moment she is met and

assailed—around, a host of hating neighbours, and then the great states beyond are Austria, France, and England, and in the case we suppose, England herself is busy—we have regained France, and emancipated Austria. All this without war, without the remotest chance of it; and a war with Russia, what does it mean (at least until the Dardanelles are hers)? Nothing more than the bombardment of Sevastopol. That bombardment, to say nothing of the effect on Western Europe, or the echoes from Elsinour, raises Poland, the Cossacks, and the Tartars.

But there can be no war between England and Russia. Until the Dardanelles are occupied, Russia must accept any terms England may propose as the conditions of peace; after they are occupied, England will have to submit to every humiliation or spoliation that it may please Russia to inflict. It is, therefore, not true that Cracow cannot be reached. It is not true that war is required to bring reparation for this wrong. It is not true that Parliament would refuse supplies if called on for such a purpose. It is not true that the Foreign Minister cares for what Parliament thinks or does not think. He does not go to Parliament when he wants to violate a treaty to make a war, that is, to send forth a piratical expedition, or to plunge this country into the expenditure of tens of millions; but it is true that he has concerted with Russia to bring this calamity—it is true that he has broken the alliance with France to assist her therein; and now he misrepresents her weakness and your strength, and makes you believe yourself as powerless as you are base, that you may not counteract her work or suspect his villany.

The point to be looked to now was the Dardanelles. There was the question at once of the independence of Turkey and the access to Russia in the event of a war. Has he neglected it? No! No sooner within the doors

of the Foreign Office than he picks a quarrel with Turkey. No question was open—no boy had been shot—no Frank bastinadoed. How then make a quarrel? He attacks a law of Turkey. He calls on the Turkish Government to abolish a fundamental part of the constitution of the State and the faith—he requires them to abolish slavery. But this is a great and a philanthropic question—it is a doctrine that England has everywhere and by every means endeavoured to establish. England has virtually abandoned her own doctrine. France has withdrawn from her engagements respecting it—the Brazils refuse to renew their treaty—the whole anti-slavery system has fallen smitten with contempt.

But then it may be that in Turkey slavery has characters particularly odious—In Turkey, slavery is the slavery of the Old Testament and the New. The slave has rights, he has privileges, he is adopted into the family, he ascends to the highest offices of the State, he commands armies, provinces; the name is an honour, and not a reproach, and the condition one of dignity, not of servitude.

But, perhaps, Lord Palmerston did not know this. Several years ago he made a similar attempt. He transmitted a despatch of the same nature to “his” Ambassador, who declined communicating it to the Turkish Government. That Ambassador answered in a document which has been published to the world, stating the case as I have stated it, and demonstrating the absurdity of transmitting an appeal in favour of the abolition of slavery because of the degradation and misery of that condition, to a *Minister* who himself belonged to that very class. The reasons were admitted as valid, for the despatch of Lord Palmerston fell stillborn. They have not since been refuted.

But perhaps Lord Palmerston did not foresee that this document would irritate and alarm the Turkish Government, and did not recollect at the moment that it could serve the

purposes of Russia—In the very despatch he points to Russia, and uses *the threat of his power*, that is, the abandoning of the Ottoman empire to her mercies, as his sole argument; he drives them to look to Russia for protection against the Propagandism of England. If you doubt the purposes and connection, look at the simultaneous proceedings of Russia; she puts forward a scheme of dismemberment, and assembles an army (as rumour, her ally, states) of 240,000 men on the Pruth.

This is the Minister who was recently re-admitted into office on promise of better behaviour—he was to be a fire-brand no longer, and to give up his hates for the Emperor, or Louis Philippe, or the King of Naples, or Don Carlos, or Mehemet Ali, as the case might be.

The slave trade was, therefore, used for Constantinople, as the Treaty of Utrecht for Cracow.

A religious agitation is again commencing against France on the subject of Tahiti. It manifests itself first at Tiverton!

Another effect of this agitation is that attention is carried away from the western hemisphere, and that the President of the United States is left free to push his country as far on as possible in the war or quarrel with Mexico, forming them to the habits and spirit of aggression which has to be specially cultured before it can be brought successfully to bear on Canada.

I have in this letter dealt with the manner of the Protest alone, and must again request that you will afford me space to-morrow to deal with the Protest itself.

I remain, Sir, &c.

December 10.

LETTER III.

THE PROTEST.

SIR,—What is a Protest?

It was the complaint of the Roman censor, that, in his age, the true names of things had been lost: it is our misfortune to preserve the name when the thing is changed. A few years ago, *What is a Protest?* would have been an idle question. To-day it is a vital one. Then it would have been a question easily answered; to-day it is one to which the whole intelligence of Europe is unable to give a reply, for a riddle is read to them under that name. On the sequestration of Cracow they were all agreed: a certain thing was to be done: it was to be met with a *Protest*; but no one suspected that they did not exactly know what *that* was. There was indeed a hot debate, but it was as to the envelope, not the contents.

A Protest is a legal instrument used to establish the fact of violation or obstruction of a right, or non-performance of a duty. This is done before witnesses, either in the presence of a judicial authority, or with a view to future reference to such, and so as that the party whose act is impugned has the opportunity of hearing the charge and replying to it. As in a marriage settlement, will, or contract, there is a specified purpose. There are certain parts, as the roof, the walls of a house; they must be there for a house to be a house. It requires that there be an act, and a right or contract which it violates. There the Protest has to specify. If it does not do so, it is no protest. Being a reservation of the rights that are assailed,

not to protest is to bar their subsequent recovery. The act becomes precedent. Other legal deeds are optional as to time—a Protest is linked to the occasion. It cannot be made without a necessity, and when the necessity arises it cannot be neglected. There can be no choice as to its performance, no hesitation as to its period, and no ambiguity as to its terms.

Supposing that the attorney or solicitor of the injured party were to record a document in Court, which argued, but did not protest, and abstained from alleging the act which was the occasion of it, and even assumed the fact *not to have occurred*, could such a document be of avail, and would the term protest apply? The only inference would be, that the agent had been tampered with by the opposite party.

Transactions between nations were, until lately, conducted in as formal a manner as between individuals; and when an Empire protested, it protested in no other manner than a Cheesemonger; and to the agents between nations the responsibilities attached, to which, to this day, those are subject who have to manage cases which involve the shifting of a Scullery sink, or the dilapidation of a Pigsty.

The nation, therefore, entertains simultaneously two opinions diametrically opposed. It judges and acts according to opposite rules, on matters which do not differ in their own essence and character. The contradiction in legal procedure, however, involves, also, one in sense; and the consequences of neglect, which we should foresee in regard to the things we do attend to, have really overtaken us in respect to those which we have neglected. It is dangerous to rob a henroost, but not so to betray a nation; and while petty offences are pursued with the sternest vengeance, it is safe to perpetrate the mightiest of crimes. And, therefore, while it is difficult to deceive individual intelligence, in respect to small private concerns,

it has become easy to circumvent collective wisdom in respect to the weightiest matters.

If this be judged a good and proper condition, then is Lord Palmerston's Protest quite in order; and there is nothing to be said about it. If it be judged that a nation's honour, character, interests, and existence, are things that have to be watched over with all the care, and be guarded with all the forms that the wisdom of the people can devise, or the resources of its legal habits and experience furnish—then again, is there nothing to be said of Lord Palmerston's Protest. The occasion is furnished for the application of a people's recovered sense, and it would stand the first or the last count in an impeachment.

What serves it to argue about Cracow, or Poland, or Spain, when men do not attach clear meanings to terms—when they do not know the meaning of indistinct phraseology, or of informal steps—when they feel no distaste for baseness, no disgust for falsehood, or antipathy for crime, and have lost the sense of the penalties of the law, and are negligent of syntax? They cannot understand the facts, and if they understood them, they could not go to the remedy; yet the same men would call to a policeman if their pockets were picked, and bring an action if their field was trespassed on! Once, however, let a man understand that law is law, whether between nations or individuals—that a Protest is a Protest equally in a case of rupture of private contract or of public treaty; then would fraud and infamy be stamped upon the face of this instrument—then would the remedy be comprehended in the punishment of the delinquent—and then, rating the amount of guilt, not by the meanness, but by the grandeur of the matter to which it was applied, would an indignant nation recover from its dream that the remedial process against great offenders had become obsolete, and that the laws which protect us against wrong from private men at

home suffice not to protect us against danger and harm, the work of our public functionaries abroad.

I beg the reader to disencumber his mind from the load of anterior evidence. Let him forget the successive falsehoods and tricks, their sequence, cohesion, and object, and let him place before himself this solitary fact—

The sequestration of Cracow HAS NOT BEEN PROTESTED AGAINST by the Minister of England, and that Minister has given to a surreptitious document the form and name of Protest. His so-called document is constructed out of arguments against the reasons that had been, or might be, put forward for the act; and he has framed for himself the occasion of penning the sentences which should stand for a Protest, and avoid being one—*by the supposition that the act had not occurred!*

Suppose now that the Russian Ambassador in London had had the opportunity of changing the Protest of the British Minister—would not the composition of such a document have been a signal instance of dexterity?

Suppose that some of those extravagant and pertinacious accusers of Lord Palmerston had sketched beforehand, according to their monomania, that Minister's protest—would not such a document as this have been considered a proof of malignity, rather than of wit?

When Lord Palmerston came into office, whatever perversion has taken place, a protest was still a protest. If a Minister was reputed to have protested, it was that he had done so. War was still war, and peace still peace;—there might have been unjust wars; there might be disgraceful peace, or insecure peace and needless war, but the name, the thing, the form still remained. It is he that has brought forth the chaos of speech, whence at once the jumble in the affairs of the world and in the thoughts of its inhabitants. During eighteen years this man has been at work—he has been in the heart of the British Cabinet, the reflexion of an

intelligence as alien as hostile to England and to Europe. Directed to the ruin of Europe, and acting under England's mask and with her power, this intelligence has disturbed the common forms of procedure; this is what is seen in every common case of fraud. It is requisite, then, to trace this process and this system in some of its earlier stages.

In 1833 a quarrel between the Pacha of Egypt and the Sultan, which was all managed from St. Petersburg through London,* brought a request of succour from Turkey to England; it was not answered that it was unlawful for us to yield such succour, but that we had not the means to do so, and with the consent of the King and the Cabinet, Russia was requested to afford that support to the Sultan which he had requested from us, and had already rejected the offer of from Russia. Consequently, a Russian squadron appeared in the Bosphorus, to the utter astonishment of the Turkish Government and the consternation of the Turkish people. This Russian succour did not pass down to meet the danger, which it only aggravated by its presence. It encamped on the Giant's Hill, and then the question came to be no longer the repelling of the Pacha of Egypt, but the getting rid of their new allies. As the price of the succour thus imposed by England on Turkey, that is to say, as the condition of the withdrawal of her troops, the signature of the Turkish Government was by Russia required to a treaty, which was no less than a defensive alliance against England and France, and which bound Turkey, in case of the event of war between Russia and these or any other Power, to close the Dardanelles against their vessels. That is to say, that Turkey, who alone contemplated war between them and Russia in her quarrel, was to close to them the passage by which her enemy could be reached, or she could be saved. The treaty appeared first in the columns of the *Morning*

* See "Lord Palmerston and Mehemet Ali," by William Cargill, Esq.

Herald, and Lord Palmerston stated in the House, though with a certain ambiguity of phrase, that he had himself learnt it only through that channel. The treaty I said had been imposed upon the Turkish Government as the condition of getting rid of the Russian troops, but the Turkish Government looked to England and to France to save them both from the occupation which had been doubly England's doing, and from the new treaty, which was directed, not against Turkey, but against herself. It consequently determined to communicate to the English Embassy the secret article respecting the closing of the Dardanelles, and thereby place England in the necessity of meeting Russia directly. I have it on the authority of a Minister of the Porte, that the very *original paper was returned to the Porte by the Russian Ambassador*, with a recommendation to choose better, another time, their confidants. This, of course, might have been the treachery of a Dragoman (the English and Russian Dragomans were brothers), but see what follows! The treaty is signed. An angry correspondence ensues between England and, not Russia, but Turkey; it is she that is ground between the upper and the nether millstone. Lord Palmerston thus fixes on *her* that she is party to a secret and offensive Treaty against England. Thus is the Turkish Government, which we have spurned when it appealed to us to rescue it, driven into sheltering itself under this very treaty *against England*. England and France then protest—it is a *joint protest*. France always follows England—the composition of the document devolves, therefore, upon Lord Palmerston, and it is the very prototype of that document which we have under consideration. The grievance is not brought home to Russia. No allusion to the compact—no exclusive advantages in the East—no abolition of the treaty required; and, under the mask of anger and with the tone of petulance, a boisterous interference ensues, which serves to

embarrass Turkey and support Russia. An English and French squadron are sent to carry a protest against Russia—not to the Sound, but to the Dardanelles, *after* Turkey had been constrained and provoked into making common cause with Russia to defend the passage. The document was couched in these terms—“England and France will act as if no such treaty had been signed.” To which, of course, Russia replied that she “*would act as if the protest had never been made.*” The dexterous squadrons, having done their work, effected a judicious retreat to Malta and Toulon.

No cloud then overshadowed the harmony of England and France; and Lord Palmerston was then under the control of that burning indignation, or, as his own organs expressed it, that “morbid irritation” against Russia, which kept his anxious colleagues in continual alarm, lest, on awakening some morning, they should find England plunged in a war with Russia.

The interpretation of the words “that England would act as if no such treaty had been signed,” is, that she *would send men of war into the Black Sea, despite the article for their exclusion.*—Lord Palmerston sends Lord Durham to St. Petersburg *via* the Black Sea. This, of course, is for the purpose of acting up to his word. He sends a man of war to convey him, and an Admiralty steamer, but *the guns of the English vessel that enters the now Russian waters, are unrove from the ports and struck down into the hold!* France at that moment had obtained a firman for a man of war for the Black Sea, but following England, it is stopped. Meanwhile Austria, without the slightest hesitation on her side, or difficulty on the part of the Turks, sends into the Black Sea a man of war. No one but Lord Palmerston has closed up the Black Sea. When Turkey, through a confidential channel, besought the English Government to send up a squadron, Lord

Palmerston said that whoever proposed such a thing must be a "Russian," for it would be the prostration of *the independence of Turkey*. The manner of the conveyance of Lord Durham alone suffices to prove the whole case. He made for her the occasion of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; he repelled the Turkish Government when it appealed to him against it, before its signature; after it is signed, he makes it the cause of a quarrel, not with Russia, but with Turkey—he pretends to protest against Russia, to carry along with him France, and then practically confirms the treaty by establishing a precedent of submission to its stipulations, and to more than its stipulations; he induces France to do the same. The treaty was for eight years: it expired on July 8, 1841. A few days before quitting office, he re-enacts, as a common bond for all Europe, the secret stipulations of this very treaty, and gives France, by joining it, the occasion of re-associating herself with Europe. He then goes down to Tiverton, and denounces on the hustings her razzias in Africa.

Thus, by the change of the thing, was a new meaning given to the word Protest, and henceforward, when it was said that a Minister had protested, no particular meaning was conveyed, and no consequences followed; and thus it has become possible, as we see to-day, for a public discussion to be carried on respecting the *strength* of a protest; and we are kept in suspense as to whether M. Guizot's or Lord Palmerston's is the stronger. A Protest cannot be strengthened by any language, nor weakened by any. It cannot go beyond a Protest, and unless it comes up to a Protest, it is none. Nobody speaks of a vigorous and energetic contract of marriage, nor of a firm and decided deed of settlement; if we discussed the epithets which such deeds might merit or suggest, it would be a sign that the tenure

of property was very insecure. Thus was confirmed and extended that singular contrast between public and private business, which allows a whole nation to be circumvented with more ease than a single man. Who, in his private business, would call such a deed a Protest, or confide an affair of 10s. to an attorney who had drawn it up?

This has not been the only occasion, since this attorney has had the conduct of our business, in which he has had to deal with flagrant acts of outrage of the adverse party. Turkey is not the only neighbour of Russia whom England has to support, and which, during the last eighteen years, Russia has trampled upon. With Persia, Poland, and Central Asia, all successively the objects of these acts, England had treaties for their protection, either generally or specially, as against Russia; in each case he has abstained from doing anything to thwart Russia, or from establishing England's right; but, as in the case of Cracow, he has prepared, first the occasion for her, and then falsified the right of England.

In 1828, an aggressive war was made against Persia, England neither supported Persia, as bound by treaty, nor protested. But in this case Lord Palmerston was not Minister. His speech in the House of Commons of June 1st, 1829, shows, however, that this was his work. There was, indeed, a nominal Foreign Minister; but in defiance of the solemn warning of Canning, he had been admitted to a seat in the Cabinet as Secretary at War, and he has himself taken credit for having prevented England from supporting Persia. As there was no Protest, to him may be attributed the first disuse of such a measure when imperatively required.

The purport of that speech was, that Turkey ought to be abandoned as Persia had been; and the doctrine he

advocated was, that England could in no case be against Russia. It was naturally the occasion of the warm recommendations of the speaker, by the Russian Ambassadors in London to their Court, as the man to whom Russia had henceforward to look in England, and as the *leader of an anti-Austrian alliance*.* The introduction of Lord Palmerston into the Foreign Office followed, and he suddenly changed from Russia's most devoted partisan to her bitterest foe. Then came the war in Poland. France, as usual, turned to England, and proposed to her to unite in supporting Poland. How was it that the "friend of Poland" and the "enemy of Russia" did not seize this occasion? There was then no Montpensier marriage. How was it that the fact of France's proposition never was heard? After Poland's fall, that Minister was called to account by some of his own Radical supporters for having violated a pledge which he had given to them that Poland should be supported if they left matters to him. If he did not positively state, he left them to infer, that if England had taken any steps to support Poland, France would have placed herself on the side of Russia.

To induce the Belgian Congress to accept the protocols of London—protocols by which Germany may and will be shaken to its centre, he put forward *his anxiety to have his hands free there, in order to act against Russia in support of Poland*. He employed a Pole at Brussels to effect this purpose, by which, among other things, the violation of the treaty of Vienna, by usurpations of Austria and Russia over the Diet, were sanctioned.†

* See secret despatch of Prince Lieven and Count Matutchewitch, Portfolio, vol. 1.

† The treaty of Vienna, and subsequent conventions amongst the German states, provide that all Germanic questions should be decided by the Diet. Austria and Prussia, by a private arrangement, secured to each

How was it in 1831, that Poland fell? Russia had then no allies to put forward, with their hands to do her work, and with their bodies to shield her person: then there was no rancour between England and France: then no Quadruple Treaty to make Spain a bone of contention—no Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had closed the Dardanelles—no English troops and money had set up a Russian *protégé* on the throne of Persia—no troops had landed from a Russian line-of-battle ship to enforce the orders of a British Secretary of State for expelling (on the plea that they were Russians) a Regency from Greece—Asia was as yet untortured and undisturbed—Austria was bound to England, no less than France. How then did Poland fall? Lord Palmerston was Minister.

How was no effort made in her defence? Turkey was ready “to launch her 200,000 horse across the Ukraine.” The Cabinet of Vienna only sought to be set free to renounce, as she has so often desired, her share of Poland. Sweden would have obeyed the double impulse of Cabinet and people. France was in all the fervour yet of her Barricades, and England of her Reform; in fact, the signal only was wanted—and that signal the Crown Prince of Persia was about to give by entering the Russian territories. How were all these dispositions thwarted? Lord Palmer-

other the pretended power of binding Germany, without consulting the Diet. This ‘Hegemony,’ as the jargon of the day styles it, was acquiesced in by Lord Palmerston, when the Five Powers, represented by him and the other Ministers at London, protocolised the Netherlands, and apportioned territories there and in Germany between the Houses of Orange and Saxe Coburg. The Germanic Diet was not consulted. The free states do not hold themselves bound by the treaty of London; but are free to re-open—and will on the first occasion re-open—the whole question of the cession of Luxembourg. The Belgian Congress were induced to accept the intervention by their zeal against Russia, Lord Palmerston undertaking to save Poland, if they would submit to the conferences of London, in which Russia was the leading member. Through the influence of Count Mérode—a true friend to Poland—the proposal was accepted.

ston was Minister! The Persian Prince was followed by the secretary of the English legation, and by him constrained to march back again.

The dexterity of Sir John M'Neill was in that hour Russia's sole protection. Her Eastern and Southern frontiers were entirely naked. She had had to withdraw even her garrison from Orenburg, to send into Poland. It was not the aid of England—it was not the co-operation of England and France, that was required, and but for the positive aid against Poland of the Minister of England, the year 1831 would have witnessed a greater catastrophe than 1815, or than 1453.

All that I have said is capable of substantiation when evidence shall be required on oath, and Westminster Hall shall be again decked out for a great and solemn scene of national justice. Time, indeed, puts witnesses under the earth, and obscures in various ways the available evidence; on the other hand, the accumulation of new crimes and the confirmation of anterior charges and prognostications, more than compensates, perhaps, for what we lose. And above all, the indignation which at some particular point cannot fail to be aroused, will be pointed in the true direction by the finger posts we have left, even should the great task fall into other hands, and we who first detected the secret and proclaimed the crime be laid in our graves.

The idea has been industriously spread, and lightly accepted, that I stand alone—at least amongst the public servants of the Crown, and who have therefore had personal knowledge of this Minister and his acts, and practical acquaintance with the business of diplomacy—in believing him to be playing false. I stand alone in one respect only, and that is in the public charge. Others, and amongst them men of high standing in the service, and others of great weight as practical men of business

in the eyes of the nation, concur with me in common convictions, originating in their several experience in distinct matters. There are others, too, who know the truth, and whose testimony may be made unwittingly available. If I have spoken what others knowing have concealed, it has been a difference, not in the judgment of the case, but in the estimate of the nation. Most men in our age will consider that they have a duty to their families and their position, before their duty to the laws or the State; and this might alone suffice to account for the suppression from a betrayed nation of any indication of the truth. But that which has lost to this great cause its power, in pre-eminent witnesses and accusers, has been the judgment that it was already past redemption; and they have refused to exert their courage, where they were destitute of hope. They have been borne to the earth, or sunk even beneath it, by the desperate resolution of yielding to the fate of a constitution judged to be irrevocably lost. If I have acted differently, it is not that I have indulged in hope, but I have excluded despair, or rather, putting aside all thought of consequences, have endeavoured to do my duty.

By the Persian war of 1828, when Russia succeeded because Lord Palmerston had got a seat in the Cabinet as Secretary of War—by the Turkish war of 1829, where she had his aid, as leader of a powerful opposition—by the Polish war of 1831, where she triumphed because he was Foreign Minister, and held back the world ready to fall upon her—she was so strengthened as to be able to address herself practically to removing, with his aid, the obstacles that stood in the way of her attempting the conquest of India. By her triumph of 1828, and by the subsequent placing, through direct British intervention, of the Russian candidate upon the throne, was Persia converted from an outwork of our defence into the first parallel of Russia's

attack upon our Indian Empire. She then passes on to the second. Persia invades Herat, with the avowed purpose of reaching Delhi, and the confession that she acted under Russian dictation. The Affghan States, bound to England as Persia had been by a defensive treaty against Russia (for all those countries, *up to that period*, had but one external motive, which was dread of Russia; but one hope and desire, which was, protection from England against her), were approached by her agents with promises and bribes; her emissaries were detected even within our territories, tampering with our subjects, and organising amongst our neighbours and our allies a gigantic conspiracy against us, from the Caucasus to the Sutlej.

Now then, came the occasion for the application of a Protest, or of a remonstrance, or of a declaration; some act, in fine, of resistance on the part of the British Government, or some expression of anger; and Lord Palmerston, on Oct. 20, 1838, does address to the Russian Government, not exactly a Protest, but a protesting and denunciatory NOTE. There is in this case no assumption that the facts had not occurred; the grievances are circumstantially, clearly, and peremptorily put down. It is stated that the Government of England knows these things, not that it has been informed. The Russian Government is told that the proofs are in hand that its correspondence has been intercepted. No door of escape is left to it. Such a statement was only to be met by a denial, and the English Government has spoken, so that a denial would be a declaration of war. The Russian Government is placed in the alternative of war or the humiliation of a self-accusation. Lord Palmerston had left nothing unsaid regarding the vastness of her ambition, the unscrupulousness of her means, the perfidiousness of her agents, and the worthlessness of her word, that her bitterest foe could have inserted in a Review.*

* See "Appeal against Faction," published by Ollivier, 1842.

Here we shall have a test of the value of Protests, and an occasion of understanding the purpose of the protester.

This document was never noticed by the Russian Government. No reply was ever given to it. The case which it stated was a fiction from beginning to end.

It was perfectly true that Russia had been sending emissaries into Central Asia, not—for that was hopeless—to produce any results there, but to furnish the pretext for this very note, upon which a simulated quarrel being established, a pretext would be afforded for sending an English army to attack the Affghans. Thus would be reversed the positions of Russia and England in Central Asia, and England instead of Russia would be the power dreaded, and Russia instead of England the power appealed to and called in. The Protest against Russia was addressed to her *after the danger at Herat had passed away*, and the expedition across the Indus* to overthrow her influence was undertaken *AFTER the English Government had expressed itself perfectly satisfied with her “explanations and conduct.”* Russia never altered her conduct or offered explanation.

But a gulph yawned for the colleagues of the Minister between the fierce protest and the placid satisfaction, with no Mahomet's bridge to carry them across. In October there is the Protest, in December there is the satisfaction, *but no answer*, no acknowledgment even of the receipt of the document! How were the colleagues of the Minister to be got over from the one bank to the other? These bodies were ferried across with an ingenuity that equals the process employed by Metellus, and by which he carried the first elephants to Italy across the Straits of Messina, with-

* “On the arrival of the intelligence of the passage of the Indus, a servant of Russia in London, exclaimed exultingly to a member of another Foreign Mission, whose bias he mistook, ‘England is now in for ten millions sterling, and ten thousand lives—at least.’”

out their even suspecting that they had been off the dry land.

For four years had these affairs been going on in Central Asia, without disturbing the mind of either Government ; but it somehow happened that the same chord was simultaneously struck in Downing Street and St. Petersburg, and gave forth the same tone at precisely the same moment. And as Lord Palmerston had been waiting all this while till he caught her (as he tells her)] well out, so had she all the while been equally waiting for him ; consequently a Protest and a denunciation, in the form of a Note, leaves St. Petersburg concurrently with the Note from London. The two shoot by each other in the Catgut, and simultaneously alight on the shores of the respective countries.

Before the astounded eye of each unconscious Minister, bursts forth from the official envelope the *fac simile* of his own unparalleled production—there lay on the table before him the very indignation that he had felt and expressed, the very charges that he had made, the forms of composition that he had employed, and to the very space that he had filled. Reflected as from a mirror, appeared to each a character and dexterity corresponding with his own—the same scorn of baseness, the same perspicacity in affairs, the same benevolence for the human race, the same patriotic devotion, the same resolution to dare all things in a just cause—

“ Arcades ambo

Et cantare pares et respondere parati.”

Thus were the Elephants led into their ark, and then disembarked on the other coast, without even suspecting that they had been off dry land. They fancied that there was a real “ row,” and were very glad to have it settled any how. After having had occasion to admire their colleague’s firmness, they had the satisfaction of commending his prudence. A Russian Bow-street report, that a man

had shot himself, sufficed to substantiate the consolatory announcement made to the discriminating Parliament of an enlightened people—that Russia had disavowed her agents, and renounced her designs. “Safe men,” and judicious statesmen, were satisfied that there might be something to complain of on both sides, and the *Quarterly Review* archly brought down the matter to the meanest capacity, in an argument summed up by the quotation—“Sister, sister, where did *you* find the needle?”

How could the mutual indignation not explode? How did it subside? Was it the colleagues of the English, or the Russian Minister that were holding him back? If either could be restrained, how did the valour of the other instantaneously cool? If a sham, for which was the delusion? Was there an *English* Minister in the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, or a Russian one in the Foreign Office in London? Clearly there was no English reviewer in St. Petersburg.

After this, the English Envoy, driven from the Court of Tehran, confided the affairs of England to the Russian Ambassador, and there was a short quiet laugh at Czar-skoizlo.

With the light derived from these collateral transactions, we shall be able more clearly to trace the steps taken, to prepare at Cracow the present catastrophe.

I remain, Sir, &c.

December 17.

N.B.—The note of the Russian Government referred to in this letter was the subject of a debate in Parliament, on the 1st of March, 1843. The following extracts are from the pamphlet already quoted, in which that debate is analysed.

“Russia’s words are quoted by one ex-minister to prove the necessity of acting against Russia. Russia’s words are quoted by another ex-minister to prove that there were no

grounds of quarrel with Russia. How is it that British ministers quote Russian words to justify their acts? How is it that they have opposite cases to establish? How is it that they can quote her words in support of both? If Russia contradicts herself, her words could prove two cases. They make her words good testimony for two contradictory facts. Did Russia use contradictory language? Could at one period her *words* call for hostile measures, and then afterwards her *words* justify renewal of friendly relations? No. She is nowhere in contradiction with herself in the words she had addressed to the British Cabinet. There was no change after a lapse of time—there was no lapse of time. *The two ex-ministers refer to ONE AND THE SAME DOCUMENT!*

“The double quotation by British ex-ministers proves no perfidy of Russia, it proves their perfidy for her service.

“Two ex-colleagues, in the same debate, contradict each other as to what their object was in making a war; and in the House of Commons there is not a man to point out that they adduce as testimony the self-same document; there is not in the House of Commons a man to assert the fact, that the very document referred to by Lord John Russell as *causing the war, was accepted as satisfactory before the war was made.*

“Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston, opposed in their views of the *acts* of Russia, are agreed in the results at which they arrive.

“Lord Palmerston and Sir Robert Peel, opposed in their estimate of the *words* of Russia, are agreed in the results at which they arrive.

“Lord John Russell dreading *Russia's* act, Lord Palmerston dreading her *agent's* act, and Sir R. Peel distrusting *her* words, are all agreed to resist inquiry, which is urged by Mr. Roebuck. Against them is Mr. Roebuck, who looks upon Russia as the injured party. He urges

inquiry on the ground that England ought to know what her servants have done, and why they have done it; not that he apprehends either external danger or internal collusion. They, concurring in reasons a thousandfold more cogent than his, namely, the presence of external danger, resist the inquiry which should make it known, and thereby arrest it.

“ Now let us glance at the facts. It was four months after the explanations which satisfied Lord Palmerston, that the British forces marched to counteract those designs of Russia, which Lord John Russell dreaded. Two months before these explanations were given, had the acts of the agents of Russia, dreaded by Lord Palmerston, been discomfited. Grant to them that the invasion of Affghanistan was a legitimate means of proceeding against Russia—the cause for that invasion, by the declaration of Lord Palmerston, had disappeared four months before it was made. Grant again, that the acts of the unavowed agents of Russia, not the intentions of Russia, was a legitimate cause for the invasion of Affghanistan—this cause had disappeared five months and a half before it was made ! But the equivocal acts, whether of Russia or her agents, had been in progress for months and years ; no such step is then taken—it is taken after every alleged cause has disappeared. While the acts are in progress, those explanations, that disavowal and recall of her agents, which she is represented to have been so ready to give, are not required—they are required only after they have failed. The playing upon a distinction between the *intentions* of Russia, and the *acts* of her agents, and the taking *her* assurances as a ground of remaining friendly with her, while assuming her acts, even after failure, as a ground for making war upon another people, must surely be sufficient for the comprehension of any reasoning being.”—*Appeal against Faction*, pp. 27-9.

LETTER IV.

CONFISCATION OF CRACOW IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

SIR,—With the light derived from these past and concurrent transactions, we proceed now to examine the long and stealthy process by which this final catastrophe has been prepared, and we come to it, if there be meaning in words, purpose in deeds, or value in logic, with the certain knowledge that the Minister in England has been serving Russia, with each of the Powers her allies, and enabled to do so effectually, as representing a country that was supposed to be the most intelligent in Europe, and which stood the confessed enemy of Russia in no less than three quarters of the globe. Thus was he enabled to carry France always with him, who relied then on his animosities no less than his capacity.

Though we are obliged to speak of England and France conjointly, it must be understood that France has only followed England. In France there have been shifting Ministers, and Ministers controlled by the Chambers and by public opinion; but in England one man has held an unbroken and unhampered sway, and that same Minister has followed no established system of British policy, no recognized doctrines of a powerful party; he has notoriously pursued a course of his own. In doing so he has not appeared as a man enlightening the errors of his times, and forming the judgment of his people, but stealthily and secretly working his own way, battenning himself in silence, fencing off assaults with sophisms or falsehoods, and when

these became too thick and embarrassing, putting forward a colleague, absenting himself from the House, and boldly but not rashly relying on the "empty benches" of the House of Commons, to which he was wont triumphantly to refer,—or trusting, as a last resource against violated pledges and broken faith, to the House being counted out ! He did not want the concurrence, but the abdication of the House. In following, therefore, the prior steps taken at Cracow, when we have to speak of "England and France," it is "Lord Palmerston" that is to be understood.

The Northern Powers have put forward a justification for the confiscation of Cracow, and it is a very remarkable one. It is, that this is not the first time that the Treaty of Vienna has been violated at Cracow. Every act respecting Cracow for the last seventeen years has been a violation of the Treaty of Vienna.

The confiscation of Cracow is not a thunderbolt that has fallen from a clear sky. It is a result—it is the end of a long chain—it is the conclusion of a laboured argument. It is the catastrophe of a drama.

The event and the justification correspond ; the event has come by the act of England and France, and the justification consists in the act of England and France. As there can be no ambiguity as to the terms of a Protest, so can there be no choice and no hesitation in the performance of that duty ; and England and France, who have now protested, not according to form, did not then protest when there was the necessity ; and the purpose is the same in the informality of the present step and the neglect of the former ones. And thus have they positively lent their co-operation to the Northern Powers, and have enabled them first practically to enforce, and now legally to establish the result which they have pretended to resist, and affect to deplore.

The question, therefore, does not lie in the Montpensier marriage—the squabble made with France, the false Protest of the English Minister—but in the seventeen years of his previous labours.

The treaty of Vienna established not only the absolute external independence of the Republic of Cracow, but also its internal constitution. Thus the maintenance of the internal constitution became the condition of its external independence. This was what England and France had to watch over, not only for all the interests ostensibly at stake, but also to prevent those incipient encroachments on the part of Austria, the result of which was evidently to withdraw her from the protective alliance of England and France, and to place her on the side of the aggressive confederacy of Russia and Prussia. How could this be done unless England and France had representatives at Cracow? This care was, after the treaty of Vienna, unfortunately neglected; but, on the occurrence of the Polish war, the importance and necessity of such a step became evident. There was then a Minister in England most zealous, most enterprising, and most hateful of Russia*—how did he, supposing that the fall of Poland had been an inevitable catastrophe, not instantly send a British representative to Cracow and urge France, had she been backward, to do the same? There were no insuperable obstacles at home for him to overcome. There were then no democratic and demoniacal jubinations over the rupture of the Treaty of Vienna. He had not to brave public resistance, and he need not have heeded public indifference; but there was neither resistance nor indifference. The resistance and the efforts were the other way. No harder task has he ever had; in none has he shewn more determined perseverance, or obtained a more hard-earned success, than in prevent-

* “The *words* of Lord Palmerston were indeed for England, but his *acts* have ever been for Russia.”—Conversations Lexicon, 1842. Article, Persia.

ing a British (and French) representative from being placed at Cracow. There have been more efforts made in England and in Parliament to obtain the appointment of a British representative in Cracow than for any or for all other external purposes during the last thirty years. Indeed, it was the only specific object in respect to foreign policy that the British nation or Parliament has sought since the peace. It was such men as Mr. Cutlar Ferguson, Sir Stratford Canning, Lord Dudley Stuart, Mr. Patrick Stewart, and Mr. Gally Knight, who, session after session, urged this measure, and they were supported by almost every man of note on either side of the House, and with the entire concurrence of that House. Its attention indeed, might flag, but its opinion never varied.

The Minister of England did not take advantage of these dispositions. He did not seek to strengthen his popularity by a step, which, of course, taken by him, could have had no real or practical consequences; he braved public and private opinion, provoked suspicion, and exposed himself to the positive charge of falsehood in pursuit of a determination to prevent there being available official testimony against Russia at Cracow, and to prevent—a far more essential point—there being an agent from France, which must have followed the appointment of one from England. On none of these occasions did he deny the case or controvert the arguments of his antagonists. It is nothing but a shuffling out when that can avail, and then a stopping of debates and the obtaining the withdrawal of motions, by pledges given over and over again to do what was required. To the unwonted pertinacity of the Parliament he opposed a pertinacity more constitutional, unintelligible alike on the arguments he advanced, the pledges he gave, and the professions he made, and intelligible only by knowing that his arguments were mystification, his pledges snares, and his professions a mask.

And why was it that the House of Commons was thus pertinacious? Was it not that they foresaw precisely the very thing that now has been realized? And why was Lord Palmerston so pertinacious? Either because his foresight was or was not equal to theirs. Will the House of Commons now revert to what it has said and he has answered, and place him in a dilemma of avowing a foresight inferior or superior to its own? Will it make him responsible for the disaster which his negligence, despite their warnings, has brought—or which his forethought, in contradiction to his professions, has prepared?

There is one objection which I can foresee to the allegation of guilty knowledge and intentions, and only one—that, not having an agent at Cracow (however criminal the neglect), he might be in ignorance of the facts. There was nothing to learn *at* Cracow, though by not having an agent there he was enabled to meet the House of Commons, *as he has done on every occasion that the subject has been introduced, by declaring that the Government was without official intelligence.* This has been the shield held up on each occasion; it has been his only defence. Yet so official was the infraction, and so formal the communication of the fact, that the law officers of the Crown were enabled to decide upon it. The case was submitted to them for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was lawful or not for the English Government to continue to pay to Russia money under the Treaty of Vienna. They decided against the payment of the money, holding England discharged from every obligation towards Russia of whatever kind. Their decision was kept secret, and the money was paid. Ten years afterwards he was to assume that Cracow had not been confiscated, as the grounds of protesting against the confiscation; and therefore, ten years before, he took care to deprive his country of all power of protestation, and by establishing the wrong only to sanction it.

Every part tallies with the other from the beginning to the end, and seems rather the march of an epic or the plot of a play, than the events of human history,—

“ad imum

Qualis ab incepto processerit.”

It is with good reason that this Minister entertains the House of Commons, as he did on a recent occasion,* with jeers and scoffs at the opinion of the law officers of the Crown, but that does not prevent him from using and abusing, in every imaginable shape, the appeal to those authorities. He could obtain upon the sulphur monopoly a false opinion by submitting a false case. In the affair of the Vixen he could stop the House of Commons one day by telling them that the matter could not be proceeded with, as it had been referred to the law officers of the Crown, for whose opinion they must wait; and the next day he tells them, or causes them to be told, that again they cannot proceed in the matter, because that opinion had been given—of course of too delicate and confidential a nature to be divulged in such an assembly. I again repeat what I have before stated, that every transaction between nations is strictly legal, and the Foreign Minister has no lawful action therein, save the reporting and the drawing of the case; and those who framed the constitution of England, or of any other State that has had the faculty to become great, never conceived or established a system of Government by which the safeguard of the laws, which have been judged requisite for the protection of the pettiest interests, should be wholly set aside in respect to the gravest. But here is a specimen of the manner in which this man, the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, can trifle with all things, turn all things to profit, trample on the most sacred institutions, jeer at the gravest authorities, and change the most settled opinions.

* July 8, 1845.

I shall now trace the Parliamentary history of the sequestration of Cracow.

In 1831 a RUSSIAN force entered the State of Cracow. It was charged with being a focus of disaffection, but nothing was proved. Cracow was made to bear the expense of the occupation, and it was notorious that the Russian agents had been spreading inflammatory publications. The troops were then withdrawn, and Russia denounced to Austria and Prussia the State of Cracow as a focus of insurrection.

In 1832, now strengthened with the concurrence of Austria and Prussia, Cracow was charged by her as being a place of refuge for Polish refugees, and 300 were demanded, who were immediately delivered up by the State of Cracow; nevertheless, there was a *joint occupation* by the forces of the three Powers, who then proceeded to change the organic statute of Vienna; they vested in themselves the appointment of the President, reduced the number of Senators, and abolished nine Professorships in the University, one of them being that of Polish literature. This followed the Russian decree of February 26, 1832, for the incorporation of Poland.

On the 18th of April, 1832, Mr. Cutlar Ferguson introduced the subject in the House of Commons, himself a member of the Administration, several other members of the Administration spoke on the same side, Mr. Labouchere, Dr. Lushington, Colonel Fox, and Mr. Sheil. Their sentiments were echoed by Lord Sandon, Mr. Hume, Sir Charles Forbes, Mr. Ewart, &c. Mr. Hunt said—

“He HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT HELD BACK FRANCE WOULD HAVE AFFORDED ASSISTANCE TO THE POLES WHEN ASSISTANCE COULD HAVE BEEN OF USE.” — Here was the first time that Poland came before the House of Commons, it came with a

power which shewed that the English Minister was master of it, if he chose to act according to his then professions. The motion proceeded from a member of the very Government of which he formed a part. It also placed him in the alternative of denouncing Russia at the head of British opinion, or of displaying himself as defending her against Poland and his country. To the case was linked also a charge of the deepest dye—that of paralysing the dispositions of France to support Poland. How does the Minister appear on this occasion? How does he escape from this dilemma? HE ABSENTS HIMSELF FROM THE HOUSE. Had he got a quinsy or the plague? No. He is busy, and cannot come. He has a tame elephant at hand, and rides over the ford on Lord Althorp's back. That sagacious statesman informed the House "that Government *had received no official information*, and for that and other reasons he could not at that moment enter into any explanation relating to the views entertained by his Majesty's Government respecting this most important question." And so concluded the first act of the Parliamentary drama.

On the 28th of June, 1832, Mr. Cutlar Ferguson again introduced the subject. The debate was far more animated, the determination of the speakers more resolute, the standing of the men more authoritative. Colonel Evans hoped that the country would no longer be satisfied with speaking, but that it would act. Mr. O'Connell vied with Lord Sandon and Mr. Hume in the vehemence of their denunciations. Lord Morpeth said, that "a case was made out for the energetic intervention of England and of Europe." Lord Fortescue declared, that "if the perfidy of Russia was suffered to go without punishment, there was an end to any security for the peace of the neighbouring States." Lord Palmerston, who on this occasion *was* present, destitute of an ally amongst his own ranks, came provided with a tame elephant from the opposite camp. Having left it to

that sagacious statesman, Sir Robert Peel, to bear the first brunt of the onslaught, the Minister of England arose for the first time to utter in the House of Commons, words in respect to Poland. He told them that "no man could entertain a doubt that Great Britain had a *right to express* a full and decided *opinion* of the performance or non-performance of the stipulations contained in the treaty, nevertheless, it could not be denied that England lay under *no obligation*, individually and independently of the other contracting parties, to adopt measures of direct interference by force." This is the man who saw no reason why the protest of England and France should be a conjoint one, but every reason for the reverse! The motion was for the production of papers, namely, the Organic Statute of February, 1832, for the incorporation of Poland—"he was fully prepared to accede to that motion." The result was the formal recognition of the right of Russia to do what she had done. What part was that of the English Minister, if not that of the advocate, the sole advocate of Russia, in the British Parliament, and that of necessity in self defence, because of the steps that he had before practically taken to support her, by preventing a joint intervention to support Poland, not "by force," for there could have been no occasion to employ force where all the strength was on one side, and that side the side of justice?

Years now elapse, and he has it all his own way without either the embarrassments of explanation or of silence. On the 1st of March, 1836, Sir Stratford Canning brought before the House new violations of the Treaty of Vienna by the repetition of an illegal occupation of Cracow. Lord Palmerston replied that the English Government "had not received any official accounts of these events. It was probable that *Austrian* troops might have entered Cracow, and such an act might be a violation of the

Treaty of Vienna, but he was prepared to give no opinion upon the subject."

Sir Stratford Canning, nowise satisfied by these observations, immediately followed up the statement by a more formal motion on the 18th of the same month, when he introduced the matter in a speech of great length and power, but concluded merely by contenting himself for the present with "placing the question in the hands of her Majesty's Government, reserving for himself the right of putting the motion, should he find it necessary to do so." Lord Palmerston replied in a speech almost as elaborate, in which he commended highly Sir Stratford Canning for taking up this important matter, declaring that it was perfectly natural that the House of Commons should take Cracow into its most anxious consideration, but stating that the Government "had not received any official communication—that he had himself written to our Ministers abroad for information, but had not received any." "If the three Powers (said he) had determined to do that which was a *measure of unnecessary* violence, he was *inclined* to regard the *circumstance* of their not communicating it as an act of *involuntary* homage *tacitly* paid to the justice and plain-dealing of this country"—(observe the words, plain-dealing)—"*for* the three Powers well knew that if their intention had been communicated, the answer which would have been returned would have had *the effect of endeavouring* to dissuade them from the measures that they intended to carry into effect;" he "could not but regard the selection of Austrian instead of Russian troops for the purposes of the occupation, as a matter of good feeling and kindly discretion on the part of the three Powers." *Cossacks* had been selected for this service. He was followed by Members from both sides, who, for the first time, seemed to break away from his control, and

to think and to speak in disobedience. Mr. O'Connell spoke of "the three plundering Powers," and said, "unless these plunderings were arrested they would soon have to hear of the seizure of the Bosphorus and Constantinople; but the time was come to do justice, not only to Poland, but to Sweden, and unless it was speedily accomplished, Europe must be plunged into war. It was time, too, to make inquiries after the Russo-Dutch loan." Then Lord Palmerston brought out his tame elephant; for he always has one ready in a box, and Lord John Russell having stated that "the explanation required by the Right Honourable Gentleman having been given by his Noble Friend, he recommended that the subject should be allowed to drop, as a very important question, 'the Municipal Reform Bill,' was coming before the House."

The same month saw a third debate upon the subject, when it was introduced on the 30th of March by Mr. Patrick Stewart, who inquired whether the Polish refugees, who had been seduced into passing out of the district of Cracow, had been delivered up to Russia, and sent to Siberia. At this time the constant reply of the Minister, "No information," had led to a pretty general feeling of the necessity of having a British consul at Cracow. This had been repeatedly urged in the House, and still more warmly and repeatedly by the friends of the Minister out of doors. He had not resisted the project, and he had sent away the various reasoners, content each successive month that he was prepared to do something of the kind the next. On the present occasion he but dubiously employs the "no information" shield. He "*had* received communications from the ambassadors abroad, but he had none from the authorities themselves." "It was the intention (he stated) of the Government, when they first heard of the state of Cracow and of the disposition to expel certain refugees, to send the British Consul at Warsaw to

Cracow to obtain full information ; but before the Government could give effect to their intention (this is on the 30th March, 1836, and five years subsequently to the violation of the territory of Cracow) they heard of the actual occupation of the city by the *protecting* Powers, and it did not appear to him that that was a fit occasion for the Consul at Warsaw to present himself in the town of Cracow."

The next step is twenty days later. On the 20th April, Mr. Patrick Stewart brings in a motion for an address to his Majesty, praying the appointment of a diplomatic agent at Cracow. This motion was warmly supported, and it was met by Lord Palmerston by the expression of the "entire Friend," and the motion was withdrawn upon the assurance given by the Minister, that "his Majesty's Government do intend to send a consular agent to Cracow." *There was a majority at Mr. Patrick Stewart's back!*

Some months elapse, and nothing is done. Two Members of the House, at different times, are on the point of renewing notices of motions upon the subject, and are successively induced to withdraw them, by the assurance given by Lord Palmerston, that "he was about to send an agent to Cracow"—that "it was a settled thing"—that "he was committed to it"—that "he had pledged his word to it:" and on one of these occasions he used these words:—"They may make difficulties about receiving a Consul; but that will not matter, for in that case I shall send a Minister." A year, however, elapsing without any fruits, Lord Dudley Stuart, on the 22d of March, 1837, recalling his promise, inquired from him what he intended to do. Lord Palmerston admitted the correctness of the statement, but said that, "having experienced greater difficulties than he had anticipated, he had altered his intention, and had not sent a consular agent to Cracow, and that it was not his intention to do so." The reason

for the change was no reason, but the reason of the change was clear. He was able from the dispositions of the House of Commons to haul in, in 1837, upon the slack he had given them in 1836, of which the proofs will be seen in what follows. Lord Dudley Stuart addressed to the Minister, on the steps of the lobby, these words.—“No man can henceforward trust your word,” upon which the Minister laughed. This was no secret at the time. It led to none of those who heard it feeling of indignation or alarm. No one conceived that it was disreputable to have such a man for Minister, or that the condition of the nation might be precarious whose interests were confided to such hands, wholly uncontrolled and unsupervised. Lord Dudley Stuart having been on the former occasion replied to by Lord Palmerston, that “whenever the Noble Lord chose to bring the question before the House, he was sure that he would be able to state reasons to prove that he had exercised a sound discretion in having changed his original intention,” did bring forward on the 25th of May the case of Cracow, not merely upon its own grounds, “but as affecting the character of the Noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.” Lord Palmerston did not redeem his pledge; he did not show valid reasons to the House for the change of his original intention; he did not offer any reason at all; HE WAS ABSENT. He had no friend to reply for him; no colleague was put forward to “tell lies” for him; and the case went by default in favour of the party who did not appear. The House was counted out! And be it remarked that this is the invariable and sole defence of Lord Palmerston when charged—he stays away or he does not answer. Not indeed that he has yet had one to charge him face to face.

On the 13th July, 1840, the first diplomatic man in England, in a speech of research, gravity, and dignity, brought before Parliament the violation of the public law,

the violation of England's rights, by the three Powers at Cracow. The answer of Lord Palmerston was as follows —“He said at the time, and he still said, that the occupation of Cracow was against the principles of the treaty of Vienna.” He had never said anything of the kind, he had never, on any occasion, admitted any of the facts. He had never denied them, it is true, and he had been equally careful to avoid admitting them. To deny them would have exposed him to the detection of his purpose; to admit them must have entailed change of his conduct; and now the false assertion that he had admitted them explains the reason why he had avoided either to admit or to deny. He had always said that if the facts alleged were true, they would amount to violations, not of the principles of the treaty, but of the treaty itself. He is now about to accept the facts, and, therefore, he throws out the screen between the treaty of Vienna and its principles. How should the House of Commons be able to deal with such a master of ambiguous speech! “But,” he continues, “it was one thing to state an *opinion* and another thing to compel *three* Powers to undo acts which they had done, while, from *geographical circumstances*, there were no means to enforce the *opinion* of England, unless by an appeal to arms, which would involve us in a war with those Powers, as Cracow was a place *in which no English action could directly take place.*”

He now admits the facts which before he had invariably evaded—now he admits the wrong done to England—now he admits that submission to that wrong has only been in consequence of physical weakness. He holds them to be aggressors, and dangerous ones, since they are aggressors only by their might, and might resulting from numbers and position. How is this compatible with his former reasonings against the probability of their having done or their doing such things? How was this compatible with

his denial of aid to Poland, when there were means of reaching Cracow? How is this compatible with his paralysing the dispositions of France to do so? And how, above all, is the one or the other compatible with his signature but two days thereafter of a treaty with those very three Powers—who had thus settled the affairs of Cracow—for the settlement of the affairs of Constantinople?—a treaty that was at once to separate England and France,* and to dismember the Ottoman empire in Egypt—a treaty that was signed against France, because he had not found her as yet as docile in the affairs of Constantinople as she had been in those of Cracow—a treaty that was to lead to a new series of convulsions for the East, of dissensions and convulsions for Europe—a treaty that was to unite England in a bond with those who had violated all existing treaties by purposes of aggression and dismemberment!

A Minister declares that his country is without power of doing itself right or justice! What would be the meaning of such words in the mouth of a Minister of Sardinia, or of Naples?—but what are they in that of the Minister of England? And, if you are powerless to do yourselves justice, is that a reason for leaguings with robbers? And, if you are weak in yourselves, is that a

* “Have we not also seen that while every act of disgrace, of wrong, and of plunder, by a nation whose physical power was weak and contemptible, has been suffered by our Minister on the plea of not endangering the *peace of Europe*; that that Minister has excited the rage and the hostility of the most warlike nation on the earth, on a plea which is a violation of his own principle of policy?”—*The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Administered by Lord Palmerston*, 1841, page 145.

The work from which the above quotation is made was not published at the time, in consequence of some inaccuracies. Some copies are now to be had at Ollivier's, in Pall-mall. It is a work of great research, and presents a more comprehensive view of these subjects than is to be found elsewhere. The author commenced his investigations with the view of being enabled to vindicate Lord Palmerston.

reason for estranging from you a powerful neighbour and a willing ally, and for putting yourselves on the side of the robber to attack the ally?

Proof! What proof is requisite? There is the deed. What matters the purpose of the felon, or the motive of the murderer? The deed alone concerns us. No struggle is needed to attain to conviction, but the mind staggers under the idea of the crime. The evidence fails by proving not too little, but too much—guilt more or less than human in one man, sufferance more or less than human in the rest!

However, these transactions have been practicable only by dexterity, and Parliament has been cheated out of its supervision by management. There have been moments when a little more urgency to press, or a little more pertinacity to pursue, would, even with such a House of Commons, have sufficed to arrest these crimes and avert these evils. During the whole of these events there was no speech made in the House to the point; there was no man who saw that crimes had been committed, and that it was in the laws of England that the remedy was to be found; there was no man to denounce a guilty Minister as a traitor; there was no man to treat as guilty of falsehood in his individual capacity him who had been guilty of it in his public one. Had there been one such man, there might have been twenty, and then the due privileges of Parliament would have been exerted, the prerogatives of the Crown would have been preserved, the usurping power of a Cabinet, or of a Minister over a Cabinet, would have been rendered impossible—Poland would not have fallen, the public law of Europe would not have been violated, France and England would not have been severed, and Europe would have continued in that repose and the East in that tranquillity in which, despite even the lamentable proceedings for the emancipation of Greece, both were

found on that unhappy day when Lord Palmerston entered the British Cabinet as Secretary at War, and on that still more ill-fated day when he took possession of the Foreign Office as British Minister.

Now, what shall we say to the Montpensier marriage? Now is it clear or not who made the quarrel and for what purpose? Now is it doubtful whether or not Lord Palmerston was taken by surprise by the confiscation of Cracow, and if it was merely by accident that the *Times* upon that occasion announced that it was *France* that was "ready to surrender everything, from Cracow to Constantinople?" Now is it clear which of the two was the artful politician, Princess Lieven, who brought him into the Cabinet of 1830, or Louis Philippe, who brought him into the Cabinet of 1846? Who now will dispute the wisdom of the dying words of warning of Mr. Canning, or doubt the fulfilment of the prophecy of M. Talleyrand, that he would one day plunge Europe in blood and lay her in ashes?

But, after all, what has happened at Cracow? What took place at Cracow in November? Absolutely nothing; no Austrian regiment, no Cossack company, no Bashkir Pulk had entered the walls or territory of that "free and independent State;" no change had taken place in the University or the Senate; no new infraction of the treaty of Vienna, by open violence, or by superior power; nothing was changed of that which had existed for months, and which might have continued to exist for months and years to come. The confiscation was a gratuitous step, and was an aggressive measure, bold and far-reaching, but only taken in the confidence that the game was safe and the moment entirely propitious.

But this blow to England and France is made to be delivered, not by the three Powers, but by Austria, and, consequently, the *equivoque* called "protest" is directed against

Austria, and then she has to reply to it in such a manner as to bring down upon herself the full hatred of the Poles, and prepare thereby to render her incapable of affording any subsequent resistance when Russia shall claim her own yet unexpressed equivalent, in the full incorporation of Poland and in the substitution of the Greek for the Catholic faith. Thus is Austria interposed between Russia and the protest of England and France, exactly as Turkey was in 1833 ; for it would be superfluous to speak of Austria* otherwise than of Turkey, as one who is no longer a free agent, but constrained ; and no longer a free agent solely by the collusive support given in secret to Russia by the Minister of England.

We are told, however, that we protest. We attack Austria by our protest ; and in favour of what rights is it that we protest ? Of those secured by the *Treaty of Vienna* ! Napoleon has recorded his judgment of that treaty as one so humiliating to *England*, that had he been triumphant he could not have expected to have imposed upon her severer terms. *France* by that treaty was stripped of all her acquisitions, bound to a penalty and encircled with a chain of forts. *Austria* by that treaty was dismembered, and lost her German station and prerogatives. *Saxony* by that treaty was partitioned, so was *Sweden*, so was *Denmark*. By that treaty *Italy* and the *small States of Germany* were prostrated. WHO GAINED BY THIS COLLECTIVE LOSS OF EUROPE ? *Russia* and Russia's satellite, *Prussia*. This is the treaty in favour of which you have to protest, and to protest in vain. You are obliged to abandon it. Abandon it to regain what you have given up ? No, but to surrender it also into the hands of those for whose special gain this aggregate loss of Europe was entailed !

And you fancy the treaty of Vienna is abrogated. That

* M. de Flahaut said to the Arch-Chancellor, "*Vous avez tiré les marrons du feu.*"

treaty stands ; but the rights that you secured thereby are gone, and the bond of equality which united you to others to perform certain things has become, by their violence and your submission, a chain. It is not that the things that you had a right to are not done, but it is that your independent position is now sacrificed and the parties that were your equals have become, by their own misdeeds, your superiors. The relations of the parties have passed from that of equality to that of a supremacy and subordination. Their act presented the necessity of dissolving the bond. But your act is required to dissolve it. That, however, is a legal matter which you do not comprehend.

An individual has it in his power to confer a favour at his own cost ; he may even, without dishonour, yield a right ; he may be cheated and yet be innocent. Not so an agent. It does not belong to him to be generous any more than to be grasping. He is relieved from the temptations of personal gain, and he is also restricted from the indulgence of personal charities. Nations act not by themselves, but through agents, and for those agents the rule of conduct is laid down, and has to be observed with an exactness and a solemnity commensurate with the transcendant greatness of the concerns with which they deal. It is not merely the obligations of their own vicarious office that they have to fulfil, but the futurity of their people that they have to regard. If a Government is negligent of a right—if it surrenders one—if it suffers an infraction of positive stipulation—if it allows the opposite party to find justification in its remissness or in its acts, not only is it culpable in the highest degree that men can incur culpability, but does it become *ipso facto* the enemy of its nation and the ally of any foreign Power that does it wrong. Possessed, as such a Government is, of the means of acting for the nation, and of giving the tone to its opinions, it becomes an enemy of the direst kind ; ruining its affairs, perverting its judgment,

and extinguishing the hope of future restoration by the perversion at once of right and of history in their very sources. Whether this state is arrived at by indifference, or by purpose—by criminal ignorance, or by guilty knowledge, it matters not.

If, in the play of faction, a well-intended and upright man enters by chance the Foreign Office, our case is not improved; for he either knows or does not know that he is no match for his antagonist, and is, therefore, in both cases, equally the enemy of that only knowledge that can rescue us, namely, of our own ignorance and inferiority. You place an accountant to check an account, a fencer to oppose a fencer, a Greek to meet a Greek. Why not, then, a diplomatist to meet a diplomatist?—or, in a word, an Englishman to meet a Russian? For is it to be endured, that the word Russian shall alone be associated with intelligence, and Englishman ever linked to stupidity?

If it were only with France or Germany, or some other of the Gothic States, that we had to deal, there being equality of mind, this danger would not exist; for whatever the incompetence on one side it would be balanced upon the other. But it is a different thing when we have to do with a Power which is different from us, even in race—the mass of whose people looks upon us as a common prey—which feels the certainty of the subsequent mastery of us, through, not physical, but spiritual weapons—which, cunning and astute as the savage, appropriates all the elements of civilised warfare and corruption—which selects its instruments from every race and from every region, because of their appropriate qualifications—which has formed a system and acts upon it, in all times and in every region, and brings upon each spot to bear the results of its success acquired elsewhere—which finds equal facilities, or nearly so, at Berlin, at Vienna, at Munich, at Paris, at

Washington, at Tangier, and Catmandoo, as in Downing Street. How is it possible that, coming to interfere throughout the whole world, in common with this Government, ours should not be overreached: being overreached, that it should not become that Power's ally and its nation's enemy: that that enmity should not be brought to bear throughout the wide field of action of both—wherever, in fact, England has anything to maintain and Russia to assail, and that is wherever heat or cold has left the earth habitable for man?

The Treaty of Vienna was the greatest triumph of Russia in 1815. It was then the furthest limit to which she attained; she has now placed it behind her, and she presses on. The Treaty of Vienna was the barrier which you had raised in your defence; it is broken through; scattered and discomfited, we retreat beyond; and it is your hands alone that have broken down your defence. All that has been done is your work; nothing has been done that you have not accomplished—her daring, indeed, but your labour.

Sometimes safety comes from despair, but there must be despair for such hope. Here we are without the direction of counsel or the remedy of desperation. But surely there are grounds for despair. See and judge yourselves. What hellebore has yet been found for such madness—what morning has broken on such a night? Would that you could despair; then, indeed, might we hope. Russia's ambition would have passed away as an uneasy dream, had she for a moment triumphed over your indifference.

Whilst the results would appear to show with what ease the Parliament of England had been managed, the steps that have been taken suffice to evince the prudence, wisdom, and necessity of that management. The same case at present occurs. Supposing that the Parliament had been sitting, or that it had been re-assembled at the moment of

the announcement of the confiscation of Cracow—what would have been the position of the Minister? How would he—scarcely able to hold his own in the Cabinet, have stood in face of an excitement breaking down habitual restraints, and, above all, without his hitherto never-failing Ægis and protection, Sir Robert Peel? With such men as compose the House of Commons, I do not mean to say that any intelligible or useful course could be adopted; but I do say, with the most perfect conviction and certainty, that Lord Palmerston would have been expelled from power. The menace of Sir R. Peel would have been realized, when, stung for a moment by the “Noble Lord,” he said, in 1842, “Beware!”—and again, “I will quit the House!”—when he confessed that he alone stood in the House of Commons, though leader of the Opposition, that “Noble Lord’s” shield and bulwark.

Therefore was it to be considered, in the time selected for the publication of the confiscation of Cracow, what time the House of Commons would be sitting; and further, was it an object to obtain, that the House of Commons should not be re-assembled until the excitement of the moment had passed away. This has not been accomplished without a struggle. It has transpired that there has been a difference in the Cabinet upon this point, and that Lord Palmerston alone, or if not entirely, nearly alone, has succeeded in overruling his colleagues and postponing the meeting of Parliament.

There is a singular connection between the periods of the House of Commons and the dates of diplomatic events. In July treaties are signed. The explosion comes in the partridge and grouse seasons, from August to November. The Triple Alliance was the *6th July*, Unkiar Skelessi was the *8th July*, the treaty for closing the Dardanelles the *13th July*, for the dismemberment of Turkey and Egypt (called the Pacification of the East) the *15th July*, the

Quadruple Treaty for Spain, *July 27*, the collective note of 1839 to interfere in the affairs of the East the *17th July*, and the ominous silence that broke the compact for the Montpensier marriage extended over the *same month*.

And for this there is good reason. All these measures were adopted without the prior knowledge of Parliament; they were all in opposition to the recorded judgments of the statesmen of every party in this country on the subject of intervention. They every one of them exposed to the danger of the block the head of the Minister who signed them. The Minister did not want any support from opinion in England. He had a disciplined army and navy ready to do his work, and his strength consisted in the nation knowing nothing and caring nothing about what was done, since its power of action was already in his hands. All he had to care about was, that when intelligence reached them from abroad regarding what he had done (for by no other means could they obtain it), the Parliament should not be sitting, and that it should, if possible, be occupied otherwise, and in a manner more agreeable to itself. And therefore were the treaties signed just at the close of one session, which left his hands free until the next, and coming at the close of the one session in the midst of the labours and fatigues of that period, nobody would stop to inquire; it has become an old story before the legislators re-assemble; then, whatever they may think, it is too late, the honour of England has to be supported, &c. No man, besides, could then dare to speak upon the subject without wading through the oceans of Blue Books that have come out in the mean time. They are overwhelmed in a heap of subsequent correspondence and details. The discussion has been worked out inconclusively in the press, and there is on the one hand curiosity extinguished, and on the other a mass of information which no one can master, and which, being mastered, would lead them to nothing. Then the

documents are laid on the table in silence, and having already found reasons for everything they did not know, they are now made responsible for everything that has been done.

Lord Palmerston having succeeded in staving off the meeting of Parliament, when it meets, the Spanish marriages and the confiscation of Cracow will be old stories. Are they not so already? Have they not given place to malt, and are they not finally merged in the Christmas pantomime?

“ Nam qui dabat olim
Imperium, fasces, legiones, omnia, nunc se
Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat,
Panem et Circenses.”

Thus it is by *system* that Parliament has been weaned from its duties and left unconscious of its power. It has been dealt with as the decrepid Merovingian race by the Maires du Palais. Liberty they have indeed of forest and fell, freedom to use the cross-bow and the spear, but *Legiones* and *Fasces* are not for them. In all respects, however, the parallel does not hold. It is not a case of usurpation—it is not a convulsion within, accompanied by a strengthening abroad—it is not the revival of an effete dynasty or nation—there is neither the hammer of a Charles, nor the sword of a Pepin; but it is the vile ignoble treachery of the sentry that gives up his post, or that leads the enemy into the citadel by a sewer. It is the surrender up of a state in the midst of its strength and confidence by one who could not dare in his own person to injure the meanest subject—delivered up not to peaceful subjection to an overpowering foe, but to be used for destroying a neighbour possessed of physical means as terrible as its own; but, alas! no better furnished with the qualities of head or heart requisite to perceive or avert danger.

I remain, Sir, &c.

LETTER V.

LORD PALMERSTON AND FRANCE.

SIR,—I stopped short, in tracing the steps adopted by Lord Palmerston towards Cracow in the British Parliament, at the memorable debate which preceded by two days the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840. In the debate of the 13th, Russia was represented by the English Minister as England's enemy; on the 15th he allied England to her by signing with her a bond to interfere by arms in Turkey, and to separate at the same time England from France. The positions of all the parties were thus changed, and changed like the persons of a pantomime.* The change was the stroke of an enchanter's wand, a surprise and a delusion; the effects of the change were real, terrible, universal, and permanent—by what means, for what purpose, with what results?

From 1814, as recently clearly shown in the despatches of Lord Castlereagh, it was the settled and profound conviction of the British Government that the ambition of Russia was alarming to England, and dangerous also to the rest of Europe, and especially to France. This was, in fact, the sole danger by which Europe was threatened, and the field open to her ambition was known to be specially Turkey, the Euxine, and the East.

Lord Palmerston came into office in 1830. In the previous year he had moved the Opposition in the House of Commons to attack the Government during the war be-

* It is well known that Lord Palmerston presented the treaty (brought from St. Petersburg, by M. Brunow) for his colleagues to sign. Their resistance he conquered by a threat—that of retiring, “carrying his convictions with him.” He had already secured the Duke of Wellington, so that his threat was of turning them out.

tween Russia and Turkey, not because they had abandoned Turkey to Russia—not because they had turned a deaf ear to the solicitations of Prince Metternich, but because they had not declared that under every circumstance, under any contingency, England must always be on the side of Russia and against the Turks. It was this speech (1st June, 1829), that introduced Lord Palmerston into the Foreign Office, being hailed by his party as an evidence of extraordinary capacity, and accepted by Russia as an assurance, if, indeed, after 1828, she wanted such an assurance, that he was a man fit to play her game.

But he was not able to bring into the Foreign Office his avowed principles along with him. The war of Poland having excited feelings hostile to her, and awakened apprehensions of her, he had to take the other line. He did so, in so vehement a manner and with such entire success, that the people of England, notwithstanding the political fervour excited and power acquired by the Reform, remained calm and passive during that war, in the confidence inspired by his being in the Foreign Office. He came, indeed, to be considered as the author of an alliance with France, the value of which consisted in counteracting the ambition and the power of Russia. He avoided committing himself in Parliament, not so in those private circles which regulate affairs without, and in contempt of, Parliament: at the very moment that he was paralysing the proposed measures of France (and, indeed, of all Europe and Asia), for the support of Poland, his colleagues were hanging upon him, labouring to soothe his fretful temperament, and to restrain his warlike ardour.*

A great embarrassment and prospective danger presented themselves, however, in the constant necessity of declara-

* I was once answered by one of his colleagues with these words—
“Why, it was all we could do to keep him decently civil with the Russian Ambassador.”

tions which were at variance with every act and with every result. The acts for a time, and a long time, were concealed, and the results came after a long interval, and were misrepresented as they appeared. With months and years, however, embarrassments came; he was not master to consult either his own ease or safety, and was of course urged on to the furthest limit of activity that Russia judged practicable for herself, or compatible with the temporary safety of her instrument.

This ostensible animosity was then positively turned to account. A regency in Greece, which she did not find pliant to her wishes, was attacked by Lord Palmerston and expelled on the charge falsely brought against it, of a leaning towards Russia, with whom England was at the time acting under treaty. It was next used as a pretext for the quadruple treaty for settling the affairs of Spain: by that treaty the convulsions of the Peninsula were prolonged, the first germs of difference with France created, and the occasion furnished to Russia for a counter alliance to the constitutional alliance of the west.*

On his return to office, in 1835, after the short interregnum of the Duke of Wellington, he was placed in a

* In an article in the *Morning Chronicle*, Jan. 16, 1844, which bears internal evidence of being from the pen of Lord Palmerston, which was at the time alleged to be so by the *Herald*, the *Chronicle* only replying by expressing anger at the betrayal of editorial confidence—he says:—“*The originator and signer of the quadruple treaty which WITHDREW SPAIN FROM RUSSIAN INFLUENCE; the statesman who embarked with such frankness and boldness in the constitutional league of the west, and who, on the Indus and the Danube, the Persian Gulf, and the Dardanelles, made the boldest stand of any European politician against the encroachments of Russia in Europe and in Asia—he, according to that concentration of all absurdity which forms Mr. Urquhart’s logic, was Russian in soul!*” The charge was, that he had served Russia in those measures, and deceived England by pretending that they were planned to oppose her. His defence consists in enumerating the counts.

novel and unexpected position. Hitherto his only danger consisted in the discovery of discrepancies between his words and his acts, by men wholly ignorant of the subject matter; but about this time a new school had arisen in the East. Several persons who had separately devoted themselves to the inquiry had met, and concurring in their judgments, had concerted their plan of operations, and having each refused the most attractive offers from Russia to engage in her service, had resolved, though they were not all British subjects, to address themselves to the English Government, conceiving that its past acts had been the result of ignorance and blindness alone. They succeeded in gaining attention to their statements, and conviction in the highest and most influential quarters attended their arguments and their efforts.

Lord Palmerston, during several months, resisted, and resisted in such a manner as to give birth to the suspicion of his being no course adopted in ignorance or in error; no sooner were those suspicions articulated, than he turned right round; the denouncers of his policy and the accusers of himself were placed in the posts of chief confidence as the sign to the world of his change and the earnest to them of his integrity. The press of England, with his sanction, launched forth against Russia, as recently it has done against France; the demeanour assumed by the British Government was that of hostility, not only fixed and inveterate, but incoherent and extravagant. To oppose Russia in reality neither *éclat* nor vehemence were required. He published a mass of official correspondence, taken by the Poles at Warsaw—a correspondence which laid bare the secret of that wonderful system, and put an end to every possible question as to the perfidy of her means or the hostility of her purposes. Lord Palmerston, two years afterwards, denied that this publication was under “official sanction.” I will, there-

fore, mention the names of the persons engaged in it, and the reader will find for himself the epithet that belongs to the publication and the denial. Those persons are the *two Under Secretaries of State*, Mr. Backhouse and Mr. Strangways; *the Envoy in Persia*, Sir John M'Neill; by counsel and aid from a distance, *the Ambassador at Constantinople*, Lord Ponsonby; *the Secretary of Embassy in Turkey*, myself; *the King's Private Secretary*, Sir Herbert Taylor. There was not a document selected for publication that was not selected by Lord Palmerston, or at all events the selection of which was not sanctioned by him; there was not an article appeared that was not revised in type in the Foreign Office, and there were few that had not received previously the sanction of the King. Several secret reports to the Government appeared as simple editorial articles. The tradesmen's accounts for the expenses incurred were delivered in to the Foreign Office in the course of business, and remain there to this day.* I have only mentioned those whose participation I can substantiate by written documents in my possession.

I must here pause. We—I mean Sir John M'Neill and myself—in moving these measures, did not attach any importance to this publication, beyond committing Lord Palmerston publicly to the line which he professed in private. We attached no importance whatever to public opinion. We knew perfectly that the whole question lay in the intention and purposes of the Minister.

* A year afterwards the settlement of the accounts was refused, while at the same time the means of proof were left in my hands. It was at that time (after the sacrifice of the Vixen) an object for Lord Palmerston to render flagrant his connection with the *Portfolio*, to counteract the suspicions to which that sacrifice had given rise; and for this very reason did I abstain from urging the suit at that time, and preferred paying the charge, which amounted to about £1,400.

We knew that the nation might be saved or finally betrayed without the nation knowing anything about it. We knew that the tide of opinion which we had raised, and which seemed to support us, was of no avail against the secret intentions of a Minister; and that not only might it with equal ease be turned in an opposite sense, but that change being the rule of opinion it would fall and ebb of necessity; the height to which it had risen being an evidence of the depth to which it would sink. The reservation which I thus make I feel due to others and to myself, and also to those who may apply themselves hereafter to this Cause, in order that they may not be misled in estimating our judgment on so important a point.

But even this was not all. The Vixen was sent to open the Black Sea, and to give life and hope to Circassia; a treaty of commerce was adjusted with Turkey, which was, in reality, a defensive treaty against Russia.

Russia, thus placed under the ban of Europe by the Minister of England, treated with scorn and contumely such as has never yet been known between independent nations when not engaged in war, and scarcely equalled even then; at once the object of the fiercest denunciations in England, and of her efforts, diplomatically and publicly, to arouse against her the whole of Europe—had not a word to say! She took no offence, demanded no explanations, required the dismissal of no agents—and evacuated Silistria! It was now not only that the British Minister had publicly declared his hostility to Russia—but that policy was easily triumphant, and successful without a blow. No opposition had been manifested to this course in the House of Commons. On the contrary, he received from that body support so strong, that the pursuit of that policy in which we had engaged him, was made the very condition of ministerial existence, and the Ministry remained in power only by assenting to the motion of Mr. Patrick

Stewart, on the subject of the Black Sea and the consular agent at Cracow, and by pledging itself to carry it into effect.

A short time elapses. The tide of public opinion sinks. Parliament goes, of course, round with it. *The King dies.* The public press has forgotten all it used to say; the persons appointed because of their opposition to Russia are either sacrificed or made the instruments of effecting the objects against which they had striven.* The Vixen becomes a Russian man-of-war. The treaty with Turkey is surreptitiously changed, so as to effect the very reverse of its original intention. Thus concluded the second portion of the drama, by acts contradicting all the opinions that had been expressed, by results the reverse of all the measures that had been adopted, and in violation alike of the pledges given to the King and given to the Parliament, and of the command imposed by the one, and the course of policy laid down by the other.

But all this while *the language* did not change.

Then came the great quarrel with Russia about Central Asia. This was the fourth boiling up of indignation of Lord Palmerston against Russia. On the first occasion it was to enable him to sacrifice Poland. On the second, to convulse Spain and Greece. On the third, to allay the suspicions of the King, and to preserve his Ministerial position in Parliament. Now, it was at once to counteract the charges which then for the first time were publicly made and echoed through the country, and to *furnish a pretext for the unhappy expedition across the Indus.*

* The author of the "Progress of Russia in the East," when driven out of Persia, confided the interests of England to the Russian mission, and was then graciously received at St. Petersburg, and decorated on his return to London with the Grand Cross of the Bath, to cover, as Lord Palmerston said, "his failure:" he is now Poor Law Commissioner for Scotland.

Still there remained invariably the same position—*contradiction between words and acts*. Each step he made in advance, whether in that course which was no longer optional for him,—whether to shelter himself against the dangers besetting his path—there was always the growing accumulation of results in contradiction to professions. The point to be reached and turned was that where, by the accumulation of results, he should be enabled to change profession—that is, by his acts in favour of Russia he should have prepared common grounds of action with her, and by the reaction of those results on France, he should be able to present her to England as hostile. That point gained, he was safe and triumphant. The very fact of the change would procure such an explosion from France against England, that he would be enabled to come boldly forward, using as his shield the very weapons of his accusers. We had been alleging a real union with Russia, and a false one with France, and we pointed to his acts on one hand, and his words on another. These did not fail to have effect. The arms were struck from our hands when he could *say* that he *was* acting with Russia and *against* France. Englishmen do not know what the interests or duties of England are; all that they were struck by was, his doing one thing and saying another. The instant that he could avow what he was doing, they accepted his avowal as a defence:—what he had done became “the policy of England.” When he had joined England in a treaty with Russia against France all suspicion was extinguished by the very act that crowned the perfidy and capped the proof.*

It was entirely hopeless that the British Parliament, after sanctioning such an act, should think of endeavouring to force its Minister to maintain the rights of England against

* “What more can be said—ENGLAND AND RUSSIA UNITED.”—Words of Sir F. Burdett.

the new ally he had given it, when it had failed to do so against an ostensible foe ; when, too, deprived of its old ally, and that ally held to be the danger against which the aid of Russia might be required. Its vision was so hazy that the leader of the Opposition years afterwards remarked that “ he *never clearly understood* why the alliance with France was broken, of which the Noble Lord had formerly been so justly proud.” All independent action was now extinguished, and the Minister who two days before had to tremble at the suspicion of any leaning to Russia, and who had to justify his own submission to her on the sole ground of her strength and England’s weakness (see debate on Cracow of 13th July, 1840), now proclaimed his alliance with her, as the explanation of his past and the grounds of his *future policy*. Lord Palmerston, on the 8th of August, declared that nothing had disturbed the union between England and France, that they continued to be agreed on essential points, and differed only in some minor details—yet an instantaneous arming of France follows ! A dread of a war suddenly spread over England, not as arising from the acts of her own Minister, but from the “ aggressive disposition of the French people ;” “ France was, as ever she had been, a dangerous neighbour ;” “ England was fortunate in possessing a Minister who at the very opportune moment had given her an ally such as Russia, having alone *foreseen the necessity of such a step*.” All this has been foreseen. It was distinctly announced at the time, but of course those only who were prepared for the event before its occurrence can be at present aware either of the process by which the change of opinion in England was effected, or of the fact of that change. The nation does not at present recollect its sudden revulsion, or the passage from one set of conclusions to another, that coincided with their passage from a condition of repose and indifference to one of excitement and alarm.

It is true that a transitory re-action did expel, or aided in expelling from office, the Administration of which Lord Palmerston was a member. It is also true that his successors endeavoured as best they could to patch up matters with France, and succeeded to a certain degree in keeping things in repose. But the new position which he created remained unchanged, and if the seed did not germinate, it slumbered in the soil till the vineyard was confided again to his culturing hand.

Hitherto he had led France by appearing to oppose Russia. How now could he expect to sway her councils? He did so, nevertheless. A few days before leaving office he signed with her a treaty (13th July, 1841) which re-enacted the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which she, in common with England, had protested against; excluding therefrom foreign ships of war *during peace*, while by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi they were only to be excluded during war. On this condition was France re-admitted to the community of the European nations, from which she had been excluded the previous year, because she assumed to be disinclined to a Russian occupation of Constantinople. This was the real, but unobserved result of the quarrel which Lord Palmerston had fabricated in the previous year—the prototype of the Montpensier quarrel of 1846. It was a Minister brought into power in France to preserve the *English alliance*, that put his signature to this bond!

Having thus made safe the game for Russia, and irrevocably fixed the position of his antagonists, he retired from office, leaving them for a time the responsibility of carrying on the affairs of England according to his plan. His return to office was effected by a public reception of him in Paris, doing away with the impression in England that he was a dangerous Minister. He thus replaced himself, on his return to office in 1846, in exactly the position in which he stood on his entrance to office in 1830, namely, as the

ally of France and as the enemy of Russia. To confirm this impression, he availed himself of a debate in the House of Commons upon the subject of Cracow. Being no longer under the necessity of being on guard against motions and representations, he boldly comes forward, *for the first time in Parliament*, as the friend of Poland and as Russia's foe. England enters no longer into his calculations; the House of Commons affords him only the opportunity of working on France. To what purpose we will trace in a subsequent letter.

I remain, Sir, &c.

LETTER VI.

THE PART OF FRANCE.

SIR,—We have seen that Lord Palmerston came back to office in 1846 in his old position of 1830—alliance with France, opposition to Russia. As France's confidence had been obtained by his anti-Russian professions in 1830, despite his vehement advocacy of her interests in the previous year; so, in 1846, did her easy memory overlook 1840. In the first period she persevered in her belief in him, notwithstanding his previous words and subsequent conduct; in the latter she eagerly grasped at any lisped sentence or muttered inuendo, half sneer,* half taunt, which could serve as a pretext to herself for escaping from the intellectual effort, of opposing him. This analogy shows the perfect inability of France to deal with any case of difficulty. Lord Palmerston is as completely her master, and she as entirely his slave, as if some fable of Eastern necromancy had been translated into real life, and we saw before us the enchanter and his wand, and the enchanted, converted at his will, now into lifeless marble, now into savage beasts. In 1830 a secret whisper changed England and France to stone—and Poland, not Russia, fell. In 1840 a menacing sentence pronounced in Downing Street to a dozen bewildered colleagues—and France became a maddened beast, England a laughing idiot. In 1846 he abstains from uttering a sentence—and the public law of Europe falls with one crash, and beyond are seen the as yet indistinct but hideous forms of anarchy and revolution, of convulsion within each state, and war, not as hitherto, of ambition or injustice, but with a new and horri-

* *Louis Philippe.* Milor, vous venez visiter la France?—*Lord Palmerston.* Non, je viens voir les Francois.

ble face—war of hatred and imbecility : in the foreground Treason, with the mask of Peace, conducting us to the field with the words of security.

The difference, as already stated, between the two periods (1830 and 1846) was, that in the first he could not open his mouth against Russia in the House of Commons. It was against the hostile sense to her of the House that he had to contend. Then, too, he had also to regard a Sovereign : there was also then a high public functionary in a position to control his acts, without being a political partizan or a member of the Cabinet—the private secretary to the King. All this has disappeared in 1846. He can say now what he likes in the House of Commons ; feelings, obstacles, knowledge, have all disappeared, and therefore he brings to bear upon France a new power, in the faculty of regaining her confidence by declarations against Russia. He had in France to conquer profound antipathies ; if these were overawed on the part of the Government, it was not so on the part of the public and the Opposition ; still, by his new liberty of speech in the House of Commons, that France, which is divided upon all subjects, he has reconciled in devotion to himself. This may appear at the present hour startling, and in our actual position inconceivable ; but the proofs are incontrovertible. The French Government confided in him, since it took steps to procure his re-admission into the Ministry of England. The leader of the opposition confided in him, as shown in their reconciliation, which was signalized by the speech of M. Thiers (Lord Palmerston being present) for the *increase of the navy of France*, which was the abandonment of all M. Thiers' former doctrines, and of his theory of an alliance with England, as based on the treaties of 1815. His organ justified all that Lord Palmerston had done in 1840, and put upon him, M. Thiers, all the blame ; it expressed regret that *he!* had prevented at that time the signing of a com-

mercial treaty with England; and declared Lord Palmerston to be "*the only statesman in England prepared to take a bold and decided course against Russia.*" Here was evidently a coalition between Lord Palmerston and the Opposition in France against M. Guizot—the Minister, brought in because friendly to England and especially agreeable to Lord Palmerston.

On the first differences with respect to Spain, the Opposition journals attack, not Lord Palmerston, but M. Guizot; no indignation is aroused in their minds by the insults of the English press, directed not less against the turbulence of the French people than the ambition of the French Court. On M. Guizot is laid the whole blame of this rupture. He it is that has sacrificed the French alliance, and Lord Palmerston it is that has pronounced words that are "*french.*"

As soon as the consequences of the quarrel appear, M. Guizot it is that has extinguished Cracow. In a manifest of M. Thiers in the *Constitutionnel* of the 4th of September, he says—"The Whigs, friends of our revolution, return to power. They had signally manifested (*avec éclat*) their desire to live in good harmony with France (the trip of Lord Palmerston to Paris, and his excursions with M. Thiers round the fortifications). *They* had pronounced even on the subject of Cracow those words so energetic and so *french* which have been twenty times quoted. That alliance was more natural, more easy, more useful than ever, and it is on that very day that YOU HAVE BROKEN IT!"

He goes on to say, "It is the Spanish marriage that has destroyed the last vestige of the nationality of Poland. *Our Ministry is the real destroyer of Cracow!*"

He then taunts the Government with its mean compliances in this dilemma, in order to curry favour with Russia, and exultingly points to the contemptuous repulse

they had received. He makes a revelation, too, of some importance, which it seems there has been a common understanding not to notice, and which, nevertheless, explains the whole matter very simply. It is neither more nor less than the contentment of the Czar with the Montpensier marriage:—"LET THEM DENY, IF IT IS NOT TRUE, THAT A WORD OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA PRONOUNCED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MARRIAGE, HAS BEEN REPEATED WITH JOY AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW POLICY. AND WHAT HAS NOT BEEN SAID, IN THE SAME SENSE, OF THE LANGUAGE HELD BY THE MINISTER OF RUSSIA AT THE OFFICIAL RECEPTION OF THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF MONTPENSIER?"

What a strange position is here revealed! M. Thiers denouncing M. Guizot for subserviency to Russia, applauding Lord Palmerston as her only opponent. M. Thiers on the same line as the Czar working the downfall of M. Guizot on the subject of the Spanish marriages, and both on the same line as Lord Palmerston, with whom M. Thiers coalesces because of his opposition to Russia. The Czar encouraging M. Guizot to the marriages, and then scorning his advances when made in consequence of that encouragement. Lord Palmerston helping M. Guizot to the marriages, and then attacking him when they are completed. M. Thiers concurring with M. Guizot in bringing Lord Palmerston into power, and then attacking him on the consequences of having brought Lord Palmerston into power; holding M. Guizot responsible for the destruction of Cracow, and proving him to have been insulted by the Czar! M. Thiers, Lord Palmerston, and the Czar, all assaulting M. Guizot, and M. Guizot having all the time as his intimate counsellor and friend the Princess Lieven! Such is the appendix to "The History of Civilization" in the nineteenth century—that "furthest progress and development of the human

mind" which has succeeded in combining in itself "at once the human and divine natures."

But when this change occurs in the opposition and republican prints, do the Government organs turn round the other way? Do they retort the charges made from this side of the Channel of perfidy towards England, and connivance with Russia? So far from it, the *Journal des Débats* takes upon itself to defend Lord Palmerston against the attacks of the English press. One paper (the *Standard*) had, during two months, asserted and reiterated that Lord Palmerston had acted for Russia; unceasingly designated him the "tool of the Czar;" and alleged him to have been so for "twenty years." *With this charge none of the organs of Lord Palmerston ventured to deal.* It was the *Journal des Débats* that came forward to vouch, as Lord Palmerston's adversary, for his character and honesty, and to treat, as too absurd to require disproof, the allegation "that Lord Palmerston was swayed by any other than British motives." The sentiments in this respect of the *Débats* were re-echoed by the *Siècle*, which proved historically that England always served the purposes of Russia, and that Lord Palmerston (the only British statesman bold and decided against Russia) was, therefore, only following a profound principle of national policy.

To this unanimity there was, however, an exception, in "the avowed organ of Russia." It re-echoed with approval the parts of my letters which explained the conduct of Lord Palmerston. It denounced that Minister as "the sole source of all the mischief," as a firebrand offensive to the Northern Powers as well as France; and declared that "no good understanding could exist between England and France so long as he was Minister." Thus was he guarded and exhibited as invulnerable by the real shield held up before him by the organ of the French Government, and by the imaginary shaft

levelled at him by the organ of the Russian.* And must not that Minister be at once thoroughly English and thoroughly French who is applauded by every section of opinion in France, saving only the organ of Russia!

This extraordinary position has been realized by the extinction of all independent thought and judgment in the House of Commons. His words which, in that assembly, evaporated as idle breath, fell upon France as a fertilising shower, and taken in at each gaping crack of its parched soil, caused instantly to germinate the seeds already scattered; a growth of green and rank confidence came up, in the man who had gored and worried them, bound and lashed them, and then scoffed at their manhood and their bonds. As, in 1840, he had been hailed by his opponents in England as the "Conservative Minister," because he had trampled upon France, so now was he hailed in France as the "French" Minister in England, at once by those who feared change, and by the most vehement of the democrats and the republicans. A sentence dropped in Parliament, which no one in England had even observed, effected this.

What, then, were those talismanic words, which restored Lord Palmerston to the unbounded confidence of the Court of France, of its Parliament, of its Ministry, and of its Opposition?

First, however, it may be well to consider what it was desirable, or the reverse, for Russia, that France should do. It may be imagined, adopting my hypothesis, that with the concurrence of the two northern Courts, and the Minister of England acting in collusion with her, France

* The *Presse*, however, took care at the same time to represent him as a far inferior man to M. Guizot, by whom he had been completely overreached, and it also took care to assert in the same article that there was no connection between the Spanish marriages and the confiscation of Cracow.

could do nothing. This, however, is not the case. There was a course, by which France could have disturbed the combinations of Russia at every point, upset the Minister in England, recovered the alliance with England, and retrieved Austria. Such were the infallible consequences of taking the simplest of all possible courses, and the only one which an attorney's clerk or an *avoué* would have taken, had the case been put into his hands to deal with as a transaction between private individuals.

The single word PROTEST carries all these consequences. I do not mean the *equivoque* to which the name has been perfidiously affixed, but that legal, solemn, and terrible instrument, the declaration by a great people that its rights were violated, and thereupon the declaration that all treaties with the Powers guilty of the violation were null and void.

Let it suffice to indicate some of the most salient effects of such a measure. England's Minister would have been at once placed in the alternative of siding with France in her protest, or of being held as bringing about a rupture with France, because he sided with the Northern Powers. Can there be a doubt as to the result? As to Austria's position, I need only refer to the *Chronicle* and the *Times*. Why is the 5th of September, 1746, and its anniversary, so industriously recalled? What means the continual reference to Poland, to Hungary, and to Italy? The insecurity of Austria is great, and her position really alarming, even under the circumstances which those journals suppose—not of France taking her stand upon right and enabling Austria to escape from her dependence, but as opposed to France, re-enacting her revolutionary part of 1793, without a revolution, and without a Napoleon!

This signification to the subjects of Austria, by the re-interruption of diplomatic intercourse, of the danger of collision with France in a cause where she would not be

pursuing a war of aggression, or for the purposes of propaganda, but for the maintenance of the Treaty of Vienna, would be utterly impossible for Austria to brave. Thus would Austria have been retrieved and united to France as effectually as England.

Of Prussia I need not speak ; nor need I speak of Russia. Russia's preponderance exists solely in the belief spread from country to country that she sways every other. It has been remarked by Gustavus III., in his valuable little work, entitled, "The Danger of Europe," that in proportion as she advances and appears to strengthen herself, she incurs corresponding weakness, because the newly incorporated States, or the more nearly approached neighbours come to know her and detest her. But "the obstacles that spring out of their hatred, she subdues by the control that she obtains over Courts at a distance." Break the spell of that control, and you would then see reversed the positions, and France would instantaneously become as terrible to Russia as Russia is to the rest of Europe. The compressed elements of internal discord would then reappear, neighbours regain confidence, and subjects think again of independence ; and she would stand changed in an instant, to the quarry from the hawk.

The Government of France, now prostrated by the shame of its position, and by the animosities aroused within, would have stood forward at the head of the true and just and energetic thoughts, with which it would have inspired its whole people.

But a Protest in such a case would not stand alone. It must have been followed, if disregarded, by other steps, the first of which must have been the legal abrogation of that and every other treaty binding France and the Northern Powers. Consequently, on the day that that protest was made would have been torn the treaties of 1840, and 1841 ; the diplomatic web of craft would then have been rent

asunder, and the passage through the Dardanelles to Sevastopol re-opened. If France had then found it requisite to proceed further, and by practical but safe and easy measures to determine the wavering course of Prussia or of Austria, it would have required but a broadside delivered on that fortress to call to arms and life Poland, to rouse every subject population, from the frozen ocean of the north to the wastes of Tartary, and to cover her whole frontier, from the Pruth to the Jaik, with one sheet of invasion. France, by one single moment of energy, might have recalled and put to profit the circumstances of 1831.

Such were the dangers that environed Russia in this recent transaction. Such the occasion presented to France, and to which it was requisite she should be entirely blinded. We are now prepared for the words of Lord Palmerston—"so very energetic and so very French;" they are as follows:—

"IT CANNOT ESCAPE THE PERSPICACITY OF THE NORTHERN POWERS, THAT A TREATY THAT IS NOT GOOD UPON THE VISTULA IS EQUALLY BAD UPON THE RHINE AND THE PO."

The phrase presented to France a new world—the restoration of the alliance of the two countries. A new policy was announced in England, in the recognition of a danger which threatened them in common. That decision, energy, and boldness which had characterized Lord Palmerston in his proceedings, when his mind was filled with fears for France would now be equally directed against the new source of his alarm. His estimate of the value of numbers and of "geographical circumstances" had undergone an entire revolution since the 13th of July, 1840. Who could doubt that the alliance between the two countries was now firm and immutable, when Lord Palmerston threatened the Northern Powers, and threatened them not with anything that England was to do, but with something which

he trusted to France to perform? Who could doubt the honourable terms of his friendship, when he spoke of those steps which she would take, and on which he relied for the protection of the interests of England and the public law of Europe as measures which required, on the part of such a Government as Russia, *perspicacity to discover*, and as being of such weight as to impose upon those who dared to provoke or disregard them the character of folly?

Advice is also given, and in the most delicate and deferential manner.

But in appearing to threaten Russia, he does not do so, he does not so much as allude to anything that England has the power to do. If I had still to prove my case—if it still remained to be shown that the proceeding is one of fraud and treachery—I would here pause and ask how, foreseeing this contingency, resting upon this support, and discharging upon France the duty of defending the interests of England, he could allow any difference, if a real one, to become the cause of a quarrel with France? I would ask how, reckoning upon her for the defence of the existing treaties, and those upon which the whole condition of Europe rests—for at Vienna all prior treaties were swept away—he quarrelled with her about a treaty which had expired half a century ago?

Is that, which France has to do, some grave decision of her Cabinet, publicly avowed or secretly conveyed to him? No. It is a suggestion *of his own*. Is this suggestion, that she should attack the coalition, in its heart and head? No. It is that France herself shall violate the Treaty of Vienna. She is to invade Italy and Germany.

Had Lord Palmerston said, that a treaty that was bad on the Vistula vitiated those treaties that affected the Dardanelles, his words would have been no less French, but then they would have been *English*. He then would have

pointed to the legal consequences of the infraction of the treaty upon the Vistula, and to the means that England and France possessed to punish or prevent the outrage. The accomplishment of his prognostications, or the acceptance of his advice, involved, not a protest against the infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, but such act upon the part of France as should render herself the object of a protest on the part of England.

“THE PO” and “THE RHINE.” What volumes are in those names, and what bearing, when muttered by such a man, and in reference to such an occasion ! The thought could never have arisen in the mind of the French Cabinet; for to revolutionise Italy or Germany, or to restore one of the barrier fortresses, which was the first application of the word “RHINE,” would have been a declaration against England, but it came from the English Minister. It came presented at once as a step pleasing, useful, and needful to England. That the lesson might not be forgotten, it was repeated in the columns of the English press at the proper moment, and instantly the grand idea is paraded in the organ of the French Government:—

TIMES.

“If these clauses are so worthless, that the three Powers of the North may complete their work of destruction in Poland, by the direct and open annihilation of Cracow, there is not an engagement in the treaty of Vienna which can stand against the will of any Power disposed to break it; and to talk of the faith of treaties is an extravagant fiction. They, be it remembered, have set the example on the Vistula; let them not be surprised if it be imitated elsewhere.”

JOURNAL DES DEBATS.

“As treaties are no longer binding for the Northern Powers, why should they continue to shackle France, in preventing the establishment of works, the destruction of which laid bare her eastern frontier?”

The result was that orders were despatched by the King to re-occupy the site of Huningen, and M. Guizot was

quite prepared to adopt the proposal of the King. Had this plan been carried into effect, not only was France out of court as regarded Poland and the Treaty of Vienna—but she could be hounded through the streets, and worried on the first dunghill. That Lord Palmerston was prepared to turn to profit, as well as to prompt this false and fatal step, is not left to be conjectured. The argument in the *Débats*, and the intelligence of the orders sent respecting Huningen, seem to have led him into a premature confidence. Anticipating no farther difficulty, he laid his hand on the next piece before his antagonist had withdrawn his. France saw the blunder, and withdrew her move. Lord Palmerston's words (in the *Chronicle*), were—

“England is not prepared to abet France in breaking the treaty of Vienna on the Rhine, or beyond the Alps, *because* the Northern Powers have broken it at Cracow.”

Strange contrast and concurrence with—“A treaty that is bad on the Vistula cannot be good on the Rhine and the Po.” Observe the neatness of the variation—“beyond the Alps” for “Po,” and “at Cracow” for “on the Vistula.” This is the only mistake that I have been able to detect; but if I am right in attributing to the too hasty revelation of his joy, the sudden change at Paris and the recall of the orders to fortify Huningen, then, indeed, is this mistake of the gravest order.

This, however, is clear—that orders were sent to fortify Huningen, which was the adoption of his advice declared in Parliament, and that then these orders were withdrawn, which was again the adoption of the opposite view of the case put forward in the *Chronicle*.

It was not, however, without a struggle that the King and M. Guizot were driven from their idea. The Minister of the Interior is said to have objected in the Cabinet, and to have been supported by all the other Members. This brought what was termed a “Ministerial crisis,” which

ended by M. Guizot keeping his place and abandoning his purpose. These details are, however, of no importance, save that the rumour tallies with what may be supposed to have been the manner in which France was driven first one way, then another, under the impulses proceeding from England.

Had Huningen been fortified, there would have been practically a coalition of England and the Northern Powers, and hundreds of thousands of men might have been marched to extinguish in that crater * of Paris, the volcano which menaced Europe—a volcano called into being by the very menace of extinguishing it!

We have escaped from an immediate war, but still has the end proposed by the epigrammatic sentence been realised, and France has been effectually led away from the true bold and sane course.

Thus blinded, in this dilemma what is she to do? England rejects her proposal for a joint protest. She cannot copy Lord Palmerston's document. To assume that the act had not occurred, against which the protest or pseudo-protest is made, is a thing not to be repeated in the same age. The result is a second-rate leader in a *doctrinaire* journal. How great the triumph obtained, and consequently how great the danger that had been run may be inferred from the strains of exultation in which the event is celebrated by Lord Palmerston in his own official organ.

“ So, if not the matter, we have at any rate an account of the manner of Monsieur Guizot's Protest. Whatever may be the French Minister's faults, want of politeness is not amongst the number. Were he to offer himself as dancing-master to Prince Metternich, his manners could not be characterised by a more perfect fascination. The first point to be settled ' by the Council of State, assisted by some high personages admitted within a sanc-

* M. Thiers, in showing Lord Palmerston over the fortifications of Paris addressed him thus :—“*Voilà vos enfants.*” Yet M. Thiers was offended in 1840, when I told him that he was building “ barracks for the Baskirs.”

tuary closed to vulgar eyes,'—we quote from the *Portefeuille*—was to know whether the Protest was to have the shape of a note or of a despatch. ' *Fallait-il dire la figure d'un chapeau, ou bien la forme?*' That was the key of the position. Had Monsieur Guizot forwarded one of his sincere *notes*, the destinies of European nations might have been deeply imperilled. The *despatch* has saved all. Well, well, we are past that turning. * * * Could anything be more delightful than all this? With M. de Bresson to do the heavy Macairisms, and M. de Flahaut to apologise for them, and salve matters over, a Minister or a King may go through the world. They are like the figures of the two monks in the Dutch toy. When the weather is foul, out steps M. de Bresson; when the sun appears once more, M. de Flahaut gently glides out from his retirement to bow, conciliate, apologise, and agree with everybody. * * * All this sounds very well, and we doubt not that M. de Flahaut's pot of honey will be well received at Vienna. How is it, however, there is such confusion in the *enemy's* ranks? How is it that the *Portefeuille* falls to bludgeon-play with the unhappy *Presse*, which has devilled for M. Guizot in so enthusiastic a spirit during the late crisis?

"France has had as much to do with the question throughout as the island of Java. We have never accused the French people of being sharers in the wretched intrigue at Madrid. It is the King of the French who has used their great name for attaining his end—such as it was; and we have ever said that the transactions at the Chateau d'Eu, in which they could scarcely be said to be concerned, was the great reason why he should have abstained from the act. Whatever comes of it, let not the people on either side of the Channel forget that the annexation of Cracow is part and parcel of the Montpensier marriage. Whoever caused the one, caused the other. Had the transactions at Madrid not occurred, neither would the events at Cracow.

"As for any possibility of acting with the French Foreign Office upon this occasion, it would merely have been exposing ourselves to the general derision of Europe, and to no purpose. Observe, however, the practical results of all this cajolery. The Duc de Montpensier has got his dowry, and Austria has got her Cracow. There for the present is an end of it."

One of the organs of Lord Palmerston had declared that it was impossible that these measures could have been adopted unless with a prior understanding with one of these Governments. In consequence of the indignation which that act excited in France, it withdrew its charge; but the argument stands:—there must have been collusion with one of the two Governments. The question was not

then between France and the Northern Powers, but between France and England, or rather between France and Lord Palmerston. To displace him from office was to cause the whole case to fall. The exposure of him, or the mere refusal to hold intercourse with him, must have displaced him from office, as France would have accepted the Treaty of 1840, or abandoned the Spanish marriages, or turned out Thiers or Guizot, in short adopted any measure or abandoned any man if put to her as the alternative of a rupture with England. So would England, if the alternative was put to her, have abandoned Lord Palmerston rather than the French alliance. The boldest move on either side will always carry both nations. This would have been the result if Lord Palmerston had a character, and had internal support, and if he had been in the right. This was not a course at the option of the French Government to adopt or to neglect. It was attacked in the official organs of the English Government; not only were the King and Government charged with treacherous collusion with Russia, with perfidious acts towards England, but the people of France were excited to revolt, and the Sovereign of France threatened with expulsion from the throne. It was not one act but many such—it was not one day of ill-humour but an unceasing storm. The bare necessity of self-defence required that she should interrupt all intercourse with such a man. Supposing that in the French Cabinet or Court there had been but for one hour the feelings of a man, would not the English Ambassador have been sent away? And what, let me ask any man, the simplest or the wisest, would have been the result? Must the Minister not have been driven with ignominy from power, and instantaneously? And consequently, is it not clear that the confiscation of Cracow never would have been attempted unless they had been perfectly safe as regarded the French Court, Cabinet, and Chambers. Is

it not, in fact, the story of 1840 over again? Is it not the same "child lost in the wood, and singing to convince itself that it is not afraid, and then bursting into tears?" Is it not the same spectacle of humiliation then exhibited and thus described by a Minister, "We were ten men, and we knew nothing about the matter, one more than the other; and there was the King, who knew no more than any one of us, and *who was sobbing.*"

In the fact and purpose of the insults directed against the French King and Government was involved the betrayal of England and the prostration of Europe; and the King of the French, by dealing with that insult as the meanest subject would have dealt with it, must have rescued England from her infatuation, and Europe from the thralldom which that infatuation imposes. The scheme would, in fact, have been broken, and not by accident. Fortune, hitherto secured to the adverse party by play, would have been lost to it. We, indeed, are all cool spectators, not so the principals. These are two men who feel as no others can so much as imagine. *Louis Philippe and Lord Palmerston have THEIR HEADS ON THE HAZARD.*

A single sentence in the King of France's speech—not a denunciatory sentence—not a criminatory one—but the mere expression of the fact of the disunion of the two Cabinets having prevented concert to support the treaties of Vienna, and an exculpation of his own Government from the charge of having brought about that disunion, would have turned the scale in his favour. This is not done, and the King of the French is no more aware that he has kept Lord Palmerston in office in January, 1847, than the British nation is that Louis Philippe had imposed him upon them in July, 1846.

This fatal step of the King of the French has been of course the object of the solicitude and the result of the

labours of Lord Palmerston. To enable himself to come into power, he made use of the Queen and Lord Brougham, and "the ablest man in Europe" was thus bamboozled into inviting him to the Tuileries. It is the same story over again. The *Chronicle* of to-day expatiates with scarcely concealed delight upon the management with which epithet after epithet in the King's speech has been pared down, until the eunuch document was brought to a smooth perfection of its caste. The *Times* of to-day indicates in some degree the method of the operation. Under the management of one despatched *ad hoc*, a well-recommended person, and of light touch. And thus has the world seen the consummation of the Montpensier marriage in events that realise the imaginings which had hitherto only floated through the minds of men when they spoke of impotent conclusions.

In dealing with human affairs, knowledge, judgment, and courage are requisite for success, when these affairs present difficulty or danger. Each of these alone may avail for success, or retard and diminish failure; but what is to be expected where all are combined on the one side, and all are wanting on the other? This England will understand to her cost, when the time shall come for Russia to transpose the parts; and it will be the Russian who is Minister in Paris, and the fool who is Minister in London.

What a singular thing, that in an age when charges of treason are bandied about against a Sovereign, the idea of treason should be horrible as applied to a Minister. Strange that it is the Minister that charges the Sovereign with treason, and it is the Sovereign who dares not retort. Strange that the traitor to all Europe is the only man in Europe who dares to pronounce the word treason, and it is those against whom it is directed, as they know falsely, that start up to shield him against the charge. "When,"

exclaims the *Journal des Débats*, at the close of its first article upon Cracow, “will nations recover from their infatuation?” When, indeed, will they?

If it be said, it is too late; if, seeing the opportunity they have missed, they say, we cannot recall it, I answer, *you are not yet at the end*. Had France understood the objects of the British Minister in the Quadruple Treaty, she would have had no fortifications of Paris. Had she understood the objects of the British Minister in the treaty of the 15th of July, she would have had no confiscation of Cracow. There is yet much that they shall have to undergo, that they have not even dreamt of. Louis Philippe is not yet brought to the scaffold. The Queen of England still dwells in Buckingham Palace. England and France are not yet at war; the Baskirs are not yet at Calcutta, nor the Cossacks in Paris. There is yet something worth while contending for. It is even yet not too late to learn. It is but a foretaste that they have had. It is as yet but a cloud the size of a man’s hand.

And again, says France, this is an English, not a French question; the treason of an English Minister is an affair for England to settle, and not for France to meddle with. Are the interests of England and France not one? Is the enemy of England and France not one? How, then, can a Minister of either country playing false to his own country not concern the other? A matter that does not concern France! Who brought Lord Palmerston into office? A matter that does not concern France!—when he is plotting against the King! Not concern France!—when he is filling England with a hatred for her! Not concern France, when he is placing the power of England at the disposal of Russia! *What then can concern France?* It belongs not indeed to France to send his body to the Tower, or place his head on Temple Bar; but it does concern France not to blind England to his guilt—not to be

the instrument of her deception. It does concern France not to screen him from the charge or to falsify the proofs ; and it must be the first of her concerns to know whether outrages and wrongs are the result of a system that belongs to the English nation, or of a traitorous design of which England is herself the victim. If the latter be the case, then is England the victim only because she will not attend to the truth ; and surely it is in the power of France to make England or some man in England attend to that truth. We in England do not feel its direct effects, and if France, the object of his hostility, and uninfluenced by his organs, not incredulous of the possibility of such a crime—not believing in the incorruptibility of a British Peer more familiar than we are with political matters—will not attend, how shall it be expected that England ever shall ? If in France Minister after Minister can be broken and driven from power by him, the ruling dynasty threatened week after week by him, the Government, day after day, embarrassed and insulted by him, without one man being found to suspect that there is a motive in all these contradictions, however shall it be suspected in England, whose people know nothing of foreign affairs ; and who, for fear she should be surprised into a thought of justice, or an act of vigour, is ever ringing in her own ears, “ the days of impeachment are gone by.”

In her own person Russia could not have made a quarrel in Spain. By her own word she could not have embittered England against France. By her own preponderance she could have alarmed no single power. Without *his* aid she could not have converted Austria from the ally of France and England in supporting Poland into what she is to-day, nor broken that alliance with England, which was based upon a perfect identity of all interests and an entire absence of every sort of competition. The service which Russia has received is such as only a traitor can yield, and the

part played by England is that of a nation which is only fit to be ruled by one.

I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my regret that the *Journal des Débats*, in selecting a new course should not have made the change more effectual, and thereby of some use. It is all very well to foresee, and very philosophic to deplore the future contingency of the establishment of the Russian power on the Dardanelles, but the question to deal with at present is the existence of the Russian power in London. It is by expelling her from Downing-street, which would not require the one-hundredth part of the dexterity that was requisite to conclude the Montpensier marriage, that alone she can be prevented from establishing herself on the Dardanelles. This is a matter which concerns every homestead in England and France, and throughout the rest of Europe, just as much as if there were a flaw in each of their title deeds, or a sentence of death suspended over one or more members of their family. I will conclude with recommending to the *Journal des Débats* the following German view of the case.

“England has no policy ; England has no designs. Those who state otherwise are, intentionally or not, helping to conceal the great secret of our times. Not to go further back than 1841, the Tories found England involved in serious difficulties with France. On their quitting office last year these difficulties were quite, or almost, forgotten. Lord Palmerston had been not a year in office, and already new difficulties have arisen between England and France. The same Minister has continued to govern France. It is then Lord Palmerston who makes it impossible that harmony should continue between the two countries. Was not the first news of the Spanish marriage received with indifference in London? Was it not the *Globe* and *Chronicle*, the usual organs of Lord Palmerston, and the

Times (in certain articles, of which the *Standard* repeats that Lord Palmerston is the author, giving, at the same time, what it considers, unquestionable evidence of the fact), from which all the attacks on Louis Philippe, and the policy of his Ministers, have proceeded. We have heard at various times very serious charges against this Minister, charges which, if true, might affect his head. Can it be that there is any connection between these events and those grave and unrefuted charges so perseveringly repeated against Lord Palmerston? It would seem that a knowledge of this Minister's true character is essential in judging of any public event in Europe."

I remain, Sir, &c.

LETTER VII.

CONSEQUENCES FOR POLAND AND THE EAST.

SIR,—A few months ago and all was tranquil in Europe.* Suddenly we have four out of five great Powers grasping at crowns and territories. The Northern Alliance tramples down the public law of Europe, the Western Alliance is broken, and England is protesting at once against France on the one side, and the Northern Powers on the other. Such were prognosticated as the consequences to be expected from admitting a certain man into power in England. Such have been the results realized.

From what we have seen of the character of the French and English nations, it cannot be doubted that if all were settled by “the Duc de Montpensier getting his bride, and Austria getting her Cracow,”† Lord Palmerston would have now the opportunity of making himself the idol of both people. The slightest expression of regret, the faintest intimation of good will, nay, even the *mere abstinence from farther offence* would be seized with joy and exultation in France, he would be the peace-maker, the restorer of the French alliance, the preserver not only of the repose of Europe, but of its harmony and good will. Opposition, which is said even at this hour to endanger his tenure of office, would instantly fail—suspicion vanish. But the

* “The marriage of the Queen of Spain is the only question between England and France that may become perplexing. Let us cut short this perplexity. * * * If the English Government approves and adopts this policy, we are ready to act in concert with England to put it efficaciously in practice.”—M. Guizot, July 29, 1846. This policy was the exclusion of the Duc de Montpensier and Prince Leopold of Coburg.

† *Morning Chronicle*.

matter is NOT to end with the bride of the French Prince or the sequestration of the Polish town. Cracow was confiscated by the hand indeed of Austria, but by the will of Russia. Her equivalent has not yet appeared. For this there is work to be done; herein Lord Palmerston has his appointed task.

We speak of Poland as if all had ended in 1831, and as if we had endured the consequences of having then betrayed that people, or rather discovered that there were no consequences to follow, and that those who spoke of danger, or of the sanctity of treaties, were so many idle talkers. Poland even yet burdens her possessor, and makes that possessor the weakest of European powers, who, if Poland had really fallen, and become identified with herself, would be the strongest: she would be then immense, and compact, and unassailable, both by land and sea, and with unrivalled facilities of aggression on both elements. The Russian Cabinet must, therefore, beyond all other matters, be constantly occupied with this care; and all its mental faculties and its physical means must be applied to the conversion of this people, now so terrible to herself, into an instrument available against others. She has proceeded far already in effecting this change. The weight of oppression, the course of time (for already has half a generation passed away since the fall of Warsaw) have done their work; her veteran warriors and her practical statesmen have disappeared, and are disappearing, from the scene; a young generation is arising, who have forgotten past things, and who have only learned from their fathers that there was a Poland. Hate and Hope wax cold and weary, and the strong hand of necessity and fate has accustomed manhood to compliance, youth to obedience, and age to fear.

But the warlike Poland—that people of unconquerable and unrivalled activity and courage—is not to be trodden

down to brute matter alone, nor are its energies to be lost for Russia. Fifteen years of undisturbed peace and perfect control over the rest of Europe have enabled Russia to break and trample her down sufficiently to have reached the point where it may be possible to propose at once new objects for her ambition and for her hate. When—despairing of independence against Russia, they may look to conquest at her side, and detestation for Russia, their oppressor, may be exchanged for desire of vengeance against Europe, by whom they have been betrayed. Then indeed will the face of Europe be altered by the change effected in the mind of a people, which Europe believes to be slumbering in a forgotten tomb.

The Czar said to the Poles at Warsaw, "I am glad to be able to address you no longer as King of Poland, but as Czar." The Czar said to his people, "I am less sovereign of Russia than head of the Slavonic race." Muscovy was merged in all the Russias. When Poland is merged in Russia then will the time come for Slavonia to appear—mother of a race—and gather back from under foreign dominion her sons, who will then exceed two-fold any other people of Europe. Then will be known what it was that was gained and lost in 1772, 1792, 1795, 1815, and 1831.

While the tombs of their Kings still consecrated a spot of earth, a ray of hope could be excluded from no Polish breast, and towards that spot were turned their eyes and were directed their efforts, however dreary the prospect or hopeless the strife. That spell is now broken; it is not Russia that has laid her sacrilegious hand upon the shrine of her past glory, it is one of the Goths, and the other Goths* have looked on—those who had bound themselves to protect their memory at least, and to prolong

* The Slavonians speak of the other nations, not by their geographical designations, but as "*Schwabs*:" that is, the speechless, meaning the brute

their name. This deed, the powerful, the free of the earth, have suffered, and therefore approved. They, not Russia, have extinguished the hope of Poland. The last necessary measure of violence on the part of Russia, the extinction of the forms and habits which separated them from the Russian—the obliteration of their tongue and of their faith—is facilitated or rendered practicable. Such is the equivalent which Russia is to receive ;* and as this is one of the consequences of the quarrel made with France about the Montpensier marriage, Lord Palmerston cannot do that which he must have done had the question ended with the marriage and the confiscation. He will not be suffered to relax from his labours, or to relieve himself from his load of obloquy, and the quarrel with France must be prolonged, or rather revived, in Parliament; and thus will Poland, the treaty of Vienna, Russia's present acts, their future consequences (as will Greece, Turkey, Persia, the other scenes of his late virulent activity), be all forgotten. Ministerial charges of perfidy and deceit will now proceed from the breast of that assembly. Hitherto have proceeded invariably from Parliament, notwithstanding the acts of the Government, words of deference and

beasts. Russians, in remote districts, have been seen rejoicing over Polish victories, because the "*Schwabs*" were beaten, meaning the German officers in the Russian service.—(Diebitsch, &c.)

* While these sheets are being revised, the intelligence reaches London that this has been realized :—

“ Berlin, January 8.

“ We have received the official news this day that by an Imperial mandate Poland has ceased to exist, and that it is incorporated in the Russian empire. Consternation and mourning prevail in Warsaw in consequence of this intelligence. A commission is now employed in regulating the financial arrangements, and as soon as they are completed the announcement will be made public.”

“ Warsaw, January 16.

“ By an Imperial edict, the kingdom of Poland is declared the 13th circle of the land and water communication of the empire.”

regard towards the French nation, of respect and confidence in their monarch. These sentiments, indeed, have hitherto been the chief support of that monarch and his dynasty. To substitute such language as that which has filled the columns of the Ministerial press, is to open for Europe a prospect of endless convulsions—a war of succession in that country, which will become a war of principle amongst its neighbours.

How extraordinary is the resistance on the part of France to joining with Russia against England. How unceasing the motives in the insults of which she is the object, and yet what a readiness to return always to the side of England.* The cause, shall I say *secret*, is the *attachment of every Frenchman to Poland*. The change effected in Poland, which a short time will now suffice to develop, will react on France, either by common sympathies for Russia, if she places herself as before the treaty of Tilsit, or by hatred for the Poles, if Russia places herself as after that treaty (for Russia will balance herself on one and the other in peace and war as heretofore to envenomate and prolong strife); in either case the alienation of the Poles snaps that now remaining link with France, at the moment when the dangers will have been realized, which in prospect have hitherto constituted the grounds of our alliance with her.

For years, and before any of the broils, either of 1840 or 1846, the condition of France on the demise of her present King has been an object of anxiety and alarm to all men. What then would his death be at the present juncture? What if he dropped off as opportunely for Russia as William IV., as Mahmoud, as Lord Holland, as Blacque, as Constantine, as Diebitsch, as the Persian and

* The *Journal des Débats* remarks, in answer to the charges of a leaning of France towards Russia, that, while in this new session many were found to rise in both Houses to advocate the English alliance, no man “dared to propose that of Russia.”

Turkish Commissioners at Erzerum? The effects upon the health of Louis Philippe of these attacks are manifestly revealing themselves, nor would he be exposed to such risk unless they were prepared for the contingency.

But independently of hastening the event, it is one which cannot be remote in the ordinary course of nature, and cannot have been neglected in the adjustment of that most admirable scheme which we see now unrolling before us. The apprehension of its coming too soon may account for pressing matters with that violence and haste which otherwise might have seemed incautious and inexplicable. Before it did happen it was requisite that England should be brought to that position in which she would be ready to support a pretender.

The emasculation of the House of Commons which, in the last session, enabled the Minister to utter those words against Russia which gained for him the fatal confidence of France, and which will enable him some days hence to open upon her in that assembly, will likewise enable him to denounce the Northern Powers. No consequences follow such declarations—no effect is produced by them. You are, right or wrong, at enmity with France. In the various departments preparations are being made for war, plans proposed, contingencies foreseen and discussed. War with whom? With the violators of the Treaty of Vienna? No; war with the violator of the Treaty of Utrecht!

He has already taken care to exhaust indignation against the violators of treaties—as against France, where there was no treaty that she could violate, thereby to shield Russia.* Everybody is violating treaties. What, therefore, do treaties signify? Russia is safe, who has

* “The violation of the treaty of Utrecht committed by France in the affair of the Montpensier marriage was as flagrant and as palpable as the destruction of the independence of the republic of Cracow was a gross *infringement* of the treaty of Vienna.”—*Morning Chronicle*, Nov. 28.

broken the whole law of Europe; France is detested, who has broken none. Right is displaced, but animosities remain; and false animosity brings false friendship—animosity that extinguishes reason, friendship that extinguishes morality.

I solemnly warn Members of the House of Commons, who will come to that House either occupied in the details of negotiations at Madrid, or as spectators at a theatre, to be amused with what they shall see and hear, that it is not a retrospective question which comes before them, that it is not a settled one which they have curiously to examine into. The words addressed to them, apparently bearing on the past, will be uttered solely for the purpose of realizing future results, and in attaining to which their misdirected opinions, their factious associations, or their assenting silence, will be used.

I again repeat, that it is not in the Montpensier marriage that the origin of this scheme is to be found, the hand of Lord Palmerston traced, or his purposes understood; but in his acts during the eighteen previous years in which he has had the management of England, and used it so as to realize for Russia her actual position.

I have shown and proved that, from the year 1832 downwards, the measures of Russia, with regard to Poland, have been taken with the concurrence of Lord Palmerston—that he has counteracted every effort made in Parliament to resist those encroachments—that he has succeeded in maintaining himself in office by pledging himself to do certain things which he has not done—that he has avoided on every occasion to admit the knowledge of the acts that had taken place, and prevented the existence of official testimony against her. At the same time he was, by similar measures, suppressions, falsehoods, fictitious opposition to her, and real quarrels with her victims, serving her upon every other field. I have cited

his own words; I have referred to public and known facts; I have not dealt with argument but with statement, not adduced suppositions but facts. I have shown that on the 13th of July, 1840, he, for the first time, admitted that she had violated treaties, and assigned, as his own justification in submitting to this violation, that her power was too great for England to cope with, and that "geographical circumstances" prevented England from doing herself right. France at the time was united to England, and Austria, notwithstanding her concurrence in the affair of Cracow, was using every endeavour to bring the English Minister to take a position of general and energetic resistance to Russia. The allegation was therefore false, and the violation submitted to by no sense of Russia's strength or England's weakness. Two days afterwards he signed a treaty with her which separated France from England.

Upon a promise of better behaviour he returns to office and instantly a quarrel with France ensues—he has made it through the press, and explained it by the animosity of the King and M. Guizot to *him*! They had waited anxiously for his return to office, in order to gratify their pique against him, by making a quarrel with England. I have shown that he rejected the co-operation of France, to resist or resent the acts of the Northern Powers, as he had before rejected the co-operation of France to support Poland, and then he charges the French Government with collusion with Russia to bring about the confiscation of Cracow; then sending a document and calling it a protest, which was no protest, he proved at the conclusion the intention which was exhibited from the beginning. I have shown that, in the course of last session, he was aware of the coming events at Cracow; and in the House of Commons appeared to threaten the Northern Powers with terrible consequences if they

ventured on such a step, what he threatened them with was an act of France, on France he professed to rely for the defence of the rights of England. I have shown that the measure which he thus suggested to France as a means of resistance to the purpose of the Northern Powers was the very act that should be most conclusive to bring about that anarchy in Europe which is the aim and object and triumph of Russia. I have shown, on the other hand, by tracing the whole series of our diplomatic action, that France has been in every case without any original idea, destitute of any substantive will of her own; that she has always followed England, and has always been circumvented by Lord Palmerston; that she is wholly incapable in mind and character of maintaining any contest against him. I have shown that the British Parliament has been equally unfit either to fathom his motives, or, when it formed any conclusion itself, to constrain him to follow its directions. I have shown that he has had the uncontrolled management of the affairs of England, and that neither nation, nor public opinion, nor the interest of parties, nor the supervision of the House, nor the opinions of his colleagues, have weighed in any way in imposing upon him a line of policy, or of interfering with his own.

The conclusion, therefore, is, that he has acted throughout as the servant of the Czar, and that he has rendered to him such service as no avowed servant could render, or Russia could in her own person achieve. Any act or aggression of Russia could have no effect, save that of uniting England and France—Lord Palmerston, as Minister of England could divide them. On this present occasion as heretofore, he will escape detection, override, if it be manifested, opposition by involving the Parliament in confused details upon the contents of despatches or the accuracy of statement, and in criminations and recriminations between himself and France.

A coalition to break down all existing laws, to seize upon independent states, *has brought about no reconciliation between the two countries against whom it is directed.* The alliance which formerly existed between England and France was based not on the necessity of defending the public law of Europe, but upon the necessity of defending states whose existence was not provided for or guaranteed in the “reparatory stipulations” of the Treaty of Vienna. England and France have hitherto been united by the avowed necessity of protecting from assault those whom no set form of words had compelled them to defend. A state which they are so bound and compelled to defend is extinguished, and they never dream of the natural rights of men which require no treaties to enforce them, nor of the treaties to which they are parties, but descend to miserable quibbles about the difference between the separate treaty which provided for the independence of Cracow, and the general treaty, of which it formed but a part.

The only incidents are the conduct of Sweden and Turkey — the one a second-rate Power, the other a Power not included in the Treaty of Vienna. But even shame is not awakened by the statement, that the Protest of these two States has produced a greater effect upon the three Powers than the Protest of England and of France.

Turkey, whom you affect to-day to support, yet whom your whole power is given to undermine, alone protested against the first partition of Poland—alone has been unassociated by either connivance or participation in any act of spoliation or interference; and the course that she has adopted to-day in protection of the public law of Europe, to which she is no party, and which you have sacrificed, shows that she is little changed from those days in which

an act of hers called forth from Canning the following words :—

“ I know not why the Grand Seignior should not take as correct a view of his interests as any other Power whose customs may be more conformable to our own. I am sure that the declaration which we have all seen of the motives which have guided the conduct of the Porte, is as able and masterly a composition, as correct in principles of justice, and as sound in principles of policy, as any State paper that ever was published by any Cabinet in Europe. But your Turk is a Mahometan, it seems, and, therefore, an ally not fit for a Christian ! I do not know, Sir, but an alliance with a Mahometan may be as good as a peace with an Atheist ; the sanction of its engagements may, perhaps, be as sacred, and its stipulations as likely to be fulfilled.

“ But he is a sluggish Turk, slow to anger, and hard to be driven into action. If that be his character, what must be the provocations which have roused him !” *

The words of Mr. Canning, applied at that time to France, are now equally applicable to Russia :—

“ The aggressions of France have been so multiplied, so various, and so extraordinary, as to unite against her Powers the most opposite in nature and interest, as to make the necessity of resistance and the duty of self-preservation supersede every narrower consideration, every motive of more particular and contracted policy.”

* “ Lastly, we have signs of an international morality that contrasts advantageously with the expediency-principles of more civilized states. Whilst the first constitutional kingdom on the Continent can discover in the annexation of Cracow only a new method of interpreting a treaty to its own advantage, the Porte appeals to the immutable principles of justice, and strengthens its arguments by a reference to its own example. This, too, under cogent solicitations on the part of Austria to become an approving party :—

“ ‘ The Turkish Government is not a party to the treaty of Vienna, and therefore cannot be supposed to be immediately interested in any event which may affect the object for which that treaty was made. The Porte, however, would only prejudice the interests of the Ottoman empire, as well as its own character in the eyes of Europe, did it in any way express its approval of the event which formed the subject of the Austrian internuncio’s memorandum. The Porte regards all treaties as sacred, which on no pretext are to be altered but by the consent of each of the parties by whom they have been signed, and that therefore it is forced to express its regret at the conduct of Austria towards the republic of Cracow.’ ”—*Correspondence of the Morning Chronicle.*

No one in the House can venture to touch upon the subject of Russia, or the Northern Powers, or Poland, without being master of the Spanish marriages, which nobody, of course, is, and if any one were so, to deal with it involves a charge which no present Englishman would make. And thus England is played away in a game so flat, that there is scarcely any gratification in winning it.* Oh! for an hour of a Chatham or of a Burke! Such crimes, such dangers, were not of their age; such necessities impelled them not on; such fortunes waited not then the unmasker of deceit and the unraveller of mystery. Besides, we stand in a conjuncture the most favourable that can be imagined, and which, if lost now, can never be expected to return. Faction for the moment is broken. Peel and O'Connell, the two shields of Lord Palmerston, are for the moment powerless, and there are those who have had the courage to apply to themselves the old name of "country party," under which were rallied a Bolingbroke, a Swift, a Shippen, a Carteret, and a Wyndham. Thus are combined the last necessity that can compel—the fairest occasion that could invite, if only England still engendered men.

It is always objected when these matters are urged, that this nation, being a free and constitutional State, cannot adroitly manage its external affairs. These objections are raised as if no record had been preserved to us of Rome or of Venice. The question is not one of knowledge of external affairs, but simply of England's laws. It is not requisite to overreach Russia in cunning, nor to surpass her in fraud, but simply to prevent your Minister from doing what is unlawful through usurpation of an authority which is unlawful. To arrest the evils which are the consequences of these crimes, we do not know the details of any negociation, but to know what are the established forms of

* A Russian diplomatist once used to me these words:—"Le jeu est trop facile."

procedure—how a treaty can be lawfully made, or a war proclaimed, or an infraction of right dealt with. Then is the remedy within reach, and that is by calling to account our own servants. There is not a single transaction of a diplomatic kind, within the last twenty years, which has not been a violation of the laws of England; and thus every foreign transaction is a domestic affair.

We have been brought to this pass gradually, therefore the study now requisite for our restoration must be carried back to a time anterior to these perversions. I cannot more strikingly illustrate the change wrought in England, not in her laws, but in her opinions (for her laws remain unaltered), than by quoting the fact that, in the impeachment for high treason of the Lord Protector Somerset, one of the counts was, that he had held communication with a foreign Ambassador without the sanction or presence of the other Lords of the Privy Council.

Russia's ambition thus springs from the slumber of the law in England, and nothing shall prevent its accomplishment save an alteration of the basis of this her judgment. The slumber of the laws of England means the extinction of the morality of her people.

I tell the Members of the House of Commons that this is their work—they whose appointed function it is to control the Executive—they who have usurped the positive and direct management of affairs by taking upon themselves to appoint the Cabinet. If there be men who abjure the titles of faction, it is for them to undo what faction has done, and they have the occasion in doing only their duty to win the confidence of a country they will have saved.

Montesquieu announced England's fall in the emancipation of her corrupt Executive from the control of the Legislative branch. Niebuhr, in later times, announced her fall in the corruption of the Legislative following the

Executive which it no longer cared to control; yet the corruption of the one or the other is terrible to a country only by the perversion of its people. That third result is now attained, and we behold a nation in its second infancy: a people running after news and quarrelling about straws; there are many opinions and no judgment; great dexterity in separate branches, but none caring for those things that are pre-eminently useful. We have ships and armies, and fortresses and trade, but not the care and the foresight by which free men are gifted with the power of saving themselves. We are religious, perhaps, but not just—we are political, but not wise—we are wealthy, but not independent—we are many, but not united—we are courageous, but not watchful—we are learned, but not right—we reverse the sacred admonition, and unite the innocence of the serpent to the wisdom of the dove. All this is summed up in the “separation of religion and politics,” in the separation of “public and private morality,” in the separation of domestic and foreign affairs, in the separation, in a word, of Law and Government. These, the symbols of decay—the very abomination of corruption,—have become to us truths in fact while they are falsehoods in essence. They are maxims by which evil shall be done on principle, and folly learnt by rule.

What has this to do with the confiscation of Cracow? Everything. It is one of the consequences of our mental condition. Will it not be said in a future age that Poland fell because England was unable to do her duty or maintain her rights? And if history,—which God grant may yet have to record that at the last hour Poland was rescued and Europe saved,—will it not then have to recount how England was at length roused from her bed of dreams and her lair of sloth by some one who had shown to her, as in a glass, her own figure—who had been successful in inter-

preting to her her own errors, and restored at last her reason by repentance.

Let us then, on every occasion, repeat that each particular act is not a matter standing by itself, but a consequence of the change that has been effected in the mind of every man* in England, a change which may be described in words applied to a people once the greatest on earth, who had then become the basest:—"OUR FATHERS TOOK CARE THAT OUR RULERS SHOULD ONLY DO THAT WHICH WAS LAWFUL; WE TAKE FOR LAW THAT WHICH OUR RULERS DO."

There is one preliminary objection to entering upon the subject; when entered upon there are two objections that seem to outweigh all evidence and all proof. The first is, that Russia cannot really be dangerous; the second, that it is impossible for a British Peer to be corrupt.

All I will say on the first point is, that the danger to Europe from Russia, invisible to the acuter organs of the vulgar of our days, was distinctly perceived by a Hardenberg, a Gustavus III., a Pitt, a Talleyrand, and a Napoleon. And what argument do they use to justify their indifference? Only ridicule of those who fear. "She has no money," say they, or "her ships have got the dry rot." Have we, who fear Russia, a high opinion of her physical power? No, it is her weakness that we fear, for it is the constant exposure in which she lives that has put her upon the way of circumventing us. We who fear Russia entertain the highest estimate of your physical power, but as instinct is no match for reason, so are no physical means a defence against intellectual power. It is precisely because you are strong that she is dangerous, because she knows how to turn your own strength against yourselves.

There must be positive profit at the end of such a game,

* "God does not change the condition of nations till He has changed their character."—Koran.

and a purpose in all this labour. Why this incessant toil? Why circumvent Cabinets—agitate nations—suborn witnesses—corrupt Ministers? Why, but for the same end, which, in every age, and among every people, ambition has sought, and has achieved, when conjoined with ability, and brought to bear on headless nations and on heartless men.

In the recently published *Memoirs of Lord Malmesbury*, the following note from the noble editor tells the whole story:—

“He (Lord Malmesbury) had to struggle against the Empress’s false professions of friendship for a country, which she wished to see occupied and occupying France in a hot war, while she matured her own projects against Turkey.”

As to the second point, I will likewise content myself with a few words. Russia’s ends are too great compared with her means, and her success too great compared with our strength, for her to be able to have succeeded so far by other means. When a country declares that “the days of impeachment have gone by,” does it not open the door to the crimes against which that remedy was devised? What would be the condition of private property, if it were said “the days of indictment are gone by?” You do not pretend that temptations are withdrawn from men, or that the weaknesses of humanity have disappeared, yet you have withdrawn, on the one hand, the incentives to virtue, and on the other, the penalties from crime. The phenomenon, however, is not new. It was remarked of Athens, by Demosthenes, that she stood distinct from other cities of Greece, and Philip in this had the advantage of all other barbarians, that “his chief instruments were formed in the breast of that State, whose public councils most openly opposed his greatness.” The reason for this condition assigned by the Athenian orator is, that the people of that time was offended when the charge of treason was made.

You have gone a step further and deny its existence. England has been the country that most openly opposed the greatness of Russia, and it is in her breast that have been formed the chief instruments of her success, and that is because she is the country in Europe that cares the least about foreign affairs, but yet has a disciplined army and navy, and immense moral power and commanding influence through her trade, and it is no longer requisite now that a prior case should be made out, and the assent of the nation given beforehand, for any act. Her Minister has the full disposal, therefore, of all these means, thanks to her indifference, while, at the same time, he is relieved from every possible responsibility in her popular aphorism—"The days of impeachment are gone by." To what use those powers and that indifference have been applied, look around you upon Europe, Asia, and America, and see. "There is but one key," said a Statesman recently deceased, "that opens every box, and no other key will open any, and that key is TREASON."

The records of no people—the annals of the human race—present no parallel to this:—A body of men—some public servants, some lawyers, some merchants—denounce a Minister as a traitor. This charge is persisted in, re-asserted for years. It is now maintained in the presence of a Sovereign; now declared on the hustings; illustrated in numerous transactions; proved from official documents; published in assemblies, discussed in private; it fills the columns, now of one leading journal now of another; and that betrayed nation brings not the charge to trial, or that calumniated functionary brings not his maligners to justice. Yet this man has already caused above one hundred thousand of his fellow creatures to perish; and has sacrificed £60,000,000.* And this nation is humane and thrifty!

* See a series of articles in the *Morning Herald*, during July, 1842.

Panics and pauperism may suffice to bring us low, without the aid of foreign war. An internecine struggle with France is at hand—his work and his alone. It cannot be averted *now* by merely excluding him from office. It can be averted only by judicial proceedings. If he be innocent he will be cleared, and then we shall know that we have to bow to fate, for our case is desperate if he is not guilty. Then alone will the truth be known and the way made clear; then only will real responsibility be brought back to the depositories of the nation's power; then only will the mischief he has done within be rectified or understood. By punishing one criminal (if he be guilty) with her own hands, according to her own laws, will a whole nation be saved at once from guilt and danger. Peace will reappear upon earth, brought back by justice, and foreign nations will learn, that if England has produced a monster, she is no longer responsible for his crimes.

I remain, Sir, &c.

December 16.

As to the personal antagonism between Lord Palmerston and myself, I may be permitted to say that I have not varied in the *measures* I have urged, and those I have denounced. If I have served that Minister, it was in consequence of his appearing to adopt those which before I had urged upon him, as I now do against him. The only difference is, that then I believed him to be in ignorance.

My conviction of his guilt has been arrived at by personal knowledge, which I do not adduce, as it would rest upon my own testimony. The case which I adduce is independent of these grounds. Having concluded from matters within my own knowledge, I applied myself to

examine other transactions, and I have remained with no alternative save that of the admission of guilty knowledge.

I must guard myself against it being supposed that I have gone over the whole case. Other fields remain untrodden. I have given but a synopsis of the matters I have touched upon. The detailed exposition, the evidences and proofs, are to be found elsewhere, by those who may think that an *à priori* case is made out, or that the subject is worth inquiring into.

In performing the duty of denouncing crime, which is imposed by the law, even in the case of private and individual murder, I imagined that the danger which I foresaw as resulting from it was averted; for if one man, by knowing his danger in time, can save himself from his equal, how should a whole people, warned in time, be in danger from one man? I have subsequently found that the nation was not to be saved until it was changed. It was, therefore, not presumptuously, or by option, that I have undertaken a task which seems so disproportionate to the strength and means of a private individual.

In this, as in every other legal question, it is not opinions that can weigh or decide, but a verdict of a jury. The mass and clearness of the evidence can leave no doubt as to the result, once the matter put in course of legal procedure, whether before the High Court of Parliament, or, in the first instance, before some inferior tribunal. The getting over a session of Parliament is no proof that the next will be as easily got over, and the corrupting or the overawing of some few men is no earnest that every man will be equally seduced. And, after all, thank God! the present Parliament is near its close.

LETTER VIII.

THE OPENING OF THE SESSION.

THE publication of the Documents, the Royal speeches in both countries, and the discussion in both Parliaments, impose on me the necessity of addressing you once more. The debate on the opening of Parliament, at such a crisis, is, moreover, an occasion for testing the men we possess, discovering the faculties that lie dormant, or the errors and fallacies that have been in operation in secret. It is an occasion for the nation to appreciate its servants, whether termed rulers or representatives. The grounds I had for exposing the diplomatic transaction, stand equally for this debate. There can be no wrong, no crime, no treachery, no danger, except by the sufferance or connivance of Parliament. No illustration more direct or timely than the present was ever offered of the truth of the aphorism of the old Lord Treasurer, that "ENGLAND NEVER COULD BE UNDONE BUT BY HER PARLIAMENTS."

Regarding the causes of the dissensions that have suddenly sprung up between England and France, and which have avowedly brought the confiscation of Cracow, there is no material statement in my letters which is not borne out by the now published documents. I had reduced the case to the following points:—that the French Government had appealed to Lord Palmerston, on his coming into office, to

act conjointly in Spain: that he had not deigned to give an answer: that on being pressed by the French representative in London, he accounted for his silence by an insult: that he could have made any arrangement with France: that he could have stopped the marriages if he chose: that he abstained from warning them of his view of infraction of treaty or violation of engagement: that he only did what was requisite to irritate the French Government into acting alone, and did not do what he must have done had he wished to prevent the match. It was thus that, in the beginning of December, I described the snare set for France, to trap her into pushing the marriage without the concurrence of England, which should afford the pretext of charging her with violating engagements and treaties.

This the documents do not invalidate, but confirm. They exhibit, moreover, France as desirous, in July last, to do anything that might prevent Spain from becoming the subject of discord between the two Governments: they establish the hollowness of the alleged pretexts, whether the engagement or the Treaty; while the debates in the French Chamber, and the declarations of her Ministers, show the continuance of the same dispositions, and a futile perseverance of endeavours to regain by any concession, and by every means, the good-will of England. In fact, there is as timorous an avoidance of any thing that might irritate the English Minister,* as there is on his part a recklessness of delight in whatever may exasperate the French.

* "The ill-humour now felt will wear off. It will disappear before other *superior necessities*! and the importance of France and England being on a good understanding will be felt! It was of the highest importance that such a feeling should exist in the face of other events which had taken place."—*M. Guizot, 20th Jan.* Thus the French Government goes on sacrificing every means and chance of remedying the evil.

"It cannot but excite surprise that the French Ministerial press does not

I have shown the Treaty of Utrecht, on the violation of which the quarrel was originally founded, not to be a European compact, not having been revived at Vienna, Amiens, Campo Formio, or Luneville, and to have thus entirely and long passed away from the body of European law. This has not been disproved. Perhaps it may be said that my conclusion was too absurd to be noticed, and that I must be wrong, seeing that all the diplomatists and statesmen of both countries take that Treaty as a valid instrument; and the debate rolls upon its interpretation. My view of the case was, however, reproduced in the House of Commons, and by a lawyer. It was not denied. Lord Palmerston now appears to give up the Treaty of Utrecht.

I had stated that Lord Palmerston in opposition, and not Lord Aberdeen in office, had had the previous management of affairs in Spain. In this I am again supported by the documents. It now appears that Lord Aberdeen had censured Mr. Bulwer's conduct, and yet retained him Ambassador of England. The Tory Government first continued Mr. Aston, whom Lord Palmerston had selected for that office, and then replaced him by Mr. Bulwer, the special selection of Lord Palmerston, to do his work in

summon to its aid Urquhart's polemics. His letters are a whole arsenal of weapons of assault, which are not to be put aside in contempt, and remain worthy of consideration despite their singularity. But when we know to what point France at this moment navigates, namely, to render possible once more a cordial understanding, an aim towards which she now directs efforts both official and quasi-official, we may comprehend that she has to spare Palmerston, and refuse to borrow weapons from his adversaries—weapons however, with which they are accurately acquainted. Gently the *Débats* has touched—à propos of the correspondence of the *Augsburgh Allgemeine Zeitung*—on the impression which the fall of Cracow makes at Constantinople, and refers to Urquhart having already pointed to this, and announced the question of Cracow as only the prelude to that of the East and Constantinople.”—*Aachener Zeitung* (published under Prussian Censorship.)

Paris in 1840 : the act for which Lord Aberdeen censured Mr. Bulwer was precisely what Lord Palmerston repeated when he came into office, and by doing which it was that he nailed the French Government into acting alone.* That was putting forward Prince Leopold of Coburg, who, notwithstanding the censures of Lord Aberdeen, was in every way marked to the Spanish nation as England's candidate. Being at that time in Spain, and receiving, from a quarter that left no doubt as to the accuracy of the statement, the assurance that Lord Aberdeen had not adopted Prince Leopold as England's candidate, I answered—"Then the English Cabinet has not been placed, by its servants in Spain, in their confidence." Independently of any management from the mere contrast of character, Lord Aberdeen, as minister, will be less considered by such men as have been distributed through the service, than Lord Palmerston out of office.

I had explained Lord Palmerston's success in so strange an enterprise by the imbecility of the French Government. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Correspondence.

I prognosticated that Lord Palmerston would not desist from his aggressive course, but would persevere in it. It may be supposed that the Queen's speech, and his own language in the House, does not bear out this anticipation;

* The marriage was announced beforehand, as it now appears to the English Government as a measure to counteract the Coburg scheme.

"The question, therefore, of marrying a Queen to a Bourbon Prince of the Spanish line is now one of greater difficulty, and has been rendered still more difficult *by a proposal which seems to have come from the Spanish Court for an alliance with a Prince of the house of Coburg.* The intelligence of a proposal having been made for an alliance with a Prince of the house of Coburg occasioned the greatest consternation here. M. Guizot told me that if the project was persisted in, he should recommend it to the King to put forward the Duke de Montpensier as a candidate for the Queen's hand."—*Lord Cowley, 13th July.*

but the course adopted is not conciliation : it is therefore, (for there are but two,) the alternative—though acrimonious display is for the moment delayed. There have been rumours of a serious dissension in the Cabinet, because his colleagues would not consent to the expressions which he wished to put in the Queen's mouth ; and the reality of an opposition to him in the Cabinet is left no matter of hypothesis by the words uttered by Lord Lansdowne. Besides, on the very morning of the opening of the session, the most virulent attack which has yet appeared against the French Government and King, was printed in the columns of the *Morning Chronicle*. It was, in fact, the speech which he would have delivered in the House, had his colleagues not hampered him ; and it went forth to France with all the weight of the official character of that paper, to counteract the apparent mildness of the Queen's speech.

Whatever the expressions might have been which his colleagues objected to, he has covered, in those that were uttered, his stakes. All the charges to which he was open he had himself made against the French King and Government. The chief of these was collusion with Russia, to bring about the confiscation of Cracow. From the moment that the intelligence became known this charge has not ceased to be re-echoed by all his organs, a test of its truth was, however, always made to accompany it, and it was this. *How* will the French Government deal with the case?—thereby will we be able to decide whether or not there has been a prior understanding.—for clearly there must have been *an understanding with one of the two Governments*. The French speech comes, the opening of the session is in England fixed to that end, a week after that of France. In the French speech Cracow has been pared down to an “unexpected event.” The English speech boldly declares, that “There has been a manifest

violation." If, then, there was collusion with one of the two Governments, and if the test of innocence consisted in the superior energy with which the outrage is met, the evidence in the Queen's speech is overwhelming; and the simple words, "manifest violation," "a protest," suffice to denounce Louis Philippe to Europe as a traitor—as the destroyer of Poland, and the first Sovereign of France that has broken his royal word. In fact, he presents a substitute criminal for himself; * on the following morning he represents the House of Commons as "unanimous" in reproving an act which it was unanimous in sanctioning, and almost unanimous in applauding; and offers this as the answer to the "vile calumny," that *England* had been in connivance with the

* "Reports are current, however, that M. GUIZOT was as much the dupe as the rest of the world—that an understanding not written on paper, neither signed, sealed, nor delivered, had been come to between one personage in France and others who were especially interested in this question of the annexation of Cracow. It is difficult indeed to conceive that the practised astuteness which has placed the King of the French in the palace of the Tuileries, should not also have enabled him to make some little guess at what was going on at Vienna. Consider how boundless are his means of information, what the French system of espionage is, and what fine raw material for corruption might be found in the chanceries of the ill-paid *employés* of the three Powers. It is not necessary to make out King Louis Philippe an active partner and participator in the resolutions and conferences; if he knew of them, that is enough to make him out an accomplice before the fact. He knew of what was going on; he might have prevented it. He shut his eyes until it became what Prince Metternich calls "un fait irrévocable."—

"King Louis Philippe has little to dread from any resolution to which the Chamber may arrive. But the Chambers is *not* the country. *Had it been so, most assuredly the annexation of Cracow to Austria would never have taken place.* The king knew this well, and is at this moment far more solicitous about the paragraph in the Queen's speech of this day in England and the subsequent explanations in the British Parliament, than upon what may take place in the French Chambers."—*Morning Chronicle*, Jan. 19.

Northern Powers. No one had charged England with this, but I had charged *him*. To meet in such a manner an insignificant accuser is strange.*

I further predicted that the Parliament would not call this Minister to account, and that it would present a chaos wherein, if any pervading thought was to be found, it would be the paralyzing dread of war with France, with the inability to trace that danger to its origin or to apply itself to its cure; and that that fear would serve but to aggravate its source, by inducing them to turn towards Russia, accept her misdeeds, and forget Cracow and Constantinople in Louis Philippe and Guizot—the violated Treaty of Vienna in imaginary infractions of the non-existing Treaty of Utrecht.

These predictions have been to the letter verified. Therein is also confirmed what I said of the English Parliament, when I placed it beside the French Government, and showed both to be equally incapable of doing their duty, managing their affairs, or understanding or thwarting the purposes of that man who, during eighteen years, has had the unrestrained mastery of Europe—has produced all its present strifes, hatreds, embarrassments, and dangers, and who, justifying so far the prediction of Talleyrand,† has carried us towards the fulfilment of that of Napoleon.‡

I joined to this anticipation of the *revulsion* of the feelings of the House, from France, and towards Russia, another

* “If anything could add force to the becoming declaration in the speech respecting the extinction of Cracow, it would be the unanimous condemnation pronounced upon that great public crime by the leading men of all parties. This is *England’s* answer to the vile calumny of having given a covert sanction to this act. *Would that the governing powers of another nation were as little open to the suspicion of complicity.*”—*Morning Chronicle*, Jan. 20.

† “Ce tappageur finira par mettre l’Europe à feu et à sang.”

‡ “In fifty years Europe will be Republican or *Cossack*.”

which might appear in contradiction to it, but which the event has equally justified was linked,—that Lord Palmerston would come forward strongly against the Northern Powers. He did appear in the House resisting the torrent, and arguing, not only that the Treaty of Vienna had been violated at Cracow, but that it signified whether Treaties were violated or not; and he is still more explicit next morning in the *Morning Chronicle*.*

The process of emasculation of the House has been gradual. Here is the accomplishment. During ten years, in all the debates which regarded Russia, Lord Palmerston had never uttered respecting her in the House a single syllable that was disparaging, or admitted a single fact that was criminatory. He could not do so, for the House, anticipating the consequences we now see, was then pushing him on to act. His first declaration *against her* was only made when the Treaty of July, 1840, to break with France, had been fairly copied and lay ready for signature. His first admission of facts, so long asserted in the House, and fenced off by him, was accompanied by the assertion that she was too strong, and had too many friends, for England to cope with her! Last session he denounced her amidst the cheers of Parliament, which had become *vox et pre-terea nihil*. Mark the difference after the *second rupture* with France. It is now the House itself that is rushing northward, and throwing itself into the Bothnian Gulf; and it is Lord Palmerston who stands alone upon the steep imploring the herd to stay at home. The fact is incontrovertible, explain it how you will. The English

*“For the three Powers to pretend to annul these articles of the treaty, without the assent and consent of the other five Powers, is a daring outrage on the first principles of international law and public faith and honour, which European opinion has already decisively stigmatized, and which will infallibly have consequences alike unexpected and disagreeable to some or all of its perpetrators.”

House becomes Russian. The Minister at each period stands inscrutable and alone. In March, 1836, the Ministry remained in office on the condition and on the pledge of doing two things—the first, to send a consular agent to Cracow, to watch over the observance of the Treaty of Vienna; and the other, to take measures to remedy, in the Black Sea, the evil that had already been done, the meaning of which was, to break the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Lord Palmerston was, then, the person driven, and pledges were required from him by the House for the performance of what it laid down as measures necessary for the safety of Europe, the honour and interests of England. In January, 1847, the House approves of the confiscation of Cracow; the leader of the Opposition declares it to be a fortunate event! and parades illuminations where the lamps were lifted on the bayonet point. On the other side not a voice is raised—and the most authoritative personages in England applaud, consent, or doubt. No, there is one man who does loathe this affection for Russia's person, and scorns this sympathy for her principles—that man is Lord Palmerston!*

Who has wrought this change in the House of Commons, if not Lord Palmerston? The proof of his agency, if wanted, is given in the change assumed by himself. This is of importance not retrospectively only—it is so prospectively. He covers effectually his own track from the eyes of England, prolongs the delusion in France, and presents himself to Austria and Prussia as a refuge in the time of their trouble; so that, if either of them should either now, or at a future time, look abroad for alliances or support against her, their appeals and suppli-

* The Representatives of the three Powers do not honour the Queen with their presence on the opening of the Session—they are sedulous to wait on Lord Palmerston before the week's end.

cations, as those of Turkey in 1833, will be poured into safe ears, and their waverings or their projects be transmitted by the next messenger to St. Petersburg. One advantage might thence result, and that is his detection. There may be occasion, even at the present moment, for suggesting to one of them, at least, the thought.

To awaken the Parliament, I have trusted to the exposure of the crimes of the Minister. What means are there to awaken the nation, save the exposure of the imbecility of the Parliament. If the Parliament be the cause of these present troubles and of the future desolation of Europe, is that not the fault of the electors? Have they no interest in the fate—no part in the conduct of England? Is it really true that the liberty of England consists, as was said by Rousseau, in the opportunity of selling herself every seventh year? Are not, on the contrary, the Members of Parliament the very slaves of public opinion,—the creatures of every passion, caprice, or frenzy of the hour? No; England may be undone by her Parliament, but her Parliament will have been first undone by herself. England has not attended to essential things; she occupies herself with trifling things. She seeks not what is just, she comprehends not what is useful, she knows not what is lawful. In a word, she is no longer a people; she is a house divided against herself. In each inhabitant the Englishman has perished, and the Whig or Tory lives. Faction itself, the child of error, is the cause—every man who belongs to a party, or who follows a leader, is the criminal.

I therefore conclude these letters by an analysis of the opening debate of the Session, 1847—a session commencing under circumstances of graver danger, external and internal, than perhaps ever before presented themselves. Which exhibits a more disjointed condition of party and faction, a more absolute want of opinions

that have authority, or capacities that can command,—than ever was known before, even at the periods of greatest ease and tranquillity. There are other features so suddenly magnified that they may be called novel—unsettlement of all notion of public right, contradiction among the parties themselves, the Government, and the fractions of the Opposition. Imbecility in regard to the conduct of men, rivals divergency in estimate of principles or understanding of facts.

We have before us Ireland more embarrassing than ever; the indications of a money crisis which gives rise already to prognostications of convulsions parallel to those of 1825-6; in addition to this, there is famine. These necessities for vigorously applying ourselves at once to stop dangers infinitely more alarming from foreign sources, confessedly originating in an interchange of letters between the Foreign Ministers of France and England, which countries, by the confession of an actual Minister, have no grounds of difference beyond those letters—are actually taken for reasons to avoid the subject, and to allow this danger to grow to a head, and to become an accumulation upon the top of all the apprehended evils within, which all the care, efforts, and wisdom of Parliament will do nothing to relieve.

There must be many homely and commonplace persons in the House: to them I appeal as a last resource. Has the emasculating atmosphere of that House left to no man of plain common sense or ordinary business habits the faculty to perceive the dangers that surround us, and the inability of their leaders to deal with them?

Why should they not insist upon the establishment of judicial tribunals to dispose of railway business, and thus escape, among other things, from a toil artfully imposed upon them to disqualify them from attending to any important duty. Then the preservation of each of them—

selves, with England, from the consequences of Ministerial malversation, might make it worth the while of men of the description to which I refer to undertake the task, in a select or secret committee, of investigating the prior conduct of this Minister, from his first entrance into office. When they are in possession of the facts, they will know how to deal with them. This is the only course in case of malversation, public or private, and the penalty of not adopting this course is war with France, England being the aggressor—a war which, as it will have been made without object, so will it be without end, save with this empire's close.

THE DEBATE.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

LORD HATHERTON.—“As he had no authentic information upon anything that had passed upon this subject, (the Spanish marriage,) he should refrain from making a single observation. *If*, on account of the distance of that ill-fated Republic, (Cracow,) it was impossible for other States to interfere for her protection, it *then* became necessary for the honour and general interest of all, that the strongest protest should be made by all that were interested, against this unfortunate act; and he could not entertain a shadow of a doubt that both their Lordships and the other House of Parliament would respond to the general sentiment of the people of this country—abhorrence of an unrighteous act, which they conceived to be *not only* a crime, *but* an evil of the gravest description.” (Hear, hear.)

Was Oregon near? &c. It was not distance, but the state of things with France—yet he fails to regret the state of things with France—and this regret would not be inconsistent with passing no opinion on the causes of that state of things, while it is necessary to make his indigna-

tion at the "crime" coherent.—Thank God! that at least there is one man not afraid to utter the word "crime."

Lord CRAVEN.—Says nothing of anything but famine, and has no regret that things tend to the aggravation of famine by war.

Lord STANLEY.—"The confidence which he for one fully entertained that the general peace will be maintained, he did not altogether found on the cause to which it is ascribed in the speech from the Throne, viz., the state of our relations with Foreign Powers, but on the growing conviction, in this and all other countries, of the impolicy, of the folly, and of the wickedness of war."

"I am sure that for a commercial nation like this, powerful as it may be, or capable of the greatest exertions in time of war, peace is not only desirable, but almost necessary for its existence. I cannot say that I look with satisfaction, &c."

War for justice or self-defence is called wicked! and classed with the piracies of the day!

If "peace" be "almost necessary" even for "bare existence," it is impossible that we should be "capable of the greatest exertions in time of war," and equally impossible that we should go to war for right, honour, and justice. We could only fight for "bare existence," and the struggle would be

a brief frenzy alone. Such language, coming from one who leads a number of men professing to restore the tone and character of England, presents to those who do know by what thoughts nations can be restored, and only have been, a sight as painful as the forebodings are melancholy to which it gives rise. To present the defence of hearth and home, and the assault upon hearth and home, as one and the same idea, is to extinguish, not restore, the sense of right and wrong—is to spread, not cure, judicial blindness. If war is so terrible for England that she

can barely exist through it, there is a chance that in the next war she may perish. Yet that war is acknowledged to be in prospect only through the matters which England is at present treating with France and other powers, *i. e.* the acts and conduct of her Foreign Minister. Lord Stanley has pointed to the conduct of that man as distinct from the general words "policy," "England," and the like; he has evinced suspicions of him—how, then, can he not see, that the calling to account that Minister is the means by which that war which he so much dreads is to be averted; for, if there be in France a purpose really hostile, then is there a *de facto* concurrence between France and the Northern Powers to put England down. Such a confederacy would wear no mask,—such a purpose no cloak could cover. The cause, then, of the embroilment is not on the side of France, and herein lies our safety, if we know how to use it.

"My Lords, I must say, I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at much that appears in the tone of that correspondence: recriminations—charges of suppression and interpolations."

The chief of Lord Palmerston's communications have been issued by the press. This was the important matter to have observed—here was the key of the proceedings. The fact was not doubtful; the out-

rage was unparalleled. The animosity of the two countries was the result. And not to notice, in censuring Lord Palmerston, or in stating the case, his connection with the press,* or the language of that press which officially represented the Government, was the part not of a judge, but of an advocate or a partisan. He has made a quarrel out of the Montpensier affair, not by the correspondence itself,

* It is not only in London that this game is carried on; Lord Normanby avowedly communicates at Paris with the Opposition journals—furnishes them facts and arguments, and sends the Secretary of Embassy and the Attachés to their offices.

but by envenoming feeling, through the press, before the correspondence appeared.

“ I read these statements with pain, not only on account of the statesmen themselves, but because it has led to a result in the measure adopted by France, which, in the manner in which it has been carried out, has affixed on this country a slight and a discourtesy, which, to say the least of it, should not have been offered. (Hear, hear.) I must regret also that this *misfortune* attending on the Noble Viscount at the head of Foreign Affairs has not stood singly or alone ; for I cannot but think that the unfortunate alteration in the tone of the communications between the two Governments of England and France has had something to do with another measure against which we are told that her Majesty’s Government have entered their Protest—a late and unavailing Protest.”

“ I am not sure that there is not good ground for showing that, on the footing of precedents, of the example of former treaties, and of this very Treaty of Vienna, the violation of the stipulations of an *original* treaty, which is incorporated in a *subsequent* treaty, provided the assent of the *three parties*

If the Spanish marriages and the confiscation of Cracow have their parts duly assigned to them in the Queen’s Speech—silence on the one, and anger on the other—then, on that showing alone, should the protest have *not* been late and unavailing. The minor grievance should have yielded to the graver, and France and England heartily joined.

What could any man do beyond expressing a doubt on the gravest of questions—the law of treaties? What can be said when a man like Lord Stanley could admit a doubt on such a point? Supposing that he was prepared to submit to such an act, that he should now, as once before, say, “ I dare

to the *original agreement be obtained*, is not or cannot be held or deemed a violation of the subsequent treaty with which it is incorporated. I DO NOT WISH TO EXPRESS MY OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT."

treaty. The discovery reserved for the 60th century of the world's existence ought surely to be taken as a basis to to which all things have to be adjusted, if it be supposed to be applied to any. The Treaty of Vienna includes the separate acts—they form part of it—the separate acts are doubtless signed by the separate powers. They are thus made doubly sacred by the addition of the OATH by those parties who alone were placed in a position directly to violate them. Treaties are in the name of the HOLY TRINITY—they are sworn to.—What can one say?

"I do not pretend to deny that the altering of an act agreed upon by the three Powers, and entered into between themselves, but *under the auspices* of England, without taking any step to communicate *their intention* of making such a change to the Powers under whose auspices the act was effected, is not among nations a slight discourtesy; and such a one as would not have been attempted if it had been understood that

any man in this house to pronounce the word *war*," it would be melancholy but intelligible. But it passes belief that a man should be found in England even yet, and that man Lord Stanley, who could entertain a doubt on the binding power of a

The relations with Foreign Powers disquiet Lord Stanley on the score of war, or would disquiet him were it not from the growing good sense of nations and the increasing horror for war. He is sure that there is no violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, and doubts there being any of that of Vienna. All he is sure of is, that Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France are all guilty of *discourtesy* towards England. This results from the

France and England were still on the same cordial footing as formerly."

correspondence ; it has produced all the evil. The one or the other Minister is guilty. He says that up to

the entrance of Lord Palmerston into office, though M. Guizot was Minister, no such discourtesies had to be suffered ; and he denies the grounds (in the Treaty of Utrecht) on which Lord Palmerston assailed M. Guizot. If, then, any conclusion is to be extracted, it is that *the "discourtesies" of the four Powers have been brought on England by Lord Palmerston.*

"I now approach a subject more interesting to the well being of this country than *any thing* connected with Foreign Policy."

Any thing! Treason?—War? No, my Lord: the first note of war would thrill the heart of this nation with deeper throbs than all the famine that as yet has fallen

on us. It would *cost* more, disturb *trade* more, and destroy more *living bodies*.—If successful, double the national debt, and if unsuccessful——! This danger, too, is in prospect merely by your neglect ;—those *greater* evils, that you fear, are the result of your activity. What evil is there in England to-day that has not been brought by parliamentary interference, opinions, speeches, and laws? You have proved sufficiently your inability to remedy internal evils by your industry, and your willingness to suffer the growth of external danger by your neglect, and now you make the necessity for that activity a plea for that neglect. Yet Lord Stanley's speech is a relief when contrasted with the chaos amidst which it stands. And this is the more remarkable, for Lord Stanley does not appear, in taking his stand in opposition to faction, on the same line as the glorious array of witnesses to truth and protesters against evil, from Sir William Temple to Burke, who none of them belonged to faction, or arrayed

themselves under the banners of a party. Lord Stanley has belonged to both the factions. He must be therefore considered as undergoing a change; and each step made is not to be looked at in itself, except as a promise for the future.

Lord LANSDOWNE.— A valuable record against Lord Palmerston's future attempts to prove that in all fields we are at this moment in a state of unmanageable collision and entanglement with France. Lord Lansdowne says nothing about Cracow, but if what he said before is true, how can it be true what Lord Palmerston says in the Chronicle, that France is in collusion with the Northern Powers?

"They had carried into effect the principles laid down by their predecessors" [many and cordial expressions about his hope of restored harmony.] "But even in the present case, and after what had happened, and to which their Lordships could not shut their eyes when the correspondence was produced that arose out of these circumstances, there was nothing to prevent a perfect understanding with France, where the interests of the two countries were involved."

Lord BROUGHAM.—"Not connected with Party he might say certain things that it would be wholesome for the people to hear." He says the people do not care a straw about the Spanish marriages. To prove the people wrong he alludes to Philip the 5th and William III. "our great deliverer," who was wisely awake on these things, and yet could not get the people to care. There is a parallel established—quite to Lord Palmerston's taste—for William III. acted, for the first time in England, without the concurrence or knowledge of Parliament, and thus commenced the system of secret wars, Cabinet irresponsibility, financial mystery and debt. The struggle of William III. was

to circumvent the watchfulness of his people, Lord Palmerston's merely to manage his colleagues. He thus classes Viscount Palmerston with "the counsels of Godolphin, and the wisdom of Somers;" and the danger at the two epochs from similar causes in the same category. The parallel holds; William III. projected a partition of the Spanish monarchy, his chief object being to embroil England in war, that his own title, crime, might not be too curiously enquired into. Lord Palmerston has made THE PARTITION OF THE SPANISH PRINCESSES a means of embroiling us, for this, among other reasons, that his crimes may escape detection and punishment.

"He asked, therefore, how was it possible for any Minister to fix public attention in the present day on what was called the Montpensier marriage?"

As if it was the duty, however onerous, of the Minister, to try to do so. Just as one might have asked about the nation's indifference to Circassia and the Vixen. But what was im-

possible in a good cause *against* Lord Palmerston is proved to be possible by Lord Palmerston in a bad one.

"He did not agree with his Noble Friend opposite that his Noble Friend near him differed with the Foreign policy of the present Government; for the policy was the same of this as of the previous Government, as it must be of all Governments in this country, namely, to maintain by all possible means—that was, by all honourable means—

The French Government hold the policy of the two administrations to be different. So does the present opposition in England. The results are different; the processes are different. The late administration did not call Louis Philippe an usurper—did not excite the French people to revolt—did not incite France to revolutionize Italy or Ger-

to secure the maintenance of peaceful relations between our most illustrious and gracious Sovereign and the Sovereigns of all other States, and, above all, with the neighbouring kingdom.” many. The former administration did not consider the marriage of a French Prince and a Spanish Infanta to be a violation of the treaty of Utrecht—and did not violate the compact which itself had made, of which that marriage

was a part. It is out of these things that have come the present sudden embarrassments. These constitute the contrast between Lord Palmerston and his predecessors—these constitute the case of delinquency against him. Oh! says Lord Brougham, there is no difference—therefore none of these things exist. The policy of the two administrations is the same, because it *must* be the same; and it must be the same because it is right. Therefore those things that did not exist because they were wrong do exist when there is “no difference;” and the late Administration did all that the present Minister has done, or the present Minister had done nothing that they did not do. A charge of assault is brought into Court; the Judge says “no assault was committed, because it would be wrong,” and “it is quite right that the assault should be committed—dismiss the case.”

Yet, in one sense, it is true to say that the policy has not changed, since the Tories in coming into office in 1841, accepted the peculiar, and, to them, incomprehensible course, in which Lord Palmerston had involved England. They did not take up any of the stitches he had let down, in respect of Cracow, or the Treaty of Vienna. They did not break that monstrous compact of the 13th of July, 1841, and they placed in Spain the very man whom Lord Palmerston selected to do his work at Paris in 1840, and kept him there despite the knowledge of his actions, in a sense opposed to the views of the Cabinet. There was,

therefore, no change in this sense between the two administrations; and, in the same way, it may be said throughout, there is no difference between England and France, for M. Guizot and Lord Aberdeen, as Lord Brougham himself, have all done what Lord Palmerston would have wished them to do. The number of the fools does not multiply the difficulties of the knave, but, on the contrary, it works for him.

“There is an anxious desire on the other side of the water, that a good understanding should exist in form as well as substance—for it was not *broken in substance*.”

Why then would Lord Palmerston not unite in the Protest about Cracow? Does not he proclaim that Cracow falls because of the misunderstanding? Does he not threaten change of dynasty to France, revolution and war? What *is* substantial friendship, if such discord is shadow? No doubt, Louis Philippe would be glad of any patch to cover the sore, and any shred to conceal the crack. But even such fatal slumber is not now to be allowed to him or to us.

“He regretted that on this question his noble friend, the mover of the address, should have made use of the language he had employed. He expressed his *abhorrence of what had taken place, and spoke of it as a crime*. Now, he (Lord Brougham) *thought this dangerous language*, unless they meant to go further.

[Lord Hatherton. — ‘The French Minister had already said the same thing.’] Then he said very wrong. (A laugh.) This happened to be

Why then would Lord Palmerston not unite in the Protest about Cracow? Does not he proclaim that Cracow falls because of the misunderstanding? Does he not threaten change of dynasty to France, revolution and war?

“What, sir! do you call stabbing a man *murder*? It is most improper.”—“Why, sir, we *saw* it done!” “It must *not* be called murder; for we do not intend to call in the police. Be consistent, and, mark me, young man, *ever square your principles to your misconduct*; the contrary is indecent.”

the subject, of all others, on which the public mind was most excited and exasperated, in consequence of its bearings upon the fate of Poland; and he thought it was not right to use such strong expressions when they were not prepared to go further. To say to a foreign state, 'You have committed a crime which we abhor; your conduct is an infraction of a treaty which you were bound to keep sacred,' was language that ought not to be employed unless *they were prepared to follow it up with important consequences.*"

"A Government, however, was not only at liberty, *but on certain occasions was bound to enter a protest against the conduct of other states, and he thought that*

on the present occasion the speech from the throne did enter a protest, strongly indeed expressed, but not indecently strong, *not dangerously strong, not a protest which either Russia, or Austria, or Prussia, had a right to complain of.*"

"Austria, with the assent of the other Powers, had chosen to act behind the backs of the other parties to the Treaty."

The passage upon the qualities of a Protest, which proceeds from the mouth of an ex-Chancellor, belongs to the burlesque.

Lord Brougham was wont, at the opening of sessions, while Poland still lived, to thunder denunciations against the Lord of the Baskirs and the King of the Calmucks: his bolts are now no longer for the Czar, but for his tools and victims. The instrument is now the principal, and the dupe has to pay the penalty.

LORD FITZWILLIAM.—Only speaks of Ireland, and only of the food question there.

MARQUESS OF WESTMEATH.—Ditto.

THE EARL OF RODEN.—Ditto.

LORD HARDWICK.—Ditto.

And the debate ends in a conversation about what night this or that Irish or food question should be discussed.

DEBATE IN THE COMMONS.

I shall here content myself with a mere summary, as the nonsense that was said refutes itself.

Mr. HUME gave notice that on this day week he would call the attention of the House to the violation of the Treaty of Vienna, by the seizure of Cracow, with a view to suspend the payment of £100,000 annually to the Emperor of Russia, on condition that he would maintain the articles of the Treaty of Vienna.

Mr. HOWARD.—“The confiscation of Cracow is a violation of the sanctity of treaties.”

Mr. RICARDO.—Not a word on the subject.

Mr. SMITH O'BRIEN, Mr. SCROPE, Mr. LABOUCHERE, Mr. GRATTAN, Mr. B. OSBORNE, Mr. D. BROWNE.—Ditto.

Lord G. BENTINCK is “at a loss to understand how we “now see a manifest violation of the Treaty of Vienna. It “is *only* an infraction of one of the seventeen *supplementary* articles, which the Minister of this country never “signed *in chief*.” “If the Treaty of Vienna is violated “now, so had it been before:—and those who had done it “now were three of the most powerful sovereigns, oldest “allies, and natural friends of England. It was the best “thing that could have happened to Cracow. The city had “been illuminated.” “He” (entirely differing with Lord Stanley) “was glad that Lord Palmerston no longer “placed the Treaty of Utrecht as a bar to the Montpensier marriage:”—“did not believe the people of England “took any interest in that marriage.”

Mr. ROEBUCK.—“The complete answer to the Noble

“ Lord’s Protest was that the Treaty of Utrecht was no
 “ longer binding on any of the Powers of Europe, and that
 “ the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier had nothing to
 “ do with that treaty. He took it that all writers on inter-
 “ national law laid down that a war annulled a treaty
 “ unless it were subsequently *seriatim* revived.”

He has no international law for this Treaty of Vienna.

Sir R. INGLIS.—“ Lord Palmerston would not carry the
 “ people of England with him if he made the Treaty of
 “ Utrecht the ground of a war. That Treaty was at this
 “ moment just as just a ground of appeal as at any period
 “ since it was signed ; FOR it was referred to on the part of
 “ our Government within *these two years*, and recognized
 “ then as a sufficient ground of diplomatic appeal. So far
 “ as the good faith of treaties was concerned, the Treaty of
 “ Utrecht had been violated. He did not think it expe-
 “ dient that the peace of Europe should have been risked,
 “ and that cordial good understanding, expressed in two
 “ words by our neighbours, perhaps be for ever lost, by
 “ *any refinement* or by a *reference however just to a treaty*
 “ *however clear*, when the event contemplated was neces-
 “ sarily so remote. We were wrong to place such a stress
 “ on that treaty as to endanger the peace of Europe.”

Lord J. MANNERS speaks of the Spanish marriages, to introduce a personal explanation relative to the Conde de Montemolino — not one word either of Cracow, the Treaty of Vienna, or the quarrel with France.

Lord J. RUSSELL.—“ There is so little difference upon
 “ it (the extinction of Cracow) in this House (!) or indeed
 “ any where, that I really feel it unnecessary to *say* more
 “ than that it seems that the fatal policy which originally
 “ led to the partition of Poland—that unholy act, which
 “ is perhaps the most to be condemned of any act of mo-
 “ dern times, seems to have induced the Powers who have
 “ been parties to the incorporation of Cracow, to forget all

“ their obligations, and to act without any justifiable motive, and without considering the relations they were bound to have observed.”

Except the mover of the Address in the one House, and the seconder in the other, all were agreed, indeed, but it was that Cracow should be confiscated. Lord J. Russell assumes the unanimity to be the other way, or the sentence that follows is nonsense : if not nonsense, the statement is untrue.

This is the Prime Minister of England—the responsible head of the Government that has brought about the last extinction of Poland, and who for eighteen years has given his service as a subordinate member of the Cabinet, and to his colleagues, in stopping debates on Cracow or Poland, in causing motions to be withdrawn, and in counting out the House.

Mr. D'ISRAELI. —“ There had been no violation of either of those treaties, and it was merely a subject for international law.” ! “ He would look *merely* to the legal merits of the question.” “ That Lord Palmerston should have authorized the solemn announcement in Her Majesty's speech was one of the most surprising incidents in diplomacy” !

The “ legal merits” of the case, as expounded at large by Mr. D'Israeli, seem to have had an apt scholar in Lord George Bentinck, and a consenting listener in Lord Stanley. It is singular to see the sanction given to them by Sir Robert Peel ; and there can be no doubt of the gratification of Lord Palmerston in beholding such concurrence in originalities and in forgetfulness. Thus, notwithstanding all minor differences, all parties are agreed in essentials, that is, how the plainest facts can be distorted, and the clearest obligations set at nought.

SIR ROBERT PEEL. —“ *There may be truth* in the statements and observations of the Hon. gentleman (Mr.

“ D’Israeli), *but still* there was *an inkling* of that public
 “ assurance which was given to Europe, at the period
 “ when the settlement of its affairs took place, and when
 “ that settlement was confirmed by the treaty of Vienna
 “ —an assurance as binding as any formal notification
 “ could be, that that last remnant of Polish independence
 “ should be scrupulously respected, and that Cracow
 “ should never, by any act of the combined Powers, be
 “ reduced to that condition in which we have at this mo-
 “ ment to consider it.”

The new doctrines on international law afford the Foreign Minister the opportunity of coming forward to repudiate them, to assert the binding power of treaties, and to deny Mr. D’Israeli’s alleged cases of prior violation, but he only establishes the validity of treaty stipulations to deny its effects.

LORD PALMERSTON.—“ Now, there was no general
 “ guarantee entered into between the parties to that treaty,
 “ and there was no obligation on the parties to the treaty
 “ to take active measures to enforce any particular stipu-
 “ lation of the treaty. Though they were authorized, they
 “ were not compelled to do so.”

The violation of a treaty thus only confers a new right, that of doing or not doing yourself or *others* justice. You have at your option now to go to war with one state and to be at peace with another, both standing to England in exactly similar positions ; or you may go to war with France about the Treaty of Utrecht, and be on good terms with Russia, despite the Treaty of Vienna. You may even have her your ally, having broken every bond with you, to punish another for the presumed infraction of a compact that is defunct. The door is thrown wide to every caprice, and this by a Minister of England in Parliament. How dares he raise even such questions ? and these words are introduced under the pretext of refuting propositions, too absurd

to be called profligate, and too imbecile to be designated vicious. He who has to be put on his trial for causing the extinction of Cracow, is lecturing the House on the faith of treaties! He is reproving those who are inventing cloaks for their own shame, because of his acts! If the occasion was presented to him by chance, and not secured by management, then indeed does he add the fortune of a Sylla to the merit of a Sejanus.

Now as to the Treaty of Utrecht. The marriage of the Spanish Princess was no ground for appealing to any Treaty or to any Renunciation. Whatever the stipulation of that Treaty in respect to the succession of her issue, it could afford no grounds for protesting against the act of marriage. The question for the House, therefore, was one of his unwarrantable interference, by a procedure which, independently of all effect upon the feelings of the two nations, grievously compromises England, both at present and for the future; and which step, even if justifiable in itself, could only have been taken with and by the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown. The question, therefore, was, either a Bill of Indemnity, or an Impeachment. The merits of the case could not so much as come to be discussed. There was no ground for the interference. There was not a case provided for by the Treaty—there was consequently no violation of the Treaty by the marriage of the Infanta. There was, as I have shown before, no such Treaty in existence; and if that Treaty had existed, and if it contained a stipulation respecting the marriage of the two families, and if the present marriage had been a flagrant violation of such stipulation, then was it requisite for the Minister to have presented the case to the Law Officers of the Crown; and then to have appealed to the other parties to the Treaty of Utrecht, to obtain their sanction and concurrence; only then could there have been an occasion for a Protest, and only thus could a Protest have been legally made.

There was no difficulty as to time ; for months, nay years, the proposition had been before and between the Governments. It was then for the Parliament, whatever it thought upon the subject, if it intended to proceed accordingly to Parliamentary ways, either to call the Minister to account for what he had done, or to shield him from the future consequences of his act. But as forms were set aside by the Minister, so were they set aside by the House.

Lord Palmerston opens the subject by contradicting and explaining away impressions respecting the part which her Majesty's Government had made the Treaty of Utrecht to play, and he "wishes it to be clearly understood that there is not anything in the Treaty that forbids marriages—the *ground* of his *Protest* was, *that the Treaty of Utrecht disabled* the issue of such a marriage from succeeding to the Spanish throne." Thus, he protests on the Treaty against the marriage, because of the exclusion of the issue, while he declares that the Treaty has no clause which forbids the marriage. But a protest can only be made on the violation of a right or of a stipulation. The Protest being inapplicable to the case, he explains the contradiction, by—the contradiction itself!

To answer, as it has been answered already, by shewing that such marriages had taken place before, would have been, for a less practised hand, sufficient. But he turns round and adopts the answer as an argument—as negligent Ministers of England in the last century did not do their duty, is it no bar against, but a reason for the watchful Minister of England to-day, doing his? Opportunely leaving out of sight that the failing to protest on the part of a Minister is a bar to the subsequent exercise of its right by the nation. "Though precedents may serve for the interpretation of doubtful and ambiguous speculations, *they*

never can set aside stipulations which, like those of the Treaty of Utrecht, are clear, positive, and incapable of being misunderstood; and the omissions of Governments in the last century, cannot bar the treaty rights of Governments in the present day.”—It was thus M. Guizot's catalogue of former marriages was disposed of.

It has been shown that the Treaty of Utrecht is not even any longer in existence, that is, he has been found out on that point. He answers (in the House) “I wish it *clearly* to be understood that there is nothing in the Treaty of Utrecht which forbids the two marriages.” His is the cost and care of enlightening the public respecting the false conclusions upon the Treaty of Utrecht, which his Notes, his Despatches, and his Protests had produced. The British public is not very reprehensible for original ideas upon such subjects.

But while he abandons the Treaty of Utrecht, he holds to it. It is not “on the Treaty of Utrecht” that he now takes his stand, but “on the renunciations of the Treaty of Utrecht.” What means “renunciations of the Treaty of Utrecht”? If the treaty is gone *quoad* England the renunciations are gone too. If the treaty is not gone, then, the renunciations, being a part of the treaty, it is on the treaty that he must take his stand. It is either the treaty or it is not the treaty—and he answers that he wishes it to be “clearly understood” that—it is *not* the treaty, and—that it is the treaty.

But this is not a mere play of wit and fancy in the House. It is didactic—but it is also descriptive and historical. He is summing up what has gone before. He is not explaining his last view of a question, but he is justifying public and formal steps taken. That description is the reverse of what he has done—and that justification is its completest censure. How could he say to Parliament that it was

not on the Treaty of Utrecht that he took his stand until he had said so to M. Guizot, and until he had requested M. Guizot, and Lord Normanby, as upon another occasion, to correct, according to his most recent emendation, the original and the copy in the two offices.*

I now place side by side his words in the House of Commons and an extract or two from his Notes to the French Government, and I shall there leave the matter, for the present, to the candour of the Minister and the discrimination of the House. Before doing so, let me recall the fact, that the official organ of the Government, on the intelligence of the confiscation of Cracow, placed side by side that act and the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier, making, however, a difference, in calling the latter a "Violation," while designating the other only an "Infringement." Let it also be remembered, that there was a second ground taken for protesting against the Montpensier marriage, which was, that the close alliance which would result between the Crowns of Spain and France would endanger "*the balance of power in Europe*,"—he saw no danger to the balance of power from a confederacy of three despotic and military monarchies to take possession of an independent state.

WORDS IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS.

"I wish it to be clearly understood that the ground taken by Government is not that there was anything in the Treaty of Utrecht which

NOTES TO PARIS.

"*That renunciation was embodied in the Treaty of Utrecht, and thereby was made binding on France, and became part of the public law of Europe.*

* "I have to instruct your Excellency to correct this error of *punctuation* in the original despatch in the archives of your Embassy; and perhaps M. Guizot will have the goodness to do the same by the copy which was delivered to him."—*Lord Palmerston to Lord Normanby, 8th January.*

This is the answer to M. Guizot's charge of falsely quoting his words.

forbade marriages between the royal families of the two countries. The ground taken is this:—That the Renunciations of the Treaty of Utrecht, and the laws by which they were sanctioned, prevent the succession to the Crown of Spain of any descendant of the Duke of Orleans.”

“It is on the definitive conditions of that peace that her Majesty’s Government, in this discussion, have taken their stand; and it is *“the letter and the spirit”* of that Treaty of which they deem themselves entitled to claim the faithful observance.”

And was he not ostentatious of this plea for keeping separate from France in protesting about Cracow—with this plea did he not make the press to ring—That France, just violating the Treaty of Utrecht, was unworthy to be permitted a place by the side of England in vindicating that of Vienna?

The melancholy conclusion is, that Parliament is no longer a court fitted to inquire into grave matters. In the present instance it is clearly not the examination of a case, but we have a nation placed in circumstances with which it dares not deal. It has just enough of sense and morality left to pervert reason and misrepresent facts, in order that it may not be troubled at the sight of its own baseness, or disturbed by the forecast of its own danger.

Burke said that experience of the House of Commons had extinguished in him two of the most active impulses of the human breast—surprise and indignation. He witnessed only the practice of evil, for profit—not the endurance of wrong; not the justification of outrage; not the invitation of enmity; not the shrieking of false avowals of cowardice and weakness; not the masking from themselves the treachery of which they are the victims; not the invocation of ruin.

These things had he lived to see, save that, had he lived, they could not have been—then indeed would this nation have acquired what it seems to have lost, surprise for inexplicable acts and indignation for wicked men.

I remain, &c.

January 22, 1847.

P.S. The number of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, which has just come out, contains a singular piece of intelligence, which shows that it is noways the intention of the three Powers that the general heedlessness shall not bear for them its natural fruit. The crime that has been perpetrated at Cracow is to be repeated at Bucharest. If treaties serve so little where so formally made, and with such an array of power to support them, what will avail mere law of God and nations, mere duty of self-defence, mere honour and justice? Cracow has been confiscated with impunity only; to strip the Ottoman Empire will be, in the new morals and maxims of the two Houses of Parliament, a worthy service rendered to the cause of Christianity, civilization, general philanthropy, and universal peace:—

“Some time before the declaration of the great Powers on the subject of Cracow, the Russian Consul at Bucharest had communicated to the Sublime Porte all the disquietude which the situation of those provinces caused to his Government. He had piously pointed out the progress of communism and of irreligion among the Bayards, and conjured the Porte to interfere, under the now too famous pretext, that regular States could not suffer so near them a focus of revolution. We recall this fact, which is too little known, and which throws light upon the affair of Cracow.”

APPENDIX.

THE CASTLEREAGH CORRESPONDENCE.

SIR,—A series of extraordinary diplomatic revelations is now appearing in the *Times*, recalling those which formerly were published in the *Portfolio*. In them are revealed, under new circumstances, and with curious incidents, the pretensions and the ambition of Russia, and the strenuous and able, yet insufficient and unsuccessful, efforts of a British Minister to resist her. These documents have partly been communicated to other Courts,* but, as in the *Portfolio*, no explanation is given of whence they proceed, a letter from the present Marquess of Londonderry in to-day's *Times*, proves that they do not proceed from the family or friends of the deceased statesman. It is not easy to imagine how they should get into the possession of any one except the two Cabinets. There was no captured city in which they were found, as on the two previous occasions of the publication of secret diplomatic documents, captured at Warsaw and Dresden. How these documents have seen the light becomes an enigma, of which it would be very desirable to obtain the solution. The least improbable solution is, perhaps, that they have come from the Foreign Office. "What!" it will be said, "Lord Palmerston publishing documents exposing Russia!" If it be so, it is nothing new. Suppose that some suspicion be

* In 1826 Baron Sagern, one of the veterans of the Congress of Vienna, published very copious extracts from it, in a work entitled "Mein Antheil; an der Politik." The same extracts have been transferred into the first supplementary volume (published in 1839) of "Marten's Recueil;" the extracts having been done into French by Gentz.

awakened in the mind of a colleague, he must do something to counteract it. The suspicion is whispered—the ready answer is now furnished, “*Don’t you know that it was Lord Palmerston who gave that correspondence to the Times?*” At all events, that was the object of publications against Russia which issued from the press in 1835 and 1836, under official sanction. He had been by myself, to his Sovereign, charged with serving the interests of a foreign power. By sanctioning those publications, and by furnishing from the Foreign Office documents against Russia, I, in common with others, was induced to surrender my suspicions. It was then that the “*Progress of Russia in the East,*” by the British Envoy in Persia appeared. It was then that the *Portfolio* came forth week by week. It was then that the whole press of England and partly of Europe was moved under his direction to arouse and combine a confederacy against Russia. When he had thus recovered his Ministerial position, and strengthened himself by the belief of his profound Russian antipathies, then did he turn round and do exactly the reverse of all that had been urged in these publications. It was by assuming on that occasion the guise of hostility to Russia, one of the forms of which was the publication of secret diplomatic documents against her, that he calmed suspicions in the very highest quarter, maintained his ground in Parliament, and was enabled to continue his services to her as heretofore. If to-day he has recourse to a similar expedient, I conclude that he has been placed under a similar necessity. I trust, however, that this intimation of its purpose, if indeed the fact is so, will prevent its effect.

I remain, Sir, &c.

January 7th.

SIR,—I am induced to address you a second time on the subject of Lord Castlereagh’s Despatches, in consequence of finding that, as indeed I anticipated, it is represented in the diplomatic circles in London that it is I who have communicated

those despatches to the *Times*. I formally deny this statement. It is also said that these despatches were taken by the Poles at Warsaw, and that thus they had come into my possession. This statement is absolutely false as to the second point, and, to the best of my belief, false as to the first. It is further said, that they could not have come from Lord Palmerston, since the documents published in the *Times* have been collated in the Foreign Office, with the originals, and found not to be in all respects verbally accurate. I need not comment on such an argument, intended only for *la petite diplomatie*. These shifts, I contend, substantiate in no ordinary degree my letter addressed to you on the 7th.

It is singular that on the day on which that letter appeared, fortunately postponed to the 9th, the *Times* objecting to Lord Londonderry's claims to control the publication of these documents, asserted the property of them to be vested solely in the two Cabinets, and threatened *him* with a prohibitory ukase from St. Petersburg, in case of his presuming to publish them, leaving it, of course, to be inferred, that if no injunction from the Court of Chancery interfered with *their* publication, it was not without the sanction of the Foreign Office.

The documents were in his charge—the publication it was his duty to inhibit. He could not have suffered it unless it were his own act. They were public property indeed, but secret in their nature, and were possessed by him alone.

The publication of these documents was an evidence that the letters on the Montpensier marriage had not remained without effect; the circulation of these rumours is an evidence that the explanation afforded in my letter of the 7th has baffled the attempt to counteract that effect. I had shown that out of this Montpensier marriage a fictitious quarrel was made with France in order to enable Russia to proceed to the confiscation of Cracow:—Lord Palmerston parries the thrust by publishing documents hostile to Russia, for it to be said, "How could the man that is thus acting against her be in secret connivance with her"? I show that this is the reason for which the documents are published. I myself am charged with publishing

them. This is whispered in order that it may produce its effect secretly :—I again take out the sting by publishing it, and proving its falsehood. Can there be a doubt as to whence the documents proceed, as to the purpose for which they were published, and therefore, of the truth of the original charge which they were intended to invalidate?

It has only been this morning that my attention has been called to an article in the *Times* of the 5th, which contains another and still more remarkable confirmation. There is there quoted a passage from a memorandum of Count Pozzo di Borgo to his own Government in 1814. This document was surely not communicated by the Russian to the English Government. The *Times* gives no explanation of how it came into their possession, but quotes it as if it had a library of the like at its disposal. I am not unacquainted with this document, which belongs to a set placed in Lord Palmerston's hands fourteen years ago. That one, was in a certain degree separated from the set, but I cannot doubt that he had communication of it together with the others. He did not come into the possession of them by any desire or search of his own, they were pressed upon them. That memorandum it is indeed barely possible might have been communicated by another individual. Against that bare possibility is to be weighed the probability of its use by Lord Palmerston, concurrently with the others.

My allegations that these documents proceed from the Foreign Office has been followed, not by those steps which would have been taken had it been false, but by those which were to be anticipated if true. If it was worth while to give out to the Foreign Ministers that the clerks in the Foreign Office did not find the copies to be correct, it was surely worth while to insert a line of contradiction in the Government organ to clear it from the injurious imputation; for it was a stab in the dark to an ally, an indecent use of public property for a perfidious purpose. The organs of Lord Palmerston, whether official or non-official, have indeed used denials in a manner which deprives them considerably of their worth; but

in this case to have denied the fact, would have been to have placed himself in the dilemma of losing altogether the effect for which they were published, or of obtaining it with the drawback of an additional falsehood.

Jam intelliges multo me vigilare acrius ad salutem, quam te ad perniciem, reipublicæ.

I remain, Sir, &c.

January 11.

THE END.

Urquhart, David

Europe at the opening of the session of 1847, the spanish marriages, and
the confiscation of Cracow

London 1847

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